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Distinction in Poland. Testing elements of the Bourdieuian theory of class.

Piotr Marzec

“A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, submitted in April 2019”

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Abstract

The thesis aims to address the gap in the class research on Poland by offering a comprehensive investigation of the class divisions and their relation to cultural divisions and hierarchies as seen from the Bourdieusian perspective. Poland is taken to be an interesting case in the Bourdieusian approach, due to its state-socialist history, very different from Western European societies studied so far. The importance of this historical context is carefully considered in order to answer the question about the best way of investigating the class structure of Poland, in the thesis understood as social space. The historical part of the thesis is meant to generate hypotheses on the possible shape and logic of the Polish social space. In the empirical part of the thesis, the Polish social space is constructed on the basis of indicators of economic and cultural capital with the use of multiple correspondence analysis. The second goal of the thesis is an exploration of the contemporary cultural hierarchies in Poland at the backdrop of the key debates in cultural sociology, most importantly, the *cultural omnivorousness thesis*. The patterns of cultural consumption and elements of lifestyle differentiation are examined through the construction of the space of lifestyles/symbolic space, another key element of the Bourdieusian theory of class. In the final step the relationship between the constructed social and symbolic spaces is investigated to determine whether a *homology* between the spaces could be found.

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Author's declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's *Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes* and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: Piotr Marzec. DATE: 29.04.2019

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Introduction

Over the last forty years the sociology of class has been dominated by two theoretical perspectives and related research programmes. Firstly, there has been the influential neo-Marxist approach developed by American sociologist Erik Olin Wright. Secondly, a neo-Weberian perspective, known as the Nuffield School and developed by John Goldthorpe and his colleagues, emerged in the UK at the turn of the 1980s. For years these two perspectives competed for dominance in the field of class studies and the title of the most accurate and effective way to measure and study class divisions. Sometime in the late 1980s and the early 1990s the Nuffield School started outpacing the neo-Marxist approach, and eventually emerged – judging by its uptake by others across social sciences – as the winner of this competition. For a moment it seemed that the question of the ultimate approach to class analysis was settled. However, the world was rapidly changing due to a set of economic and social processes, such as the growth of services in the economy at the expense of heavy industry, leading to a profound change in class structures, namely a shrinking working class and an expanding middle class. This resulted in the emergence of new challenges for class analysis in general. There was a lot of talk of ‘the death of class’ (Pakulski and Waters, 1996), and class was declared to be a ‘zombie category’ (Beck, 1992), a ghost from the past haunting sociology simply due to the institutional inertia of the discipline.

The new era of ‘reflexivity’ and ‘individualisation’ was announced (Bauman, 2000; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991). In this new reflexive or liquid modernity people were said to be largely freed from the constraints of traditional social institutions, class included, and reflexively constructing their biographies and identities on their own. This perspective became very influential, and it seemed that this new intellectual mood was especially damaging for class analysis. Such was the impact of anti-class critique that John Goldthorpe and his colleague Gordon Marshall (1992) decided to face it head on. They declared that, contrary to the claims of the critics, class was alive and kicking, and there was no sign of a significant weakening of class divisions. Moreover, the critique was said to be devoid of almost any empirical backing and was thus ill-founded and largely irrelevant. Sociologists of class should, they argued, continue their work without any disruption.

At roughly the same time, however, another group of critics emerged who did not reject the class analysis as such, but who nevertheless found the dominant neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian perspectives wanting. They sought not to refute class analysis, but to *reform* it; not to deny the importance of class but to *rethink* it. Their argument was complex and multifaceted,

but an overriding theme was that the intellectual challenges and developments of the 1980s onwards could not be ignored – class analysis could not continue with ‘business as usual’. The critics of class had rightly foregrounded the importance of culture and consumption for identity and domination, yet Wright and Goldthorpe both dismissed them as irrelevant. Culture needed to be brought back into the sights of class analysis – historically it has always been central, from Weber’s interest in social closure through the Birmingham School’s culturalist brand of Marxism, but Goldthorpe and Wright had muscled it out. This new strand of thought has become known as *cultural class analysis*, and in the quest to reform class analysis its adherents looked for new theoretical inspirations, none more important than the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu.

Cultural class analysis eventually brought elements of Bourdieu’s theory of class into the mainstream sociology of class. However, it took some time to identify what exactly was at the core of Bourdieu’s theory of class and how to deploy these ideas in large-scale quantitative empirical research of the kind pioneered by Goldthorpe and Wright. Initial studies in the UK were mostly qualitative and focussed on a few well-known concepts like cultural capital (Skeggs, 1997; Reay, 1998), yet Bourdieu’s own research as laid out in *Distinction*, his masterwork on class, was based on a theoretically distinct and integrated model of class and underpinned by both qualitative data and analysis of surveys using very specific quantitative techniques. In the US, meanwhile, Bourdieu had some influence on the emergence of the now enormously influential *omnivore thesis*, which held that culture was key to domination insofar as the broad and eclectic tastes of the higher classes are presented as better (more ‘enlightened’ or ‘cultured’) of the more restrictive and popular tastes of lower classes.

Eventually a more rigorous and coherent approach originated in Denmark and Norway. The main advantage over British cultural class analysis and the US omnivore research was the fact that the Scandinavian sociologists conceptualised class structure, with Bourdieu, as a *social space*, that is, a multidimensional space of positions representing different configuration of capital. Not only that, but they followed Bourdieu’s lead in deploying the specific tools of geometric data analysis, especially multiple correspondence analysis, in the service of systematically charting the social space empirically. Moreover, and again with Bourdieu, they understood lifestyles and consumption to be defined *relationally*, forming a space of their own that can be mapped on to the social space, and set about using their tools to chart these structures of difference too. In all cases the finding was the same: confirmation that the social space is, as Bourdieu found for 1970s France, structured according to two principles, capital volume and capital composition, and that the space of lifestyles maps closely on to it. In the process they largely disproved not only the supposed breakdown of the link between cultural

and social hierarchies claimed by advocates of the ‘death of class’ thesis but the omnivore thesis too. Soon similar studies emerged in the UK and Serbia, the only non-Western society with a rather distinct history, in the latter case with somewhat different conclusions.

This thesis aims to apply the Scandinavian version of Bourdieusian class analysis to contemporary Poland. Poland is an interesting case to study because of its specific history, most importantly the state-socialist period. This had profound effects on the shape of the class structure and stratification, something that Bourdieu himself noted, and as such the country is certainly different from the Western societies studied with the Scandinavian approach so far. At the same time it is also different from Serbia, whose path in the last thirty years has been very different from the one Poland has taken. An exploration of a society clearly distinct from the ones studied so far raises important questions regarding the generalisability of the core findings of the Scandinavian tradition and, indeed, of the applicability of Bourdieu’s major insights beyond Western Europe.

The thesis thus aims to answer four main groups of questions:

1. How does the Polish case compare to Western capitalist society in general? Does its political-economic and demographic history and structure make it amenable to the same type of analysis as Denmark, Norway or the UK, i.e. use of the same measures of capital and lifestyles? Or does it diverge so much, like Serbia, that other factors need to be considered? If so, then what would be the local forms of capital of lifestyle differentiation?
2. What exactly is the structure of the Polish social space?
 - a. If Poland *is* largely comparable to the western long-established capitalist societies, is it structured according to the same principles as observed in France and the countries studied more recently, i.e. capital volume and capital principle, or is it structured differently, reflecting the role of local forms of capital? Would the structure of these dimensions be similar to that observed elsewhere, or would some important differences register? What would be the strength of these dimensions relative to each other? Finally, what would be the relationship between the structure of the space and relevant secondary characteristics like gender, age, sector and industry of employment, and, most importantly, occupation?
 - b. If, on the other hand, Poland is a *different* case and requires introducing modified or new forms of capital, how would that translate into the shape of the

space, i.e. how many dimensions might be found and what is the space's structure?

3. What are the patterns of cultural consumption and lifestyle differentiation, that is, what is the structure of the Polish space of lifestyles? How does the Polish case relate to debates in the field of cultural sociology? Is omnivorousness discernible in the structure of the space, or is there a clear opposition between legitimate, well established cultural forms and more popular, less established cultural forms like Bourdieu found? What is the relationship between the structure of the Polish space of lifestyles and important social characteristics, found to be important factors structuring the lifestyle space elsewhere, most important age and gender?
4. What is the relationship between the constructed social space and the space of lifestyles? What is the pattern of the distribution of economic and cultural capitals in this space? Does this pattern allow us to speak of *homology* between the spaces, and if so, how strong is it?

In order to answer these questions, quantitative analysis of nationally representative surveys is used. The social space and the lifestyle space will be constructed with the use of multiple correspondence analysis, their features will be explored and their homology examined with a view to comparing with what has been found elsewhere. I will thus provide some first answers to the most basic questions regarding the Polish case but will also no doubt generate hypotheses to be investigated by more comprehensive future research.

Overview of the thesis

The thesis is divided into two parts, with Chapters 1 to 3 offering an extended introduction and discussion of the core theoretical and methodological aspects of the thesis and Chapters 4 to 7 reporting the findings from the data analysis.

Chapter 1 situates the research by briefly discussing the two major alternative approaches to class research, the neo-Marxist and the neo-Weberian ones, and introducing the reader into the specifics of Bourdieu's theory of class with a view to presenting its advantages. The chapter ends with a presentation of the studies conducted in Denmark, Norway, the UK and Serbia. Chapter 2 is designed to be a detailed introduction into the Polish case. Firstly, it discusses the historical context, that is, the structure of social space during the state socialist period, starting with Bourdieu's idea of the primacy of *social* capital in the form of political capital, which is examined against the available data and findings from the studies conducted by Polish sociologists of class and stratification. Secondly, it examines the nature and the extent of the changes brought by systemic economic transformation, which began with the fall of the state-socialist system, and its ramifications for the shape of the social space. Finally, it presents how post-1989 Polish sociology has approached the issue of class divisions and stratification, focusing especially on the studies deploying Bourdieusian concepts. The theoretical part of the thesis closes with Chapter 3, which discusses in detail the techniques of statistical analysis used in the thesis: multiple correspondence analysis and cluster analysis. Chapter 3 presents these techniques as an integral part of the programme of Bourdieusian class research.

Chapter 4 presents the details of the construction process of the Polish space and reports the findings regarding its structure. It starts with a detailed account of the variables used in the analysis and then presents the structure of the revealed dimensions. In the last section the relationship with secondary characteristics such as gender, sector of employment, age and occupation is discussed.

Chapters 5 to 7 focus on the space of lifestyles. Chapter 5 introduces the reader to the most important debates on contemporary cultural hierarchies and their relation to social hierarchies. The cultural omnivore thesis and its shortcomings are discussed in detail and form the key thread. The findings from the studies directly inspired by Bourdieusian ideas are presented in this context as a way to proceed forward and overcome the limitations of the omnivore thesis. Chapter 6 is structured similarly to Chapter 4, starting with a careful consideration of the available data, their shortcomings and their potential ramifications for the shape of the space of lifestyles. Next, the uncovered dimensions are presented and their

relationship to social characteristics is discussed. The distribution of capitals within the space and the role played by additional structuring factors, such as gender and age, is considered. The key issue of homology between the spaces is addressed in detail. Chapter 7 then delves into the more fine-grained details of the distribution of the cultural practices and preferences in the space by dividing the space into seven separate segments (or clusters) identified by the cluster analysis.

Chapter 8 then summarises the conclusions and findings from earlier chapters and situates them in the backdrop of patterns observed elsewhere. It recapitulates the answers to the research questions posed in the thesis.

Chapter 1: Setting the scene: class analysis in the 21st century and the rise of the Bourdieusian approach

The sociology of class has been long dominated (and to a great extent still is, especially when it comes to large scale empirical investigations) by two perspectives, one developed by the American sociologist Erik Olin Wright, and the other by John Goldthorpe and his collaborators. The latter is known as known as the EGP schema,¹ or alternatively as the Nuffield school (Nuffield College, Oxford has been Goldthorpe's institutional affiliation for most of his career) (Atkinson 2015: 49-50). Each perspective draws its inspiration from one of two great classics of sociology and fathers of the concept of class: Karl Marx in the former case, and Max Weber in the latter. A third approach to class analysis, inspired by the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, has recently gained more recognition, challenging these older perspectives theoretically and empirically.

Neo-Marxist theory of class

Wright undertook the difficult task of reviving Marxist class analysis, and at the same time marrying it to the logic and methods of quantitative survey research. He dropped some of the theoretical mainstays of Marxist reflection on class - most importantly, labour value theory (identified as the main problem with Marxist class research) - but by putting the concept of exploitation at the centre of the theory, retained the spirit of Marx's original formulation. Exploitation explains the nature of the relationship between the exploiters and the exploited: (1) their interests are antagonistic and the welfare of the former depends on the deprivation of the latter; (2) it results from excluding the exploited "from access to certain productive resources" (Wright 2005: 23); and (3) the exploiters achieve material advantage by appropriating "the labour effort of the exploited" (Ibid.). In the final version of the schema, Wright distinguished three dimensions of class differentiation, each producing further divisions (in brackets): property assets (owners vs. non-owners), skill assets (experts, skilled, unskilled) and organizational assets (managers, supervisors, non-management) (Wright 1997: 25). An individual's position in the system of relations of exploitation depends on the combination of these assets. This system is rather complex and involves *contradictory positions*, as for example managers are exploited as non-owners, but at the same time they ensure the efficiency of the

¹ An acronym made of the researchers' names: Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero.

exploitation of workers on behalf of the owners, for which they receive certain rewards, that is, a “loyalty rent” (Atkinson 2015: 34). Crossing these principles of division produces twelve classes in total, three types of owner and nine of employee (Wright 1997: 25). Although the schema was certainly theoretically interesting and it nevertheless fell from grace relatively quickly and ended up being rarely – if ever – used in empirical research, even by its author (Atkinson 2015: 38-39). For this reason, below I present the Bourdieusian approach only on the backdrop of the Nuffield approach.

Neo-Weberian theory of class

The Nuffield school’s approach has been much more successful, and is still, even if recently seriously challenged, the dominant perspective in class research. In the initial formulation, classes were derived from occupations grouped according to their *market situation* (e.g. the source and level of income, conditions of employment) and *work situation* (an occupation’s place in the structure of authority and control in the workplace) (Breen, 2005). These criteria produced a schema consisting of seven classes. The criteria of class differentiation were later modified (though not the shape of the schema itself). The key principle has become “to differentiate positions within labour markets and production units (...) in terms of the employment relations that they entail” (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 37) This boils down to the following detailed criteria. First, relationship to the means of production (owners vs. employees). Second, for employees only, type of relationship with the employer, which could be either a labour contract or a service relationship, dependent on the character of a given job. A labour contract is typically found in occupations for which, on the one hand, work is easy to monitor and the outcome measured in a straightforward way and, on the other, where no expert skills are required and a single employee is not a particularly valuable asset for the company. In such cases a short-term contract is a viable solution. A service relationship characterises positions which are neither easily monitored, and where remuneration on an hourly or piece basis is not possible. Moreover, these are highly skilled positions, often requiring expert knowledge, hence an employee is a valuable asset for the company. Such positions therefore require a long-term relationship between the employee and the employer, and instead of direct monitoring, a system of rewards and incentives built into the position, e.g. a system of pay increases and promotion, which guarantees an employee’s loyalty and efficiency. This theoretical model initially did not entail a component explaining how exactly class operates to cause observable outcomes (e.g. class-based educational inequality), but

Goldthorpe later adopted, similar to Wright, a version of rational choice theory. In this case it was labelled rational action theory (RAT) and it posited that people act rationally in the class situation they found themselves in, considering the resources they have and the constraints they are subjected to.

Pierre Bourdieu's theory of class

The theory of class has been widely acknowledged as playing central role in Bourdieu's social theory. (eg. Swartz 1997, Weininger 2005, Atkinson 2010, Wacquant 2012). However, Bourdieu's work on social class has become an inspiration for class analysis research projects only recently. Weininger has proposed several reasons why this could be the case (Weininger 2005: 82-83).

Firstly, Bourdieu has not followed one particular tradition of class analysis (Marxist, Weberian or Durkheimian) but rather taken only certain elements of the thought of his predecessors. The fact that it is difficult to directly link his account with well-known and understood ways of thinking about social classes makes it harder to situate and comprehend. However, it has to be noticed that this feature is also said to be one of the strongest points in Bourdieu's account (Wacquant 2013). Secondly, in Bourdieu's case one can hardly speak of an explicit theory of classes, because the way he conceived the relationship between theory and empirical sociological research was quite unusual (in comparison to mainstream currents of social research, especially quantitative). Instead of a clear separation, Bourdieu preferred to present his theoretical ideas always in connection with concrete empirical data which means that it is hard to find an explicit formulation of his theory of class. Thirdly, his approach to research has also been specific in methodological terms because of his decisive refutation of 'standard multivariate techniques' and 'linearity' in general (Weininger, 2005). Finally, Weininger points to the rejection of a rational action paradigm, a step that clearly differentiates Bourdieu's approach from that of the Nuffield school, as well as that of Erik Olin Wright. The reason for this, however, could be a trivial one; namely, the "lazy reading" of Bourdieu leading to miscomprehension and misunderstanding of his concepts, class included (Atkinson 2010: 47).

Although these problems indeed complicated and delayed incorporation of Bourdieu's ideas into mainstream research on class, at the beginning of the 21st century he finally started to be considered as a class theoretician proper, on par with the Nuffield School and Erik Olin

Wright. The inclusion of chapters on his theory of class in important handbooks and monographs symbolically acknowledged his legitimate position in class research (Bottero, 2007; Breen, 2005; Crompton, 2008; Oesch, 2006). The following sections introduce a brief overview of the Bourdieu's theory of class.

Methodology and philosophy of science – underpinnings of Bourdieusian class analysis

Bourdieu's theory of class is rooted in his reflections on the philosophy of science and methodology. Two issues in particular are fundamental. The first issue, taken from the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer, is the opposition between substantialism and relationalism. This distinction is generally acknowledged to be a key underpinning of Bourdieu's whole social theory (e.g. Swartz 1997, Wacquant 2012).

Substantialism is a mode of thinking based on the premise that social phenomena have an ascribed, fixed meaning or essence (Bourdieu 1998: 4). Importantly, substantialism is a common and widespread mistake in social science, representing the erroneous borrowing of practical but flawed ways of thinking from common sense (Bourdieu 1998:4). It is observed in the domain of consumption, for instance, when a practice or a pattern of consumption is taken 'in and for itself, independently of the universe of substitutable practice' and when at the same time the relationship between a given practice and social position is interpreted in a mechanistic and direct manner (Ibid.: 3). In the substantialist mode of thought, for example, boxing might be considered to be an *intrinsically* lower-class sport, characterised as universally 'brutal' and 'brainless', yet it only derives its contemporary characterisation from its place in the system as a whole (contra, for example, horse riding or yoga), and historical analysis reveals that it has in fact undergone a shift over time, being originally considered a gentlemanly pursuit of the upper class.

Relationalism, Bourdieu's solution to tackling the issues stemming from substantialism, entails a very different way of thinking: a focus on relations instead of essences, implying that the source of meaning lies in the relationship *between* objects rather than the objects themselves. Sociology, then, should be considered as social topology: "an analysis of relative positions and objective relations between these positions". (Bourdieu 1990:127). Most importantly, this mode of thinking underlies the central concept in Bourdieu's vision of class analysis, that is, the social space. For Bourdieu, "the real is relational" and "reality is nothing other than the structure as a set of constant relationships" (Bourdieu 1987: 2-3).

The second issue tackled by Bourdieu is the opposition between objectivism and subjectivism.² Bourdieu presents objectivism (or physicalism, e.g. 1990: 124) through several references to Durkheim, though structuralism and functionalism are usually considered paradigmatic cases too. Objectivism asserts that social phenomena should be treated as ‘things’ (Bourdieu 1990: 124) and that one should look for “deep causes which lie outside consciousness” (Durkheim cited in Ibid.: 125). To find these causes, social science must start with the rejection of what Durkheim has called ‘pre-notions’, which are treated as a flawed and superficial, secondary knowledge of social reality.

Subjectivism – also known as ‘constructivism’, ‘spontaneous sociology’ or psychologism (Bourdieu 1987: 10; 1990: 124) – is the opposite tendency, that is, the reduction of social phenomena to people’s representations of these phenomena and rejection of external causes or determinants (Bourdieu 1990: 125). Therefore, there is no place for “outer” causes and individuals are understood to be acting solely according to their representation of reality. The task of science is then also opposite in comparison to objectivism: agents’ representations are not considered as flawed ‘pre-notions’ but rather as the only available and “true” elements of the social reality there is. Hence, the task of science is to interpret those representations, and build a representation of those representations (Ibid.: 125). The worst sin of subjectivism is that it ignores the “structural aspects of practice”, that is, the fact that every practice is predetermined by agents’ characteristics. (Ibid.: 128)

Bourdieu’s view in this regard is clear: the only sound way of developing a complete and comprehensive social theory, and theory of social class, is the reconciliation of subjectivism and objectivism. It has to acknowledge agents’ representations of the social world, and the difference they can make, but also offer an account of the processes by which this representation is formed. These two positions then “stand in a dialectical relation” (Bourdieu 1990: 126). This is important enough for Bourdieu to call the overcoming of this opposition one of the main tasks of social science (Ibid.: 125)

² For a detailed account of these issues see Swartz (1997: 52-60).

Social structure as social space

The prime consequence of Bourdieu's relational worldview is to envision class, and social reality in general, in spatial terms: 'The social world can be conceived as a multi-dimensional space that can be constructed empirically'. (Bourdieu 1987: 3). It is, he says, a "space of objective differences" (Ibid.: 11), a "set of invisible relations (...) that constitute a space of positions exterior to each other and defined by their proximity, neighbourhood with or distance from each other" (Bourdieu 1990: 126; see also Bourdieu 1998: 6). Importantly, social space is made up of objective relations of difference and distance which cannot be reduced to interactions (Bourdieu 1987: 3). Each individual is assigned a unique position depending on their possession of what Bourdieu calls capital, since these determine one's 'conditions of existence' and the conditionings that go with it. By conditions of existence Bourdieu means relative distance from necessity. The more capital one has, the more distant from necessity one is, and the more one is deprived of capital, the more constrained one is.

A set of agents who share similar class conditions and conditionings, and thus develop a similar habitus, forms what Bourdieu calls a logical class, that is, a group of people characterized by internal consistency understood as the highest possible level of similarity of individuals making up the class, and, at the same time, as distinct from other classes as possible. Habitus refers to a "system of generative schemes applicable (...) to the most varied areas of practice" specific for each individual (Bourdieu 1984: 170), but only as variants on the class habitus, which operates "below the level of consciousness and language" (Bourdieu 1984: 466). From a relational point of view, social space is a system of positions, where a given position may be above, below or in between other positions (Bourdieu 1987: 5-6). At the same time, as we will see shortly, the habitus is Bourdieu's means of overcoming the opposition between subjectivism and objectivism by acknowledging agents have schemes of perception generated by structural conditions of existence but generative of practice that can maintain or transform that structure. The structure of a social space in capitalist societies is dependent on the distribution of three basic forms of capital: economic, cultural and social capital. (Bourdieu, 1997) Economic capital takes various forms, most importantly, accumulated and inherited wealth, income from work and rents from property and financial assets. Cultural capital has three primary forms. First, there is the embodied state, that is, "knowledge, skills, competencies and orientations" (Atkinson 2010: 46) which are inscribed in the mind and the body, the core

of the habitus. The most important components are knowledge of and preference for certain elements of highly valued domains (e.g. arts and culture) as well as linguistic competence, and these could be subsumed under a more universal idea of “symbolic mastery” (introduced in Bourdieu and Passeron 1977), that is, a generalized ability to think in abstract and theoretical terms, e.g. the capacity to distinguish between form and function, the core of the *aesthetic disposition* (Atkinson 2010: 46). Second, there is the objective state of cultural capital, that is, all sorts of material objects one owns which reflect the level of and serve as signifiers of symbolic mastery. Third, there is the institutionalized state, that is, various certificates issued by relevant institutions, most importantly, educational credentials granted by schools and universities. Finally, social capital refers to one’s access to and position in valuable social networks (e.g. having powerful friends able to exert influence in relevant fields).

Bourdieu, on the basis of various research projects conducted in France in the 1960s and 70s and presented in *Distinction* (Bourdieu, 1984), perhaps the most famous of all his works, determined that there were three principles organizing the French social space (ordered according to their importance): total volume of capital, composition of capital (the relative weight of forms of capital possessed), and trajectory in social space, the last of these reflecting how well established one’s position is (i.e. whether and in what direction someone is socially mobile). (Bourdieu 1984: 114; 1987: 4; 1990: 128; 1998: 7) However, one has to bear in mind that neither the relative value of particular forms of capital, nor these particular principles structuring it, are fixed and unchangeable. Quite the contrary, these are subject to permanent and on-going classificatory struggles. Any social space is a historical entity and could be structured by different logics of stratification – when characterising social space, Bourdieu added a proviso that his finding referred to “this particular universe” (Bourdieu 1987: 4), though in other places he claimed that a similar structure and order of importance of capitals was relevant for “the American society of today” (Bourdieu 1987: 4; see also Bourdieu 1990: 8) and Japan (Bourdieu 1998: 6). The historicity of social spaces is very important, as it opens up a possibility of finding social spaces structured differently than the French one and extends the application of the theory beyond the French society of the second half of the 20th century.

The understanding of class structure as social space distinguishes it from the approaches of Erik Olin Wright and the Nuffield school. Classes are not deductively constructed “employment-aggregates” (Atkinson, 2009; Crompton, 2008). Bourdieu rejects the understanding of classes as objective entities in the sense of “homogenous sets of economically and socially differentiated individuals objectively constituted into groups” (Bourdieu 1987:3).

Instead, he proposes to think of classes as “analytical constructs obtained by theoretically dividing a theoretical space” (that is, social space) (Ibid.:4). Although classes are then “only analytical constructs”, it does not mean that logical classes are some kind of abstract concept detached from empirical data. Quite the opposite, because analytical classes are derived from an empirically constructed social space, and therefore are “well-founded in reality” (Bourdieu 1987:5).

The classificatory struggles and symbolic space

Class analysis, in order to be comprehensive, needs to take into account both objective and subjective sides of social reality. Constructing the social space and dividing it into logical/analytical classes is a necessary first step, but one has to remember that these are, though deeply anchored in reality through a particular volume and combination of economic and cultural capital, still only abstract aggregates of individuals which exist only in terms of certain probabilities of characteristics and action they could generate. In other words, these are classes in the sense of classes of objects sharing particular common features.

The second necessary step in class analysis involves exploring ‘agents’ representation of the social world’ and “the contribution they make to the construction of the vision of this world” (Bourdieu 1991: 234). This construction happens via symbolic action, which Bourdieu calls a ‘labour of representation’, in which all individuals are involved in everyday life “in order to impose their own vision of the world or the vision of their own position in this world, that is, their social identity” (Ibid.). However, this does not necessarily entail conscious and rational actions, as people act according to their habitus. At the same time, however, it is not a deterministic model of action where a human being is a kind of automaton – habitus should be understood as of a system of “association, categorizations and expectations” (Atkinson 2010: 54), which is readily available to an individual, and thus produces a certain probability of taking a particular course of action over others possible in a given situation. (for a detailed discussion see Atkinson 2010: 51-55). Perception and construction of social reality are then “subjected to structural constraints imposed by the structure of social space” (Bourdieu 1990: 131). Looking from the objective point of view, agents’ characteristics form particular combinations of different probability (dependent on the structure of social space), whereas from the subjective point of view, “the schemes of perception and evaluation” available for each actor are the product of earlier struggles (Bourdieu 1991: 234).

These processes of perception and construction of the social world have a character of conflict. As in any struggle, one's ability to fight and win depends on how well one is prepared for it. Thus, agent's power in those struggles is dependent on position in the social space, which thus defines the chances of imposing of one's vision of social world (Bourdieu 1998: 11). In other words, people strive for recognition of who they are, how they think and how they act. The most potent and efficient way to achieve success in these struggles is by imposing a vision of the world where a particular set of characteristics (e.g. high volume of economic capital) leading to a particular system of social stratification (wealthy people being at the top and in power) is seen and accepted as being *natural* (e.g. resulting from hard work and innate abilities *only*) rather than being, at least to a certain degree, arbitrary, therefore being *misrecognized*. In the most general terms then, class in Bourdieu's account could be understood as a system of *misrecognition* (Atkinson, 2015).

Lifestyles and cultural consumption are among the most important domains where these symbolic struggles are fought and they form a separate structure from social space, that is, a space of lifestyles (also known as the 'symbolic space'). The space of lifestyles is a complex system of meaning which comprises of virtually everything which could play a role as a signifier of one's position in the social space, so it ranges from an individual's characteristics deeply inscribed in the body (e.g. pronunciation, bearing, posture, manners, (Bourdieu 1984: 241)), through more external, but still close to the body, symbols such as clothing and food choices, to signifying practices, activities, taste and knowledge in the area of cultural consumption broadly defined (literary, musical and visual art preferences, to name just a few most frequently researched). The space of lifestyles is then a symbolic system "organized by the logic of difference, of a differential variation" that should be considered another outcome of Bourdieu's relational reconceptualization of social phenomena (Bourdieu 1990: 133).

Although the space of lifestyles is analytically independent and separate from social space, the two structures are interrelated: there is a "homology between the space of distinctive signs and space of positions" (Bourdieu 1987: 11). This means that for each position in the social space there exists an analogous position in the symbolic space. The first opposition organizing the social space, defined by the overall stock of capital, maps then into the symbolic space as the opposition between 'rare', and thus 'distinguished', practices and goods on one hand (characteristic for people whose stock of both, economic and cultural, capital is the highest, that is, the dominant class), and, on the other, practices which are 'identified as vulgar' because of being 'easy and common' (the situation of people lacking economic and cultural

capital, the dominated class). In Bourdieu's research, for example, the opposition manifests in classical versus popular music, a taste for light and refined meals versus a taste for heavy and hearty food, abstract art versus realist art, exclusive sports versus accessible sports and so on (Bourdieu, 1984). The second opposition, related to capital composition, is between those whose stock of capital is based primarily on economic capital on the one hand (like the *bourgeoisie*, the dominant fraction of the dominant class), and those rich primarily in cultural capital on the other (e.g. *intellectuals* and *artists*). This is reflected in the symbolic space as the taste for a "hedonistic aesthetic of ease and facility" characteristic of the former group versus the contrasting preference for the "ascetic aspect of aesthetics" indicative of the latter (Bourdieu 1984: 176). The homology between social space and symbolic space is always mediated by habitus insofar as the practices and goods indicative of positions in symbolic space are the product of so many choices and evaluations flowing from the schemes of perception and appreciation adapted to different conditions of existence associated with differing volumes and compositions of capital.

Class analysis at the crossroads – the *death of class*, the Nuffield school hegemony questioned and the rise of Bourdieusian class analysis

Although the Nuffield school approach has dominated class research and achieved a position of virtual hegemony in the field, it has also been criticised for a variety of reasons. First of all, the concepts of class and class analysis as such fell out of favour in the more general field of sociology at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. A set of economic processes dating back to the 1970s was said to be profoundly transforming Western societies. Most importantly it included the gradual de-industrialization of the West and shift of industrial production to the rapidly industrialising Asian economies, and more generally, globalization of the world economy. Moreover, it entailed the transition from mass Fordist to a more flexible post-Fordist mode of production with the accompanying expansion of consumerism (for a detailed account see Crompton 2008: 81-84). The ramifications of these changes were manifold, but for class analysis the most important was the (alleged) waning importance of economic inequalities in defining class divisions and the increasing importance of lifestyle differentiation. However, this did not simply mean replacing the economic with the cultural dimension in class divisions, but rather a complete breakdown of the class hierarchy, the *death of class* (Pakulski and Waters, 1996). The underlying reasons were *individualization* and *reflexivity*, in the era of *liquid* (Bauman, 2000) or *reflexive modernity* (Beck et al., 1994). In

this transformed reality people were said to be gradually disembedded from the traditional institutions of modern society (including class) and left to construct their biographies on their own, in a reflexive way. In the light of such diagnosis the outlook for class research may have appeared grim, but in fact it did not do much damage and was quickly refuted on the grounds that it was a baseless attack on class, overly theoretical and lacking proper empirical backing. Therefore, not only was class analysis not dead, but, quite the contrary, it had a “promising future” ahead (Goldthorpe and Marshall, 1992).³ The body of research that followed, from all strands of class analysis, has time and again shown the continuous relevance of class as category of social analysis.

The attack by the proponents of the individualisation/reflexivity, however, was not the only challenge that the reigning Nuffield school had to face. Below I discuss some of the most pressing issues, and where possible, the way in which a Bourdieusian approach to class can solve or at least alleviate these.

First, some argued that class analysis has become a field of high specialization, primarily focused on refinement of statistical methods at the expense of theory. In effect, this is the argument that class analysis has gradually become detached from general sociology and is overly self-referential, drawing legitimization for its usefulness simply from the fact that it is a long and well-established tradition (Atkinson 2015; Savage 2000). Against this backdrop, a Bourdieusian approach is more versatile, both in terms of methods, as it welcomes complex research programmes combining survey-based quantitative analyses with a range of qualitative ones (e.g. forms of content analysis, in-depth interviews), as in the case of *Distinction* but also in some more recent projects (Faber et al., 2012), as well as theoretical openness to modification of the elements of the model (e.g. changes to the capital hierarchy and the possibility of devising new forms of capital (for example, in Cvetičanin and Popescu 2011).

Second, controversies have arisen around the RAT model, which is considered not only to be reductionist and not particularly realistic (Atkinson 2015: 59-60), but also to reveal more general problems with the theory, most importantly, the fact that a successful integration of the RAT with the whole model requires positing a well-developed class consciousness, arguably not included in the Nuffield model (Savage 2000: 15-19, 85-88). In the place of a utilitarian RAT mode, the one in Bourdieu’s approach is built around the concept of habitus and is

³ A more comprehensive engagement with the arguments of Beck, Bauman and Giddens, specifically from the Bourdieusian point of view, came much later (Atkinson, 2007a, 2007b, 2008).

“practical, pre-reflexive and dispositional“ (Atkinson 2010: 44), and offers a sound link between the subjective and the objective dimensions of class.

Moreover, one of the reasons for incorporating RAT into the Nuffield theory of class was not only to offer a better account of how class position translates into specific outcomes, but also to exclude culture, and more specifically class/classed cultures, from the explanatory frame. In contrast, Bourdieu’s concept of class is multidimensional and includes both economic and cultural aspects. The exclusion of the subjective dimension of class – as lived and experienced – has been found by some to be the most problematic aspect of the Nuffield approach and sparked a new strand of class research, usually labelled *cultural class analysis*, aiming to address this deficiency, and drawing its primary inspiration from Bourdieu’s ideas on class. This has covered a variety of problems, e.g. studying the class identity of working-class women and its intersection with gender (Skeggs, 1997), or exploring class as multidimensional and multifaceted phenomenon (Reay, 1998).

Sometimes, the multidimensionality of Bourdieu’s theory of class has been presented as an attempt to incorporate two classic concepts – class and status – distinguished as separate by Weber, into one single model (Swartz, 1997; Weininger, 2005). As interest in the link between class and culture has been growing, so has the popularity of Bourdieu’s approach to class, the issue could not be ignored and eventually has been addressed by the Nuffield school. In a string of papers Goldthorpe and his collaborator Chan have chosen to present Bourdieu’s conceptualization of the relationship between class and status as the main shortcoming of his approach (Tak Wing Chan, 2010; Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2010). They advocate a strict separation between class and status – class is thought to be a factor shaping and explaining life chances (e.g. access to education, jobs and financial security), whilst lifestyle and cultural consumption differentiation is seen as causally related to status. This assumption underlies a series of analyses, which, according to the authors, provided a robust empirical backing for the theoretical argument for the need to distinguish between class and status.⁴

This contribution to the debates by Goldthorpe and Chan, however, rather than achieving the goal of bolstering their approach to class analysis, has produced additional problems. This is primarily related to the way in which they conceptualise and operationalise

⁴ The problems with the conceptualization of cultural consumption differentiation and its ramifications for the validity of Goldthorpe and Chan’s conclusions is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

status and has been recently elucidated by Flemmen et al. (2018a). Status is understood and measured by Goldthorpe and Chan as patterns of friendship between occupations (respondents and their closest friend). This is problematic, first of all because friendship patterns (in other words, differential association) in Weber's original formulation is taken to be of secondary importance, whilst it is lifestyle differentiation that reflects differences related to *honour*. Second, it is also questionable whether occupation is the best way to capture these differences. Moreover, these issues are even clearer when one examines the tool they deploy to empirically measure status. It is a scale of differential association modelled on that introduced by Laumann, a tool devised to measure more general social position in the fashion of the American tradition of social stratification studies, rather than status in the Weberian sense. This is further corroborated by the fact that similar scales are considered to be useful precisely because they capture more than just status (e.g. that proposed by the Cambridge Stratification Group) (Ibid.: 3-8). It would then seem that the Goldthorpe and Chan's understanding of status substantially deviates from that of Weber, which they claim to be using. It has been pointed out that Bourdieu's approach to class and status distinctions offers a better alternative. Firstly, the ways in which embodied cultural capital operates capture what in Weberian terms is framed as status. Secondly, the concept of status differentiation is captured in the construction of a space of lifestyles (which could be understood as a space of different status positions) in a way closer to Weber's meaning than is the case with Goldthorpe and Chan's approach. Thirdly, when certain attributes become highly valuable and achieve an esteemed status through symbolic power and misrecognition (for example, a particular level and combination of capital, or knowledge of and preferences for certain artists), it is an example of status processes (Ibid.: 8-10).

It has been also suggested that some aspects of the economic and societal changes mentioned above render the EGP schema, constructed on the basis of data gathered in the 1970s, seriously outdated in places. The most important changes have been the growing share of services in the economy (tertiarization), a rapidly increasing number of degree holders in the educational structure (educational expansion), and related changes in the occupational structure, that is, a growing number of highly qualified jobs (managerial and professional) (Oesch 2006, ch. 2). These processes have redefined the class structure in two ways: first, at least in the West, the working-class has been gradually diminishing in size; second, and in relation to the first point, the middle class has been growing so large that it has become the most numerous class. This has led many sociologists to draw conclusions about the demise of

class conflict and structure mentioned earlier, but also has a more practical ramification, which has to be taken into consideration by any class analyst – where the top of the middle class (roughly speaking the service class in the EGP) becomes so large that it lumps together very different occupations, thus undermining the theoretical validity and empirical usefulness of such a heterogeneous aggregate (Oesch 2006; Savage 1992; Savage 2000). Education is then the primary line of division in the service class which is dissected into two parts: professionals, who on average are better educated, and managers, whose position stems more from organizational assets than educational credentials. A second line of division, further partitioning professionals, is related to the type of educational credentials, setting those having technical and business diplomas against those who graduated in arts and humanities and social sciences, thus introducing division between, on the one hand, technical experts, and, on the other, social and culture professionals (Oesch 2006, ch. 4). Politics is the domain in which this new differentiation was first given most attention which has led some adherents of the Nuffield approach to admit that education is indeed a factor dividing the services into fractions that differ in their political behaviour, though separate from class (Goldthorpe, 1999). As we will see, Bourdieu's model captures this new horizontal differentiation very well, as it is closely related to capital composition. This division has been since labelled *educational cleavage* (e.g. Stubager 2010).

One more process, namely a steadily rising female employment rate in the majority of Western countries, has generated additional fault lines that challenge the Nuffield school paradigm of class and lead to the discussion on the proper unit of class analysis (Atkinson 2015: 82-85). For a long time, women have been excluded from class analyses altogether, as the household has been the unit of analysis, and since males have most often been the main breadwinners, women have been assigned the class of their male partners. However, as the share of women in the labour force has substantially increased, it has become necessary for the Nuffield school to somehow address the issue. This has been done by introducing a sub-class for women (the class IIIb in the updated EGP schema) and by introducing the concept of the main breadwinner, who could be male or female, depending on their contribution to the household budget, but these measures have been found to be only a partial and not entirely satisfactory solution (Oesch, 2006). In the Bourdieusian approach the problem, however, is easily bypassed, as the unit of analysis is an individual, which means that anyone could be assigned a position in social space. As we will see, the gendered character of certain regions of social space is an important finding that enriches the understanding of the class structure,

instead of being an issue that does not exactly square with the model. Similarly, for people not in paid work (retirees and the unemployed), or those who do not have an occupation yet (students), it is still possible to determine their position in social space.

The rapid development of Bourdieusian class analysis in the last fifteen years

Without a doubt, the contribution of the British cultural class analysis researchers should be seen as important, not only because it generated valuable empirical results, but also because it brought Bourdieu's ideas on class to the field of class analysis and made important progress towards legitimising it. However, the full potential of Bourdieu's model of class was most fully realised in a new strand of research, originating in Scandinavia, developed after the turn of the new century (Faber et al., 2012; Flemmen et al., 2018a, 2018b; Prieur et al., 2008; Prieur and Rosenlund, 2010a; Rosenlund, 2009). A similar study has recently been conducted in the UK (Atkinson, 2017a). The distinctive feature of all these projects is that the researchers succeeded in fully comprehending the theoretical and analytical framework presented in *Distinction* and replicated it using data for their respective countries. They therefore, first, conceptualised the class structure as social space, and, second, constructed it empirically using relevant measures of economic and cultural capital, complemented by measures of the secondary characteristics of the spaces; most importantly, the occupational effects. Moreover, following *Distinction*, correspondence analysis has been deployed in the construction of the space (a method discussed in detail in Chapter 3).⁵

All the above studies found social spaces that resemble those presented in *Distinction*. The first dimension reflects capital volume and opposes people who are well endowed with both cultural and economic capital, to those with low levels. The second dimension is about capital composition, with people having more economic than cultural capital set against those with the reverse combination. Further differentiation on this dimension, modifying the original pattern found by Bourdieu, is related to the type of educational credentials: business and technical education is found more often on the economic side, whilst education in the fields arts and humanities, social sciences and culture is found more often on the cultural side. This is important because, especially in the high capital regions of space, where most people have degrees, capital composition is primarily about the field of study distinction.

⁵ More precisely multiple correspondence, a sister technique, based on correspondence analysis.

In most spaces, the cloud of individuals has a characteristic conical shape, reflecting the increasing variance of the second dimension with the increasing volume of capital, meaning that the capital composition principle is strongest within the dominant class. In accordance with Bourdieu's model of class, spaces have been divided into three *analytical classes* of equal size, gathering individuals representing three overall levels of capital – low, middle and high. These three classes were then further partitioned into *class fractions*, representing different composition of capital: the economic fraction (economic capital dominating), the balanced fraction and the cultural fraction (cultural capital dominating). These *analytical classes*, to reiterate, taken to be groupings of people who represent a particular combination of volume and composition of capital and not *real* social groups, were used in the next step to explore the relationship between these different combinations and lifestyle patterns and cultural consumption differentiation, explored by constructing a separate *space of lifestyles/symbolic space*. In all cases, homology between the social space and the space of lifestyles was found, that is, both were structured by the same two principles: capital volume and capital composition (the process of space of lifestyle construction is discussed in detail in Chapter 5).

Regarding the relationship between the spaces and external factors, most importantly occupation, sector, industry and status of employment (in some studies some of these were active variables, contributing to the shape of the space), and socio-demographic variables, age and gender, a similar pattern appeared across the studies. The distribution of occupations along the volume of capital dimension reflected their level of complexity, required skill and average level of remuneration, manual workers and elementary occupations being positioned in the area of low level capital, white-collar workers and technicians in the middle, and managers and professionals in the area of high capital volume. On the capital composition dimension, similar to the differentiation observed in case of educational credentials, the distribution corresponded to the type of cultural capital characteristic for a given occupation. Hence, business professionals and managers were found on the economic side, whilst teachers and professionals employed in education, culture industries, but also in health and care were found on the cultural side. Furthermore, those in the economic fractions were found to be employed more often in the private sector, whilst those in the cultural ones in the public sector (which is perhaps to a considerable degree related to an occupational and industry division). Where this was analysed, spaces were also related to age, reflecting life course effects, with the lowest levels of capital related to the oldest age groups, a high overall level of capital and being in economic fractions for the middle-aged, whilst a middle overall level and being in cultural fractions for the

youngest groups (Faber et al., 2012; Rosenlund, 2009). Finally, the spaces were also highly gendered, women gathering on the cultural side of the composition dimension, whilst men at the economic side opposite, which to a large degree reflects the gendered occupational structure intertwined with the public vs. private sector division.

Additional confirmation and complementation with more fine-grained details has been drawn from qualitative research based on in-depth interviews, proving that these divisions are also present at the level of people's representation of the world and are indeed alive and functioning (Jarness, 2017; Jarness and Friedman, 2017).

Questions of the applicability of Bourdieu's model outside France

An important question for a researcher who intends to replicate a study and test a model in a different context (in this case, society) is its applicability to this context, in other words, a question about how to conceptualise the difference between the society under study and France. Overall, in the author's opinion, not enough attention has been paid to this aspect. There seem to be two strategies here. Firstly, examining how the societies in question differ from France, and more generally speaking, a kind of an ideal type of a 'Western capitalist' society, by investigating the local context and its peculiarity, and how this could be affecting the Bourdieu's model. Secondly, the class and stratification structure of studied society could be seen as being subjected to the workings of largely universal mechanisms stemming from the logic of capitalist economy functioning in a (post-)industrial setting, in a way postulated by Flemmen (2013).

In the Scandinavian studies (especially Norwegian), the respective societies are presented as a peculiar case due to its high level of equality, both on the structural level, manifesting a comparatively low overall level of inequality, as well as attitudinal, as demonstrated by the prevalence of egalitarian attitudes (Flemmen et al., 2018b; Hjellbrekke et al., 2014; Jarness, 2017; Melldahl and Börjesson, 2014). These societies are then presented as interesting as one can reasonably expect the class structure to be more blurred, and class-related lifestyle differentiation and cultural consumption weaker. Hence, the fact that it is possible to uncover social and symbolic spaces structured according to the principles proposed by Bourdieu is taken to be a particularly strong confirmation of its validity. It could be also concluded that Scandinavian societies, all salient differences notwithstanding, have turned out

to be similar enough to the ideal type of a *Western capitalist* society, to proceed with the “standard model”, with no special modifications to uncover the structure of their social spaces.

The problem of the applicability of Bourdieu’s model outside France has been addressed in a different way in the Serbian study (Cvetičanin and Popescu, 2011). This is very important, as out of all the societies studied so far within the social space paradigm, Serbia (which is not easily classified as Western and is a former state socialist country), presents a case that is the most distinctive in comparison to France and other Western societies, and at the same time, arguably the most similar to Poland.

The authors conceptualise Serbian specificity as the result of a different model of stratification characteristic of state socialism, in which social capital, in the form of political capital, rather than economic capital, was said to be the most important form of capital (Bourdieu, 1998). To adjust the Bourdieusian model to this different context, Cvetičanin and Popescu proposed adding subtypes of social and cultural capital that were originally not distinguished by Bourdieu.

They introduced two subtypes of social capital: “political social capital” and the “social capital of solidarity”. Central to this distinction is the idea of two different types of social network which are the source of these subtypes of capital. Political social capital stems from networks that “link people whose control over access to public resources (goods and services) enables them to use these resources to satisfy the private needs of other members of these networks and in this way accumulate power (and acquire access to the resources they do not control)” (Cvetičanin and Popescu 2011: 447). Thus, it offers influence through the use of powers ascribed to state and, more generally, public positions. It can work only if the condition of reciprocity is met – both sides have to be interested in the exchange of informal favours. “Social solidarity capital” in turn refers to another type of social network – “social networks of solidarity among neighbours, friends, relatives, or ‘countrymen’ who can pitch in to help with money, goods, services or emotional support.” (Ibid.) The most important difference is that, whilst in the case of political social capital the core of the relation is always an instrumental trade-off, possible because all sides have access to valuable and rare resources, the social capital of solidarity is based on what the authors call “*primary ties*”, whilst “social solidarity capital” networks may link people who are strangers to each other (Ibid.).

In regard to cultural capital, Cvetičanin and Popescu propose to split it into local cultural capital and global cultural capital. The distinction stems from an important observation

about the difference between Western ('true' Western) and 'Westernised' societies. They state that the field of legitimate culture in the latter category of societies has a somewhat different character than in France of the 1960s and 70s – which is a field of constant struggle between local and Western culture. Global culture refers to both 'highbrow' and 'lowbrow' practices, whereas local culture encompasses practices related to 'important life events' and everyday entertainment, which are under the influence of either traditional folk culture or neo-folk culture. It is crucial to point out that a variety of different practices may be recognised as parts of global culture, for instance knowledge of foreign languages or a high level of computer literacy skills - in general any kind of practice or knowledge that is highly associated with representations of the 'West' and 'Western' and rare enough to become a basis for making a successful distinction.

These modifications translated into a different approach to social space construction. In addition to the measures of cultural and economic capital deployed in the Scandinavian and British studies, the authors have also included measures of the subtypes of capital discussed above, two binary variables, political party membership and a position in the party leadership measuring political social capital, and two variables that measure the social capital of solidarity through access to two types of network, informal networks of favours and 'primary ties' networks. Second, the standard set of cultural capital indicators (respondent's and parental education) has been supplemented with one synthetic measure of taste (in which there are five types of taste reflecting the global vs. local cultural capital continuum). Importantly, the latter decision is problematic as it conflates social with lifestyle space and there is a risk of circular reasoning when social space is taken to structurally underpin lifestyles and taste (and serving this purpose is one of the aims of the study).

Not surprisingly, this has produced a social space of a different shape than those observed in the Scandinavian countries and in the UK. The first dimension of the model is similar, as it reflects volume of capital and opposes people well endowed with capital to those characterised by low volume. The second dimension, however, differs and its interpretation is rather complex. The authors proposed drawing two additional bisectors going diagonally, one from the upper-left to the lower-right sector, and the other one from the lower-left to the upper-right sector, both crossing the first (horizontal) axis at the angle of 45° and thus being correlated with capital volume. The first bisector opposes global cultural capital, which is a characteristic of individuals with a high volume of capital, to local cultural capital, characteristic of those with low volume. The second bisector is defined by the opposition between, on the one hand,

a high volume of economic capital and political social capital, positioned on the high overall volume of capital side, and, on the other, a low volume of economic capital and social capital of solidarity, positioned on the low overall volume of capital side.

Speaking of the second way of conceptualising the applicability of Bourdieu's model of social space, that is, by focusing on the role of universal mechanisms, the most interesting argument was proposed by Rosenlund (2009, chapter 7). Rosenlund analysed three datasets collected in the 1970s, 80s and 90s with the aim of constructing social space for these points and tracing how its shape developed. He observed a profound change in the principles organising spaces. On the one hand, the capital volume principle was the strongest in the 1970s, but its dominance and relative strength was gradually diminishing. On the other, the capital composition principle was not detectable in the 1970s, was weak and ambiguous in the 1980s, and appeared strong and fully shaped only in the 1990s. According to Rosenlund, this pattern could be attributed to changes in the class structure resulting from the transition from industrialism to post-industrialism – the most important aspect of this process being tertiarization and educational expansion, in turn leading to profound changes in the occupational structure.

In this light, the fact that later Danish and Norwegian studies have found a consistently strong capital composition dimension should be interpreted as corroborating Rosenlund's findings and lending further credence to their interpretation, therefore strengthening the case for the increasing role of the capital composition principle in the post-industrial world. This would also provide a powerful argument, contrary to the proponents of reflexivity and individualization, that changes related to post-industrialization do not weaken the class structure, but only alter its shape.

The validity of Bourdieu's model outside France – some further points

However, there are still some issues needing further attention before it is possible to conclude that Bourdieu's model of social space has been confirmed. All Western European projects, except the most recent research Norwegian ones (Flemmen et al., 2018a, 2018b), have been constructed using samples drawn from city populations rather than national samples. This is important as cities have a specific educational and occupational structure, different from that observable in the general population – highly skilled people employed in services make up a larger share of the workforce (and this is confirmed when relevant data is provided (Faber et

al., 2012)), and some groups are not present at all (ie., farmers). This results in a relatively numerous and well differentiated dominant and intermediate classes, what, considering that differentiation along the capital composition dimension is much stronger in this area of social space, in effect strengthens this dimension.

Moreover, one can argue that not only are the samples in these studies specific, but the societies themselves are also a special case. As was mentioned, the authors do admit this when describing the high level of equality and widespread egalitarian attitude, but an alternative interpretation of the role played by this trait of Scandinavian societies, along with some other important characteristics, is possible. The most important in this context is the particular structure of their economies, with a large public sector in which a lot of “health, care, education” (Flemmen et al., 2018a) specialists are employed, but at the same time, a well developed private sector with a lot of business and finance professionals and managers. Again, as these groups are expected to be on opposite sides of the capital dimension, this would be a factor that amplifies this dimension. If this was the case, this would mean that this of an economy in an advanced stage of post-industrialization with specifically Scandinavian egalitarian characteristics could be working in a opposite direction than it appears at first sight; that is, that in case of the Scandinavian societies confirming the Bourdieu’s model is not less but rather *more* probable, and these very features strengthen the capital composition principle and in effect buttress the whole model. This would be then strengthening the argument made by Rosenlund (2009) and Scandinavian societies would be indeed a special case, but primarily because of the very high degree of post-industrialisation.

This is not necessarily very problematic, nevertheless it reveals a lack of clarity regarding exactly what is the causal mechanism behind this particular structuring of social spaces; that is, according to capital volume and capital composition. Arguably, France in the 1960s and 70s was not an example of a post-industrial society, how was it then possible that Bourdieu found a social space structure in this way? The answer could be related to the fact that a good deal of his conclusions about capital composition were drawn from analysis of the sub-spaces of the dominant and intermediate classes, where, to reiterate, this principle has been time and again found to be stronger. The findings from the only non-Scandinavian country studied in detail, the UK, also point to the interpretation that such a structure of social space is a more universal phenomenon, and not some Scandinavian peculiarity. Nevertheless, the issue is still under-researched and to resolve it, it is necessary to expand the number and diversity of the cases studied.

Recapitulation

The chapter has discussed some of the most important aspects of the contemporary debates on class and offered a brief overview of the three leading perspectives: the Neo-Weberian, the Neo-Marxist and the Bourdieusian. The Bourdieusian approach to class, based on the concepts of social and symbolic spaces, has been presented against the backdrop of the still dominant Nuffield approach. A few areas in which the Bourdieusian perspective offers an important advancements have been identified: high versatility of the theory allowing to meaningfully analyse different domains of the social world under one unified analytical model, a theory of action built around the concept of habitus, a multidimensionality of this approach allowing to successfully analyse both economic and cultural aspects of class division at the same time, what in turn allows to conceptualise the relationship between status and class in a more convincing and appropriate manner than Goldthorpe and Chan have proposed, and, finally, the ability to capture the horizontal differentiation within the Goldthorpe's service class. As we have seen, the Bourdieusian perspective has recently gained more recognition and resulted in fruitful empirical research projects exploring the social spaces of Denmark, Norway, and the UK, which confirmed the model reported in "Distinction", and in Serbia which revealed a somewhat different pattern due to the role played by specific local forms of social capital. Finally, the details of the conceptualisation of the applicability of the "Disintinction" model to national contexts has been discussed. Two strategies of approaching this issue has been identified: (i) by looking for national specificity possibly requiring modifications to the model of social space, (ii) by presenting national cases as subjected to largely universal mechanisms, most importantly post-industrialisation. Here the first research question emerges: which strategy should direct the process of the construction of the Polish social space? Possible answers to this question are discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 2: Poland as a case in Bourdieusian class research

The following sections introduce the reader to the details of the Polish case. What makes it interesting, worth exploring and something that needs more commentary is its history after 1945 (or perhaps, as we will see, dating back even earlier). Unlike the countries that have become the subject of systematic research, inspired and oriented by the core of Bourdieu's ideas, Poland has not experienced the largely continuous and undisturbed economic and social development of capitalism – it achieved full industrialisation as a result of the implementation of economic plans designed by the state. The ramifications of its divergence from the typical Western path are discussed in detail below, starting with a Bourdieusian perspective, strong theoretically but rather weak in terms of empirical analysis, followed by an interpretation of the work of Polish sociologists of class and stratification, which was theoretically less inspired but empirically very well researched. The historical part is followed by an analysis of changes in the class structure and system of stratification after 1989 that stemmed from the systemic transformation and a few other possible structural determinants of the shape of the contemporary Polish social space are discussed. The chapter closes with the overview of the ways in which Bourdieu's ideas have been deployed in Polish sociology of class and stratification.

Bourdieu's model outside France – the social space of the GDR and Eastern European stratificational regimes

Even though Bourdieu never really deployed the concept of social space to explore systematically societies other than France, he did manage to address briefly the issue of how the French model of social space translated into the social reality of a few other societies, state-socialist included. Although it was just a brief sketch (a lecture after all), he was still able to capture some of the most important characteristics of the principles organizing communist social spaces (specifically that of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), but his observations also extend to other state-socialist countries). The key difference was a reversed hierarchy of importance of capitals observed in the GDR. Contrary to capitalist France where it was the most important asset, economic capital came last in the order of importance, since “economic capital - private possession of the means of production” was “officially (and, for

the most part in actual fact) out of bounds in the GDR.” In turn, this affected the role of cultural capital which was “proportionally increased” (Bourdieu, 1998:16). However, it was political capital that topped the hierarchy, as this guaranteed “its holders a form of private appropriation of goods and public services (residences, cars, hospitals, schools, and so on).” ⁶ (Ibid.:16) Bourdieu complemented his analysis with a short characterization of the structure of the field of power in state-socialism, “the struggle for the dominant principle of domination” was waged between the party fraction, the “*nomenklatura*” (or, perhaps more precisely, “apparatchiks”), and “the holders of academic capital” (Ibid.:16), that is, “technocrats”, and “especially” “intellectuals” and “researchers”. (Ibid.:17)

The idea of deploying Bourdieu’s conceptual framework outside France was developed further by Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley (1998). They introduced the concept of a “stratification regime”, that is, a social space characterized by a particular configuration of the three forms of capital: economic, social and cultural. Which form of capital would be the most important at a given moment was closely related to its degree of institutionalization: the more a given form was institutionalized, the more important it would be. (Ibid.:18)

Eyal et al. (1998) then used this concept to analyse the historical reality of Central Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, where three different “stratification regimes” existed: pre-communist, communist and post-communist. In the pre-communist era the most valuable source of power and privilege was ‘traditional’ social capital, rooted in the institutions dating back to feudalism, thus highly institutionalized, and the top of the social ladder was occupied by aristocracy and gentry. Economic and cultural capital played only a subordinate role, though their importance grew gradually, and they became important resources for challenging the old social order, used by, respectively, the propertied bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the ‘modernizing intelligentsia’, a form of cultural bourgeoisie specific to Eastern Europe, on the other.

The coming of communism was a profound change, marked by a radical rupture with the previous social order. In a way, all previously important forms of capital became a liability to some extent. Quite obviously, traditional social capital was derived from aristocratic social

⁶ Bourdieu observed that the significance of political capital was not limited only to communist/Soviet countries, as, according to him, a similar phenomenon occurred in social-democratic countries, where social democratic parties were ruling long enough that a peculiar system came into being, where political capital was acquired through the structures of trade unions and political parties and then “transmitted through networks of family relations”, effecting the creation of “true political dynasties“. In the Soviet circumstances this led to “private appropriation of public goods and services”. (Bourdieu, 1998: 16).

origins and networks, as well as various form of economic capital such as ownership of land, factories or any sizeable wealth, and stood in direct opposition to the communist ideology, but even high stocks of cultural capital could have been problematic, as an unwelcome marker of the old, now officially condemned, world.

The key points of the analysis of the new communist reality by Eyal et al. (1998) corresponded closely with the observations Bourdieu made describing the social structure of the GDR and they developed these ideas further. Social capital, which took the shape of political capital, became the most important form. Access to and availability of political capital depended on the strength of one's position in the system of power, an "extremely powerful and influential network" offering all sorts of benefits, made up of various state institutions with the communist party at the centre. One could enter this network by becoming a member of the party or by being nominated by the party to a high state office (thus entering the ranks of the so called *nomenklatura*). Social capital was then institutionalized by a party membership or *nomenklatura* membership.⁷ (Eyal et al., 1998: 21; 27-28) However, it should be noted that a high level of political capital often went together with a high level of cultural capital, as it was a usual requirement that members of the *nomenklatura*, even if they were nominated primarily on the basis of their loyalty, presented or acquired sufficient educational credentials. Finally, the role of economic capital was much less prominent as it was subordinate to the other two forms. However, this did not preclude a link between cultural and economic capitals which in fact maintained a high positive relationship.⁸

The rules of the game were not static and the importance of certain capitals and the relations between them were changing throughout the state-socialist period. In its early stages, the social order resembled feudalism in some respects. An individual's position in the social network formed by the organizational structures of Communist Party depended in this case on "loyalty to patrons" and "faith in the proper world-view" (Ibid.: 28) The end of the Stalinist era brought an important change as cultural capital gradually became more important, mainly because of the growing need for well educated professionals, capable of administering the trajectory of modernization of companies in the economy. These changes were most evident in Edward Gierek's Poland and were registered in the form of the relationship between income and education, which was seen as comparable with capitalist societies by Polish sociologists

⁷ *Nomenklatura* members were usually also members of the party, but this was not a necessary condition.

⁸ The relationships between different forms of capital are analysed in more detail later.

investigating the class divisions and stratification in 1970s. (Tomescu-Dubrow, Słomczyński, Domański, et al., 2018) Another ramification of this change was a transformation of the field of power, in which the technocratic wing of the party grew in importance and power. The party technocrats, allied with the managers of state enterprises, were soon to play an important role in deciding the fate of state-socialism.

Polish sociology on class divisions in the Polish People's Republic (PPR)

Eyal et al.'s analysis was certainly a valuable and revealing account of the state-socialist Eastern Europe but it was not without flaws – firstly, it focused primarily on the field of power and secondly, its theoretical models were not backed sufficiently by an analysis of empirical data. The Polish sociology of stratification can help here, shedding some additional light on these issues. Although it had never really engaged with Bourdieu's ideas, instead referring to theories of American and British origin, more popular in the field of studies on class and stratification (ie. Peter Blau, Otis Dudley Duncan, the Nuffield School), it still offered the most systematic account of the state-socialist class structure and divisions. Where possible, I will try to look at this body of work through Bourdieusian lenses, interpreting its findings in the language of forms of capital operating in a social space.

The class structure of pre-war Polish society was typically described by a tripartite division into working class, peasantry and intelligentsia. The profound changes brought by the new state-socialist system rendered this schema obsolete and unable to fully capture the new class differentiation. The principal criterion of class divisions in Western capitalist societies, that is, the ownership of the means of production that divided these societies into owners vs. workers, was of only secondary importance in a state-socialist society, characterized by central planning and state control of the economy. A new class schema was devised by Włodzimierz Wesółowski (who built on the ideas of earlier sociologists such as Stanisław Ossowski, Julian Hochfeld and Jan Szczepański) to reflect that specificity. (Tomescu-Dubrow, Słomczyński and Kjerulf Dubrow, 2018)

Four key axes of class differentiation were distinguished. Due to the central role of the nationalized sector in the economy, the most important was “control over resources and the labor power of others” (Kohn & Słomczynski, 1990: 40); that is, “control over utilization of the means of production” (what and how should be produced) exercised by the communist party through managers who controlled the supervisors monitoring workers. The degree of

control held by managers was “extensive” and they played a key part in processes of economy management (central planning) and implementing strategic party directives; as such, managers’ decisions had to stay in line with communist ideology, which was prior to “technical or economic rationale”. Compared with managers, supervisors were given much less authority and their role was limited to immediate control over and coordination of regular workers’ labour who exerted no control whatsoever (Janicka, Tomescu--Dubrow, Słomczyński & Shabad, 2007: 48).

The second criterion, ownership of the means of production, distinguished between the dominant nationalized state sector and the private sector of the economy. Although in state-socialist Poland the role of private ownership was extremely limited in comparison to capitalist societies, it played a much more important role in some sectors than in other countries of the Eastern Bloc, primarily in agriculture which was not collectivized in Poland, unlike most other state-socialist states (Janicka et al., 2007: 49). This criterion divided the working populace into independent farmers and small business owners on the one hand, and the remainder who were employed in the nationalized sector on the other.

Third, regular workers could be further differentiated depending on their “location in the centralized economy” (Kohn & Słomczynski, 1990: 39); that is, on whether they were employed in the core of the economy doing “production” work, or the periphery doing “non-production” work (Janicka et al., 2007: 49). Production work reflected a privileged position of the heavy industry in state-socialist economies (of high strategic importance, especially in military terms) at the expense of other branches of the economy, resulting in a division of manual workers into two groups: production (“large-scale manufacturing and extractive enterprises”) and non-production workers (secondary and supportive industries, and services), with the former, thanks to their role in industrialization, considered strategically important and thus having better bargaining position with the central authorities than the latter, which was a source of privileges.

Finally, all workers could have been divided into manual and non-manual, a key distinction in most class schemas, but of somewhat special importance in the Polish context, where “the mental component of performed work” (Ibid.: 49), was symbolically very important (non-manual jobs, of any kind, guaranteeing more prestige). This made manual vs. non-manual work very important; in such a relationship the working class was still dominated, even though

the class of capitalist owners had ceased to exist, but in this new setting their class opponent was the intelligentsia (see also Domański, 2015).

The relationship between class and social status in the PPR

Further characteristics of the class system could be seen when one examines the relationship between the class schema and social stratification. In the theoretical approach to social class widely accepted and deployed in empirical studies by Polish sociologists of class, the class schema devised was not hierarchical, so the hierarchy of classes could be seen only when they were ranked on some external criteria pertaining to social stratification. Social stratification was conceptualized as resulting from uneven distribution of material rewards and scarce resources, that is, formal education, occupational rank/status and job income, a synthetic measure of which (the first dimension of a factor analysis model) was taken to be a measure of the overall status (stratification position).

Interestingly, when viewed through the lenses of this systematic analysis of class and stratification, under state socialism Polish society did not significantly differ from other industrial countries. The inter-relationships between stratificational variables showed that even though the relative weight of capitals might have been different, and a lot indeed depended on political capital, the system of stratification was similar to other industrial societies at the level of the most basic measures (Słomczyński & Tomescu-Dubrow, 2018: 58). The allocation of skills and qualifications to occupational requirements was reasonably rational and efficient. This is clear from the high correlation between education and occupational status (1978: $R=0.63$, 1988: $R=0.75$, Słomczyński, Janicka & Tomescu-Dubrow, 2010: 562) that resulted from a system of formal directives governing the allocation of people to positions suited for their qualifications, which was part of the central planning principle. However, the correlations between income and both occupational status and education were lower than between education and occupational status, which is a sign that the system of rewards was highly dependent on political decisions (the lower correlation in this case perhaps resulted from the much higher position of the working class in the income hierarchy than in capitalist countries). Generally, these relationships were prone to political manipulation, as happened during the 1980s when they fell even further and for some time manual workers effectively earned more than non-manual (Domański, 2000a).

Sociological studies consistently showed that classes formed a clear hierarchy of status that existed throughout the state-socialist era. The top was occupied by those with political capital, that is, *nomenklatura* (sometimes referred to simply as managers), followed by experts/specialists, petty bourgeoisie/private entrepreneurs (a surprisingly high position for a supposedly marginal class), supervisors, production workers, non-production workers and finally farmers. The same overall score could have been produced by a different combination of the constituent component scores, thus the position of different classes on a comparable overall level of status could be the result of a different configuration of the resources they owned. There was then a sort of capital composition difference: experts, who were better educated and had more complex/prestigious jobs, earned less than managers, the primary holders of political capital, who in turn trailed experts in terms of education and job complexity/prestigiousness. (Słomczyński & Shabad, 1996: 168-169) One could argue that this relationship was in fact not that much different from that between capitalist managers and experts (which is, as will be seen, confirmed by the data from the period after 1989). The source of the difference, however, was political rather than economic capital. A similar capital opposition was visible also on the lower level of the hierarchy, where factory workers, less educated and doing less complex work but better positioned politically, were better paid than office workers, again illustrating that the system of rewards was under the control of the ruling political elite rather than the business and financial one, as it would have been in a capitalist system. Against this backdrop, the composition of supervisors' capital was balanced, as their scores were high (but not the highest hence their middle overall position) across all three dimensions. The petty bourgeoisie/private entrepreneurs might have been on the margins of the system of power/in the structure of power, but their income was second only to that of managers, and in the final stages of the state-socialist era almost on a par with them. Finally, all the components of the peasants' status were consistently among the lowest of all classes (Słomczyński & Shabad, 1996: 168-169).

The distribution of economic capital

An examination of the distribution of further available measures of economic capital reveals that it might have actually played a bigger role than is usually granted, however it still not to the extent typical for Western capitalist countries.⁹

Regarding income distribution, one observes that the gap between manual and non-manual jobs was low: foremen and skilled manual workers earned less than professionals and managers but only by a small margin, and the unskilled workers earned roughly the same as the office and service workers, and the only group earning much more were directors (that is, those in top economic *nomenklatura* positions). However, the inter-class material differences were more pronounced when one analysed family income per capita, and were especially marked in living conditions, where the distance between professionals, semi-professionals and managers, on the one hand, and the semi- and unskilled workers, farmers and farm labourers, on the other, was huge, with about 65-70 percent of the former living in good conditions compared to only 6-18 percent of the latter. The same was true for car ownership (cars being a luxury good and an important signifier of material status in the state-socialist era) where the ranking was topped by directors, 58 percent of whom possessed a car, followed by owners (50 percent), and managers and professionals (about 20 percent). In contrast, car ownership across all working-class occupational categories was below 10 percent (Pohoski, 1986; see also Słomczyński & Wesołowski, 1968). Importantly, the consistently high position of owners on several different measures of material wealth strengthens the case that at least some of the old capitalist principles were still at work and towards the end of state-socialist period the distance between this class and the majority of classes/occupational groupings was even growing (Domański, 2000, Ch. 5).

The distribution of cultural capital

Besides the already reported differential distribution of educational capital among classes/occupational groupings, marked differences were also visible in relation to other measures of cultural capital, e.g. the number of books a person owned. In regard to reading books and weekly 'highbrow', 'high quality' magazines, there was a clear division between

⁹ Fortunately, the occupational schema in Pohoski (1986) is more detailed than the class schema presented above, so it allows for a better description of the differentiation.

non-manual and manual workers: ranging from office workers (with over 60 percent engaged in reading) to foremen (with only 30 percent engaged) (Słomczyński & Wesołowski, 1968:198-200).

The differentiation of paternal cultural capital manifested most clearly in inequalities of access to education. Despite the declarative equality enshrined in the official ideology and concrete policies that targeted the resulting educational inequalities, implemented by the majority of state-socialist countries, the influence of parent's background was still strong across state-socialist countries (with the exception of Russia) (Ganzeboom & Nieuwbeerta, 1999; see also Nieuwbeerta & Rijken, 1996). In Poland, there was a strong correlation between parents' social background (both education and occupation) and the choices made at all educational transitions, throughout the whole state-socialist period (Sawiński, 2018). Due to the structure of the education system in the PPR, the most important transition was the first, from the primary to secondary education, because this determined the final educational outcome for 60-70 percent of people (choosing at this stage a 3 year vocational school, instead of other paths, closed off the opportunity to pursue an academic degree in future). Having a father who was a worker or a farmer significantly lowered the chances of continuing education after completing elementary school in comparison to a father who was a non-manual worker, as did having a mother who had completed only primary education in comparison to having a mother who had completed or partially completed secondary education. The pattern was similar for the chances of completing secondary school. At the second transition, from secondary to tertiary education, professional fathers and mothers with secondary and especially tertiary education had a positive effect. Class background also shaped professional career paths: children of unskilled workers and farmers were less likely to continue education, and instead more likely to take a manual job or stay unemployed, in contrast to the children of professionals who had significantly higher chances of continuing education than low-level non-manual workers (Domański and Tomescu--Dubrow, 2018).

Moreover, parental cultural capital was a much more important determinant of educational success than parent's party membership (which appeared to be not at all significant). This is surprising (to say the least) considering all that has been said above about the role played by political capital. More generally, parental cultural capital (measured by cultural participation), not just educational capital, played an important role in propelling people along their educational path (Ganzeboom and Nieuwbeerta, 1999). Ganzeboom &

Nieuwbeerta (1999) concluded that communist countries failed to curtail the extent of inter-generational transmission of status.

Social mobility in the PPR

The conclusion that the Polish class structure and system of stratification were not that different from other industrial societies is further confirmed by patterns of social mobility. Poland was examined alongside other industrial societies in the famous study by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). The base model fits the Polish case very well, but the authors had to introduce some adjustments to achieve this. These adjustments reflected the effects of the pro-equality steps taken by the authorities, such as changes to the hierarchy of prestige and material rewards in favour of manual workers, on the one hand, and allowing for increased mobility from the working class to high managerial and administrative positions on the other. Poland was characterised by a low affinity between the service class and other non-manual workers, by a higher affinity between the service class and working class, by the almost non-existent effects of a hierarchy of class, and low sectorial effects (mobility between agricultural and other sectors) on the one hand, but on the other hand very strong inheritance effects, especially for the service class and petty bourgeoisie, but also for working class and non-manual workers.

The authors concluded that their findings reflected a complex pattern of social mobility, which in principle was similar to other industrial countries but at the same time showed some signs of opening the channels of upward mobility. This is likely to have been a joint effect of a general and profound upheaval in the social structure caused by World War II, on a scale comparable perhaps only to Germany¹⁰, which was then combined with a state policy that promoted social mobility, which was perhaps more effective than in other state-socialist countries (at least those studied by Erikson and Goldthorpe).

The ramifications of systemic transformation

The transition from state-socialism to capitalism was undoubtedly a complex and multifaceted historical process, but looking at it from the perspective of internal struggles within the field of power, the shape of the so-called systemic transformation was decided by a victorious alliance of technocrats, managers and former dissidents (Eyal et al. 1998: Ch. 2) .

¹⁰ And probably the USSR which was not examined in the study.

Class differentiation changed in two ways in the systemic transformation. First and foremost, there was a profound change in the very logic underlying the class system: the economy became largely independent of the realm of politics as the communist party lost control over it and shortly after ceased to exist altogether. It was decided that the transition should be swift and far-reaching, and Leszek Balcerowicz, a party technocrat ¹¹ inspired by Western (neo)liberal economic ideas of the kind described by Eyal et al. (1998), was entrusted with the task (Kowalik, 2010). However, the transition from state-socialist to capitalist economy was in fact a complex and lengthy process, most importantly due to the fact that privatization was initiated in a situation of *capitalism without capitalists* Eyal et al.(1998); that is, a robust institutional capitalist framework appeared soon after the systemic transformation but this was not followed by an equally prompt transition from state- to private-ownership. This resulted from the fact that there was simply not enough capital to perform privatization rapidly because, on the one hand, the nascent private sector developing from the state-socialist second economy was too small and weak, and on the other, foreign investors were deterred by the fact that the country was heavily indebted and thus viewed as risky, plagued by hyperinflation and generally seen as a challenging place for investment (due to capital stock obsolescence, inefficient transport and communication facilities, problems with the availability of economic information and so on) (Szelényi and Szelényi, 1995).

Secondly, changing the logic of the system obviously brought the transformation of the class structure itself, that is, most classes transformed to a degree and some disappeared altogether. However, one has to note that in this second sense, the change was gradual and its overall degree rather moderate, certainly not revolutionary. First, there was a profound change at the top of the class structure. The end of the communist party meant, by extension, the formal end of the *nomenklatura* class. This poses an important question about the role and the value of political capital in the new circumstances. On the one hand, considering that political capital was primarily resulting from the social network revolving around the communist party and secondary organizations dependent of it, the dissolution of the communist party and the subsequent demise of many these organizations, accompanied by the rising influence of new actors coming from the anti-communist opposition, one could reasonably expected decrease of the amount of power guaranteed by one's pre-transition position in these networks. On the other, however, there was a possibility that the formal dissolution of the key elements of the

¹¹ At the time of the transition, actually a former member, as he had left the communist party in 1981.

old social system did not necessarily mean decrease of the actual value of the political capital at one's disposal. Importantly, the economic transition was a gradual process that could not happen overnight (e.g. due to the constraints of privatization mentioned above) what indicated a possibility of a high degree of inertia of the old system. As the control over economy was one of the key sources of power of the communist party and, more specifically, socialist managers who were the backbone of *the nomenklatura* class, it could have been reasonably expected to observe a good deal of elite reproduction. The degree of this process underwent a thorough investigation by academics.

According to Wasilewski (1995), three primary hypotheses about the nature of the elite change were proposed (sorted in the order of the degree of change posited). First, some postulated (primarily those who opposed non-violent character of the transition) that there was no revolution but quite the opposite, a “simple reproduction” of the old system. It was argued that the change was superficial and cosmetic as only those at the very top of the structure of power were dismissed, whilst the majority managed to retain power. Second, there was a “reproduction via conversion” hypothesis, which stated that the communist *nomenklatura*, in order to keep at least some of their power and influence, designed and implemented the systemic transformation in a way that would have allowed them to transfer their political capital into economic capital, that is, translate the control of the state-owned means of production into ownership and/or control over firms, hence turning them into a capitalist propertied bourgeoisie and/or managers. This hypothesis was developed primarily by academics and hence was the most theoretically advanced (notably by Hankiss, 1990 and Staniszkis, 1991). Third, according to others, the degree of change brought by the systemic transformation was very high and the *nomenklatura* was in fact a “victim of the revolution” as its members were deposed from their positions solely because of their political affiliation, with no consideration of merit whatsoever. This view, not surprisingly, was promoted primarily by those who were the members of the *nomenklatura* themselves.

These hypotheses were examined in detail thanks to the data from the project *Social Stratification in Eastern Europe After 1989*. However, the interpretation of the results of this study was not straightforward and, more specifically, there was a divergence of opinion regarding what conditions should be met to confirm or reject the above-mentioned hypotheses.

Eyal et al. (1998), addressing the “political capital theory” (which more or less corresponds to what Wasilewski framed as the “reproduction via conversion”), focused on the

overall degree of reproduction understood as the number of the nomenklatura members in 1988 who remained in any position of authority in 1993 (roughly 50 percent of the sample). In such a formulation all those who did not manage to keep their positions were then subjected to downward mobility and the size of this group, around the half of the sample, was read as a sign of “massive” downward mobility. For those who did not manage to stay in power, an early retirement was the most common destination (17.2 percent) (Eyal et al. 1998: 117) The possibility that some chose the early retirement to pursue a career in business or that they otherwise enriched themselves was also refuted, then confirming that in the majority of cases their trajectory meant downgraded mobility (Ibid.: 121-128). Eyal et al. interpreted the number of the nomenklatura members who became “high” managers or entrepreneurs in the private sector as very low and, crucially, lower than the figure for the early retirees (13.1 percent compared to 17.2 percent). Moreover, in the former category managers dominated private owners (7.1 vs. 4 percent). Overall then, the authors concluded that these findings amounted to a rejection of the political capital theory. Eyal et al. account of the fate of the nomenklatura is, however, not without some debatable choices. Most importantly, the group of the downwardly mobile constituted a rather heterogeneous group consisting of professionals, workers, early retirees (those younger than 65) and other retirees. It could be then argued that these categories represented a rather different types of downward mobility (becoming a worker compared to becoming an early pensioner) and in case of becoming a professional it could be disputed that this constituted downward mobility at all.¹²

A different interpretation of the same data was offered by Wasilewski (Ibid.). He defined the group of downwardly mobile differently.¹³ Hence, Wasilewski did not include professionals in this number and was much more cautious about the meaning of early retirement in this regard (as it could have been a deliberate choice or related to health issues). Instead, he regarded as downwardly mobile only those whose trajectory was from the nomenklatura to manual workers and white-collar work. This approach resulted in a rather different picture as only about 8 percent of the former nomenklatura were found to be downwardly mobile. Moreover, he took a different approach regarding how high the number of the nomenklatura members moving to business should be in order to speak of conversion of

¹² It would also have been more fortunate to exclude the non-insignificant group of retirees (8.2% in Poland) from the equation altogether, as this path could not be taken as related to social mobility, but simply reflected the life-cycle effect (what the authors admit themselves). Had the authors done it, the figure for those who remained in the position of authority would have been higher.

¹³ The categorization of the nomenklatura destinations in Wasilewski is slightly different than that employed by Eyal et al., but close enough to allow for a direct comparison.

political capital into economic capital. Instead of focusing on the overall rate of outflow from the *nomenklatura* to business he looked on the problem in a comparative manner assessing the chances of the *nomenklatura* relative to other social categories. Therefore, he considered the share of the *nomenklatura* who went to private business category (24.4%) to be high enough to offer a robust support to confirm the conversion of capital hypothesis.¹⁴

However, Eyal et al. and Wasilewski generally converge in their conclusions in regard to the assessment of how different fractions of *nomenklatura* fared in the post-1989 reality. When the internal differentiation of the *nomenklatura* was taken into account (conceptualized as three fractions: economic, political and cultural), it was the economic fraction that was most successful in achieving important social positions, primarily of an economic character (whether managers or owners), there was much more circulation in the cultural faction, but it was the political faction, in direct opposition to the prediction, that was the least successful (Eyal et al. 1998, ch.4; Szelényi and Szelényi 1995). However, controlling for the internal variation of the political elite was necessary to get a more accurate and comprehensive picture of its fate: it was the party apparatus that experienced the negative effect of the transition most acutely, whilst the state administration and especially members of the official mass organizations fared much better (the latter actually no worse than the economic and cultural factions of the *nomenklatura*) (Wasilewski 1995: 120, see also Böröcz and Róna-Tas 1995: 773; Eyal et al. 1998: 124-125). Moreover, the risk of social degradation within that group was highest for those with the lowest educational credentials (Wasilewski 1995: 122).

What should be then the most general conclusion on the post-1989 elite change and the role political capital played in it? Referring to the three hypotheses distinguished by Wasilewski, it seems quite clear that there is not much evidence to support neither of the extreme ones: on the one hand, “no change” hypothesis could be refuted, as many members of the former elite were downwardly mobile, but on the other, there was still a good deal of elite reproduction as others managed to thrive in the new circumstances, thus disproving that the *nomenklatura* was as a victim of the transition. Regarding the capital conversion/political capitalism hypothesis the opinion varied depending on the details of its formulation and deployed definitions. What is certain however, is that at least some degree of capital conversion

¹⁴ The figure in Wasilewski is significantly higher than Eyal et al. (24.4 percents compared to 13.1) due to a different categorisation of the destinations: in Eyal et al. 1998 it included only “high” managers, whilst Wasilewski included all managers. A direct comparison is not possible because in Eyal et al. 1998 low-level managers were presented jointly, with no private-public breakdown, thus it is unknown how many of them should be added to the “high” managers and entrepreneurs to allow for a direct comparison.

was indeed observed and that the most beneficial kind of resources at hand was a combination of cultural capital (in the form of managerial knowledge and experience) and political capital (guaranteed by holding a *nomenklatura* position), whereas a portfolio based solely on cultural and especially political capital was less effective as a means of retaining high social position. Importantly, a similar pattern was also captured by the analysis of overall social mobility, giving them further credence at the level of elites. The most probable mobility path for *nomenklatura* members was a transition to management and entrepreneurialism (Słomczyński et al. 2010: 570-572; Słomczyński and Tomescu--Dubrow 2018b).

Finally, these patterns are overall largely in line with the technocratic advance thesis, which stated that only the technocratic wing of the *nomenklatura* (propelled upward thanks to its expertise and knowledge of the state-socialist economy, which was necessary for privatization) benefitted from the transition, not the whole class. A more general formulation of this thesis stated that cultural capital became the most valuable asset in the new reality, opening the opportunity for recruitment into the new economic elite. Moreover, in the face of the lack of financial capital, cultural capital was said to be crucial in developing less capital intensive business (eg., IT) (Böröcz and Róna-Tas, 1995).

Speaking of new classes, the most important was the emergence of the class of independent owners/entrepreneurs, perhaps the most distinctive and central class in any capitalist society. In the new capitalist environment they could now operate unconstrained by the ideology of state-socialism and undoubtedly many people used that opportunity. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of mobility into the new class showed that continuity prevailed – although this path was theoretically open to anyone, the chance of moving into its ranks was greatest for people who already had some experience in this role; that is, those working in the second economy before 1989, followed by *nomenklatura* members. However, not all of those formerly active in the second economy managed to start businesses large enough to employ other people, and instead they moved into the class of self-employed (Ibid.).

The pre-1989 working class and peasants were other classes whose character certainly changed. In case of the former, the division into privileged core production workers and underprivileged peripheral workers became irrelevant in the new political and economic reality. The typical path of mobility for production workers was into the ranks of skilled workers, whereas the majority of non-production workers became unskilled workers. The overwhelming majority of peasants remained in their class. What changed, however, was their

relation to the state and the market – in the PPR their role was limited to production, as distribution was fully under state control (at least official channels); and after 1989 they became independent farmers operating freely on the market (Ibid.).

It seems that the trajectory of the other classes (experts, supervisors, office workers) was characterized by continuity, but this is harder to assess because in the available analyses these were lumped together into a single category of *office workers*. There were four possible destinations: movement into the ranks of experts was most likely, followed by supervisors, managers and technicians and office workers ¹⁵ (Ibid.).

Changes in the hierarchy of class

The principle of the relationships between the constituent elements of the status score remained largely unchanged: the strength of the correlations between education and occupational status and between income and occupational status remained similar to the pre-1989 level and these two correlations were still much lower than between education and income, which in a way confirmed that state-socialist Poland shared a lot with other industrial societies. However, there was a significant change in the strength of the education and income correlation. In the initial phase of systemic transformation it fluctuated without a clear trend but after 1998 there was a marked increase from about 0.2 in 1998 to 0.4 in 2008 (Słomczyński, Janicka, Tomescu-Dubrow, 2010: 562). Moreover, this effect was largely independent of other possible intervening factors¹⁶ and not only was education a robust predictor of income after 1989, but the strength of this relationship was also consistently increasing. A conventional interpretation of these findings is that this was a sign of rising meritocracy (Domański, 2011; Słomczyński et al., 2010). However, from the Bourdieusian point of view, one can interpret this as reflecting a change in the conversion rate between capitals – cultural capital in the capitalist environment translated into greater material rewards. A possible and very important ramification of this could have been the strengthening of the capital volume principle.

Another important aspect of the impact of the systemic transformation on the social structure examined by Polish sociologists pertained to the change in the overall stratificational

¹⁵ This resulted from the authors' decision to deploy a less detailed version of the class schema for the state-socialist part of the table. Quite probably if the authors had included a more detailed class schema for the pre-1989 period, the observed movement would have been between the equivalent classes, e.g. from supervisors to supervisors, from experts to experts and so on.

¹⁶ That is, when this was tested in regression models controlling for a set of potentially intervening variables.

position of classes.¹⁷ The overall hierarchy remained largely unchanged in the 1990s, although there were some notable changes at the top after 2000. First, experts got ahead of managers and led the table from 2003 to 2008, but were later outrun by business owners/entrepreneurs, whose position gradually rose after 1989 until they reached the very top in 2013. Such a change at the top of the class hierarchy is without doubt significant as it reflects the growing importance of economic capital, something one would expect in a capitalist economy. In the middle of the hierarchy, supervisors managed to maintain a consistent score throughout the post-communist period and kept swapping positions with the self-employed, another descendant of the state-socialist private sector, whose score varied and was in some years one place ahead of, and in other one place behind, supervisors. There was also some movement at the bottom where farmers climbed one place, pushing unskilled workers into last place after 2000 (though there is a question about whether this was a persistent change).

When one observes the pattern of distances between the scores of individual classes on the first dimension of the factor model alone, it is hard to grasp how these distances changed. The degree of change in the relative position of classes is better visible when the most successful are grouped together, those who were winners in the transformation, on the one hand, and those who were least successful, the losers, on the other. The winners included managers, experts and business owners/entrepreneurs; the losers were manual workers (skilled and unskilled) and farmers. The distance between these groupings was large even in the PPR (1988: 2.5) but after 1989 it was consistently increasing until it reached 3.2 in 2013 (Janicka and Słomczyński 2014: 64; on the winners – losers divide see also Janicka et al. 2007; Słomczynski and Janicka 2008, Słomczyński, Janicka, and Tomescu-Dubrow 2014). One of the most important immediate costs of this economic *shock therapy* was a rapid increase in unemployment. While the rate of unemployment in the early months of 1990 was still close to 0, it began to grow consistently every month. By the beginning of 1992 it exceeded 12 percent and reached its peak of 16.5 percent in 1994. Such levels of unemployment were unseen before 1989 and were all the more shocking as they stood in stark contrast with the policy of full employment, one of the tenets of state-socialism, now abruptly abandoned. These costs were distributed very unequally along the winners – losers line: the former (managers and

¹⁷ Measured in the same fashion as reported earlier for the state-socialist period.

professionals) hardly experienced any unemployment, whilst almost a quarter in 1993 and about one fifth in 1994 and 1995 of the latter (manual workers) were jobless.¹⁸

An additional measure of the increasing differentiation between classes is the score on the second dimension of the factor analysis measuring *status inconsistency*, that is, the extent to which the components of status are negatively related, on the one hand education and occupational status, and on the other, income. It could be taken as measuring whether a class is over-rewarded, under-rewarded or rewarded “‘justly’”, relative to its level of education and the characteristics of occupations forming it – in an ideally meritocratic society the score should equal 0, as this would mean that all classes were rewarded exactly as their level of skill and job complexity required. However, looking at the problem from a Bourdieusian perspective *status inconsistency* could be seen as reflecting the capital composition principle, to some extent at least, as education, job prestige/complexity and income are obviously rather crude indicators of capitals.

At the top of the hierarchy of classes, entrepreneurs were over-rewarded in 1998 and 2003 and were joined by managers in 2003 (who in 1998 were slightly under-rewarded), in contrast to experts who in both years were under-rewarded (though their position slightly improved). Between these extremes, the self-employed were over-rewarded in 2003; office workers were downgraded from being over-rewarded in 1998 to being under-rewarded in 2003; less prominent, skilled workers were to some extent over-rewarded in both 1998 and 2003, while unskilled workers’ score was balanced and farmers’ situation worsened from being slightly over-rewarded in 1998 to being under-rewarded in 2003.¹⁹

The authors fail to offer a more in-depth interpretation of why such a pattern was observed other than simply stating the facts and labelling the over-rewarded as winners and under-rewarded as losers. This result further corroborates the growing importance of the presentation of a winners vs. losers divide, but also points to a form of differentiation of capital composition at the top and middle level of the class hierarchy: those involved in an independent

¹⁸ The specification of the winners and losers categories is not exactly the same as in Janicka and Słomczyński’s analyses but close enough to capture the key difference: winners are defined as the ISCO 1 and 2 categories (managers and professionals), losers are defined as the ISCO 7,8,9 categories (craft and related trades workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers, elementary occupations). The rates of unemployment were respectively: in 1993 3.8 percent vs. 23.2 percent, in 1994 0.4 percent vs. 22.2 percent, in 1995 1.5 percent vs. 18.4 percent. All differences are statistically significant at the level of 0.99. Source: the Polish General Social Survey data.

¹⁹ The analysis is unfortunately limited to the years 1998-2003.

business activity could expect to get a greater material reward even though their level of cultural capital was lower.

The structural determinants of the shape of Polish social space

A few factors have been found to be in a close relationship with the relative strength of the capital volume and capital composition principles. The factors that strengthen the capital composition dimension at the cost of capital volume are a low level of economic inequality, a high level of education of the population and high state investment in education, a high share of managers and professionals in the occupational structure, large public and service sectors, and a high rate of female employment (Atkinson, 2019). Such a combination is also found in the Scandinavian countries, so far the societies most extensively explored by Bourdieusian scholars, and which I use as a reference below when discussing these factors and their change in Poland after 1989.

In Poland after 1989 the earnings dispersion rose rapidly and significantly. This occurred in most of the former state-socialist countries, regardless of the pace and decisiveness of the transition from state-socialist to market economy, and it seems that this resulted primarily from the dissolution of the central system of wage setting (Rutkowski, 2001). In the final years of the PPR the Gini coefficient for income was in the range 0.21–0.24 (Domański, 2000a; Keane and Prasad, 2006; Rutkowski, 2001), by the end of the 1990s it exceeded 0.3 (Rutkowski, 2001). Comparatively speaking, Poland moved from the category of countries with low income dispersion to that with 'modestly high' dispersion (Ibid.). The Gini coefficient reached its peak at 0.36 in 2005. At that point the level of income inequality in Poland was considerably higher than the European Union average (0.29) and one of the highest in Europe.

²⁰ After the peak, the Gini coefficient decreased gradually and around 2010 it stabilised at around 0.3, finally falling below this in 2016. This recent decline meant that Poland moved down the ranks of European countries by income dispersion, in which it currently occupies a middling/middle position but its distance from the most equal countries (notably the Scandinavian countries, where the difference ranges from roughly 0.02 in Denmark and Sweden to 0.045-0.05 in Finland and Norway), is still sizable.²¹

²⁰ According to the Eurostat data Poland had the highest Gini coefficient, however, the list did not include some other countries characterised by large income inequalities e.g. Romania, Bulgaria.

²¹ Source: Eurostat. Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income - EU-SILC survey [ilc_di12].

In the last 20 years the Polish government has been investing around 11–12 percent of all government spending in education, which is a moderate figure – about 1 percentage point short of the OECD average and roughly equal to the European Union average. However, the distance from the Scandinavian countries was larger, in the range of 1 to 4 percentage points.²² Nevertheless, the education system in Poland underwent a significant transformation after 1989.

The evolution of the educational structure after 1989 was characterized by a continuous increase in the overall level of education of the populace. The structural cause behind that change was the increasing popularity of an educational path that offered the ability to continue studying at a university via general or technical secondary school at the expense of falling demand for vocational education (which, up to that point, had been the most common choice at the post-primary level).²³ The number of university graduates underwent a quick and very significant increase.²⁴

The change in the popularity of particular educational paths translated into the transformation of the overall educational structure; that is, on the one hand, a sharp continuous decrease in the proportion of people with only primary education or below, from 41.5 percent in 1988 to 18.3 percent and, on the other, a continuous increase in the percentage of those with degrees, from 6.9 percent in 1988 to 23.7 percent in 2017.²⁵ Moreover, there was a profound gender aspect to this increase – growth in university graduates was quicker among women,²⁶ and women outnumbered men for the first time in 1999 (although only by a minuscule 0.1 percentage points) a difference that grew to 6.5 percentage points in 2017.²⁷

²² Average spending for the period 1998 – 2014: OECD members 12.3 percent, European Union 11.5 percent, Euro area 11.6 percent, Poland 11.6 percent, Denmark 15 percent, Norway 16.1 percent, Sweden 13.3 percent, Finland 12.3 percent. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Government expenditure on education, total (percentage of government expenditure).

²³ The number of vocational school graduates was consistently decreasing relative to the numbers of general and technical secondary schools graduates until halfway through the 2000s, after which point the number of the former remained relatively stable and the latter started to decrease for demographic reasons: in 1990/91 the ratio of vocational to secondary school graduates was 1.16, in 2005/6 just 0.15 and 0.2 in 2015/16. Source: author's calculations on the data from *Rocznik Statystyczny* (2000), *Rocznik Statystyczny* (2017).

²⁴ In the academic year 1990/91 there were 56100 university graduates, a number that peaked in 2010/11 at 497500 and then began to slowly decrease to 364600 in 2015/16 (*Rocznik Statystyczny* 2000, 2017).

²⁵ Source: *Narodowy Spis Powszechny* (National Census) 1988, GUS, BDL, Percentage of population aged 15 and more by level of education, sex and place of residence.

²⁶ Graduate students were getting increasingly feminized throughout the 1990s, in the academic year 1990/91 the proportion of female to male students was roughly equal, from the late 1990s throughout the 2000s it was about 56 percent to reach almost 59 percent after 2010 (*Rocznik Statystyczny* 2000, 2001, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).

²⁷ 1999: women 8.1 percent, men 8 percent; 2017: women 26.8 percent, men 20.3 percent, Source: GUS, BDL, Percentage of population aged 15 and more by level of education, sex and place of residence 1995–2017.

Less pronounced changes, but still in line with the main trend, registered at other levels of education. The share of the secondary education category was steadily rising from 28 percent in 1988 to roughly 33 percent in 2006, when it stabilized at this level. Interestingly, considering the falling number of vocational school graduates, the reduction in the share of people with this qualification was very small, changing by only 1 percentage point, from 25 percent in 1988 to 24 percent in 2017.²⁸

From a comparative perspective, these changes meant that the Polish educational structure became much more similar to that of post-industrial Western European societies. At the end of the state-socialist era (1988) Poland lagged behind the majority of Western countries in regard to the percentage of university graduates. This began to change rapidly as the pace of growth of this category was higher in Poland than in the West: on the verge of the 1980s and 90s in the most highly educated Scandinavian countries, where the capital composition principle seems to be strongest, there were about 2 – 2.5 times more university graduates than in Poland, the difference being smaller for other countries like France (1.5). However, it has to be noted that for some countries (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Italy) the ratio was almost equal or actually favourable for Poland. By 2014 the gap had shrunk significantly and in the most highly educated Western European countries (the Scandinavian countries, Germany, UK) there were on average only 1.2–1.3 more university diploma holders than in Poland, which was then almost on a par with France.²⁹

After 1989, the occupational structure underwent a transformation which brought it closer to that of Western European post-industrial economies. First, there was a steady increase in the number of professionals, from 9.5 percent in 1997 to 19.4 percent in 2017, and second, a considerable decrease in the number of farmers, from 19 percent in 1997, to 9 percent in 2017. The slight increase in share of service and sales workers, from 9.3 percent to 13.3 percent went in the same direction. However, Poland did not experience significant deindustrialization and the reduction in the size of working class was very moderate: on the one hand, the number of craft and related trades workers fell from 19.5 percent to 15.2 percent, though on the other, the number of plant and machine operators and assemblers rose slightly from 8.5 percent to 10.4 percent, thus limiting the overall reduction (that is, when these categories are taken

²⁸ Source: GUS, BDL, Percentage of population aged 15 and more by level of education, sex and place of residence 1995-2017.

²⁹ Source: Eurostat, Employment by sex, occupation and educational attainment level (1 000) [lfsa_egised] 1997–2017.

together as the most representative of the traditional working-class) to just 3 percentage points. Similar to many Western European countries, the number of clerical support workers fell, though this was a small change from 7.5 percent to 6.2 percent. Slightly more marked was the reduction in elementary occupations, from 8.2 percent to 6.5 percent. Finally, the number of managers stayed largely the same throughout the period analysed, oscillating at about 5 percent.³⁰

In comparison to the most developed post-industrial Western economies Poland is characterised by a relatively large share of professionals, roughly equal to the European average and higher than, for instance, France or Germany, but still considerably lower (by 5–8 percentage points) than the Scandinavian countries.³¹ The most notable features of the Polish occupational structure are a still very high proportion of farmers (which in the EU is higher only in Greece and Romania) and a sizeable share of traditional working class (the size of ISCO groups 7 and 8 is larger only in a few other post-communist countries).³² This is reflected in the sectorial structure of employment in Poland: the industrial sector absorbs 30.4 percent of total employment and is about 1.5 to 2.5 times bigger than in Western European post-industrial economies, whilst the agrarian sector absorbs 11.5 percent, a value almost 9 times higher.³³

By Western standards, under state socialism Poland was characterised by a huge public sector (around 80 percent of employment in 1989) (Arias et al., 2014). Due to the process of privatization this was gradually reduced to less than 30 percent. Employment in the Polish public sector in 2015 comprised 24 percent of all employment, still a considerably large figure, though smaller than in the Scandinavian countries leading the ranking.³⁴

The rate of female employment, understood as both the raw proportion of women in employment in the 20-64 age group (63.6 percent in 2017), as well as the proportion of women in employment relative to men in employment in the 20-64 age group (81.3 percent in 2017),

³⁰ Source: Eurostat LFS, Employment by sex, occupation and educational attainment level (1 000) [lfsa_egised] 1997–2017.

³¹ Sweden 27.9 percent, Norway 27.4 percent, Denmark 26.3 percent, Finland 25.0 percent. Source: Eurostat LFS, Employment by sex, occupation and educational attainment level (1 000) [lfsa_egised] 1997–2017.

³² Slovakia, Czech, Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria. Source: Eurostat LFS, Employment by sex, occupation and educational attainment level (1 000) [lfsa_egised] 1997–2017.

³³ Size of industrial sectors: Denmark 18.3 percent, Norway 19.3 percent, Germany 24.2 percent, France 20 percent, United Kingdom 15.2 percent, Sweden 12 percent, Finland 20.7 percent; size of the agrarian sector: Denmark 2.4 percent, Norway 2.1 percent, Germany 1.4 percent, France 2.8 percent, United Kingdom 1.3 percent, Sweden 2 percent, Finland 4 percent. (CIA The World Fact Book 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014).

³⁴ Norway 32 percent, Sweden 29 percent, Finland 27 percent (source: author's calculation based on the ILO data), Denmark 26 percent (source: author's calculation based on the Statistics Denmark data).

was consistently lower in Poland than in the majority of European countries, whether Western European or former state-socialist. In comparison to the countries characterised by the highest levels of female employment, most importantly the Scandinavian countries, the difference exceeded 10 percentage points, however, it was much smaller when compared to the European Union average (3 percentage points).³⁵ Nevertheless, there were only a few countries further down the ranking.³⁶ Importantly, although Poland was catching up, as in other areas, the pace of growth was lower in this case and Poland managed to bridge the gap only slightly or in some cases not at all.³⁷

The state of class research in Poland and applications of Bourdieu's ideas to Polish society after 1989

We have already discussed a large part of the literature of Polish sociology of class and stratification, but a closer look on the state of class research in Poland and the place of Bourdieu's ideas within it is necessary. As Ost (Ost, 2009, 2015) has highlighted, class as a concept, especially in the context of class inequalities and exploitation, has to a considerable degree disappeared from public and political discourse, as something supposedly linked to the communist regime propaganda. These sentiments have also affected sociology, where class was certainly not the most popular subject of study (definitely much less than in the UK). Some sociologists engaged in a sort of modernization discourse and were concerned with the need for a fast growing, strong middle class, which would be professionalised and westernised, seeing this as a stabilising force of democracy and capitalist economy. The post-transformational poverty and related issues were conceptualised as a sign of the failure of individual, personal character traits and parochial unwillingness to go along with the modernisation current, rather than a systemic problem and failure to transform some branches of the economy, which touched the working class disproportionately and could be understood from a class inequalities perspective (Ibid.).

However, the picture painted by Ost seems to be somewhat too pessimistic. The number of sociologists studying class may not have been large, but such scholarship definitely existed,

³⁵ All female employment related data is based on Eurostat LFS data, Employment and activity by sex and age - annual data.

³⁶ Difference up to 5 percentage points: Romania, Spain, Malta, Croatia; difference exceeding 10 percentage points: Italy Montenegro Greece, FYR Macedonia, Turkey.

³⁷ Comparison of the female employment rate in Poland as a proportion of the female employment rate in selected Western European countries in 1999 and 2017 – Poland to Norway, 1998: 0.75, 2017: 0.83; Poland to Denmark, 1998: 0.81, 2017: 0.86, Poland to Sweden, 1998: 0.8, 2017: 0.8, Poland to the UK, 1998: 0.88, 2017: 0.87.

it dated back to the 1960s and was of high academic quality what was substantiated by the mastery of the Western class theory and the deployment of the latest advances in data analysis. This is especially praiseworthy as the general political and social circumstances rendered this to be a true challenge. This scholarship continued into the post-communist era. Most of those interested in class and social stratification in Poland continued to work within Western theoretical frameworks. In this regard, the most popular was the tradition of American stratification research focused on the issues of occupational structure and prestige (represented by e.g. Peter Blau, Otis Duncan or Donald Treiman) and the primarily British neo-Weberian tradition of class research (John Goldthorpe and his affiliates being the most important references within this strand). Polish post-1989 sociology successfully studied issues being the mainstay of class and stratification studies such as occupational prestige and scales of occupations (e.g. Domański et al., 2010), educational homogamy in marriage selection (e.g. Domański and Przybysz, 2009), educational and income inequalities (e.g. Domański, 2010; Domański and Sawiński, 2012), to name just a few. Another achievement has been the development of the Polish Panel Survey POLPAN³⁸, a long-term comprehensive quantitative research project exploring the issues of class and stratification, coordinated by Kazimierz M. Słomczyński and Krystyna Janicka. POLPAN is a still ongoing study that started in 1988 and should be without doubt considered the most important Polish project of this kind, as it is an invaluable source of data on the Polish social structure and its changes in the last thirty years. Regardless of theoretical sympathies, the contribution of the “Warsaw School of studying class and stratification” (a label for this strand of research recently proposed in Tomescu-Dubrow, Słomczyński, Domański, et al., 2018) must be considered the main point of reference for any student of class and stratification of Polish society.

Within this strand of research Pierre Bourdieu has appeared in some of the works by Henryk Domański, one of the most productive Polish sociologists of class, who has employed advanced methods of statistical data analysis (linear regression and factor analysis) in order to explore some aspects of the link between the social structure of Polish society and cultural consumption, and at the same time explicitly referred to Bourdieu’s ideas in regard to these issues (Domański, 2000a, 2000b). He has tried to determine the relationship between being a member of a given socio-occupational category and the level of cultural capital (a synthetic indicator based on the frequency of going to libraries, museums, opera, theatre, listening to

³⁸ <http://polpan.org/en/>.

classical music and reading books). Furthermore, Domański has tried to prove that cultural capital is often inherited from one's parents, something fundamental in Bourdieu's theory. Domański's most important contribution is perhaps that he has generally succeeded in showing the importance of the cultural dimension of class divisions in Polish society, however, his analyses have important shortcomings, especially looking at the issue from the Bourdieusian perspective. First of all, he has used concepts taken from other theoretical traditions, so he has focused on the issues of social and occupational prestige (the Bourdieusian concepts of social and symbolic spaces have not been mentioned), but, most importantly, he has deployed the EGP class scheme which is hard to be reconciled with the Bourdieusian approach (see e.g. Atkinson and Rosenlund 2014). In effect, Domański's references to Bourdieu are rather superficial, as he has referred only to some elements of the empirical layer of Bourdieu's conclusions, taken at face value, to comment on his own findings. Domański's contribution notwithstanding, Bourdieu overall has not played any bigger role in the Polish scholarship on class and stratification and when Bourdieusian ideas have been referred to, their critical spirit has often been lost (Warczok and Zarycki, 2014).

A rather problematic conceptualization of social position has also haunted recent projects exploring cultural consumption (Bachórz et al., 2016; Drozdowski et al., 2014). In the project *Kulturalna Hierarchia. Nowe Dystynkcje* (Bachórz 2016), social position is operationalised through a single synthetic indicator summarising information from the following variables: respondent's and parents' education, occupational status (economically inactive, manual, non-manual managers), income and home size (in square meters). This synthetic measure is referred to as dividing the population into people with high or low social position. This means that not only is the measure of social position unidimensional, most akin to socio-economic status, and probably, considering the variables used, reflecting capital volume, but also, that the occupation component of this synthetic measure is based on a rather crude division, which neither reflects any particular class schema nor an occupational schema (e.g. ISCO), and the authors do not offer any detailed rationale for this choice. Such conceptualisation and operationalisation of social position is thus unable to capture differentiation along the capital composition dimension. In other study, *Praktyki kulturalne Polaków* (Drozdowski et al., 2014), the measures of capital are also rather basic, as in the case of educational capital no question has been asked about the field of study. The operationalisation of occupation is also problematic because it does not correspond to any international or Polish classification of occupations, as the authors distinguished just five

groups: working-class occupations, technical/production occupations, occupations in services, teachers and occupations requiring higher education, and owners. These categories, again, do not allow for capturing the capital composition differentiation but are also imprecise and not necessarily disjunctive (e.g., what is the difference between working-class and production occupations?).

The most comprehensive use of some of the key ideas of Bourdieu's model of class has been offered by Zarycki (2008, 2015). His starting point are ideas developed by Eyal et al. (1998). He assumes the special role played by cultural capital in post-socialist Poland in the process of the transition to capitalism and speaks of the Polish class structure as reflecting a "dual stratification order" where "the economic logic of class clashing continually with the logic of rank, which is defined in terms of cultural capital." (Zarycki, 2015) This is a rather problematic take on the relationship between class and status as it seems to mirror the conceptualisation of Goldthorpe and Chan (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007a). However, putting the theoretical problems aside, the more practical conclusion of Zarycki's theorising is that cultural capital has much higher importance in Poland than in Western European societies. This stems from the way in which Zarycki understands economic capital which is here seen as closer to the logic of modernity – in the sense that it is the form that dominates social stratification only in fully modernised countries – as it is a basis for the highly impersonal and abstract social relations that are characteristic for countries highly developed economically. Social capital, in turn, is considered to be pre-modern, as it plays the primary role in social systems characterised by the pre-eminence of close personal social bonds, observed within closely integrated and inclusive groups that form pre-modern societies. Finally, cultural capital is considered to be in between, as, in its institutionalised form, it is closer to economic capital (so characteristic of modernity), whilst its embodied form is closer to the pre-modern social order and social capital. In other words, institutionalised cultural capital is more formal, whereas its embodied form tends to be more informal (Zarycki, 2008).

Building on this, Zarycki distinguishes four main types of cultural capital: institutionalised ("classical", as he calls it), embodied capital, informal, "group" capital and objectified capital. All of these are then adjusted for the Polish context (Ibid.: 66–9; 70–9)

With regard to cultural capital in its institutionalised form, which in Zarycki's approach is understood mainly as formal education, he suggests dividing it into two additional subtypes: technocratic, characteristic of people who hold an economic or technical degree, and

intellectual, specific to individuals whose educational title is related to the arts and humanities. It seems that the main goal of this distinction is to name the resources that are key to the capital stock of, on the one hand, technocrats, and, on the other, a broad category of intellectuals or representatives of the intelligentsia (Ibid.) This proposition is in line with a division along the field of study (technical/business vs. humanistic) which has been postulated to be a key differentiating feature within the most highly educated groups (e.g. Van De Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004) and, of course, it could be understood as related to capital composition. Next, Zarycki proposes to distinguish a specific type of embodied cultural capital which is named “post-aristocratic”. It refers to “manners”, “level of competence in relation to high culture” and a “sophisticated style of life and consumption” – a subtype that is close to social capital (Zarycki 2008: 70-71). Informal, “group” capital is formed within particular fields of struggle for symbolic dominance (defined in relation to social groups, for example the field of the intelligentsia or of the anti-communist opposition), and the formation takes place through “transforming the specific indicators of the group identity into the universal symbols of prestige” (Ibid.: 71). It refers to profound knowledge of the most important elements of the identity and discourse of a given group and the ability to use them fluently. Zarycki introduces three subtypes of this form of cultural capital, all of them related to the fields created by social actors dominating in the cultural field:

1. the capital of the intelligentsia – “the ability to discursively refer to the ethos of intelligentsia”, “erudition in reference to the aspects of the country’s socio–political history (...) important from the point of view of intelligentsia”, “the mastery of the aesthetics and lifestyle of intelligentsia”);
2. oppositional capital – “the ability to refer to the values of the anti–communist opposition”; “the mastery of the oppositional lifestyle”,
3. religious capital: “the ability to refer to the religious values”, “the knowledge and mastery of religious rituals” (Ibid.: 71).

Importantly, even though all these subtypes of embodied and informal “group” capital originate from the communist period, they also play a significant role in contemporary Poland. However, Zarycki predicts that the importance of oppositional capital will gradually diminish.

Zarycki’s work is certainly a very valuable contribution to the field of Bourdieusian studies (perhaps the single-most comprehensive in Poland), developing Bourdieu’s ideas in the

Polish context in a highly original way. However, the key question for this thesis is how Zarycki's advancements could be deployed in quantitative analysis. Looking from this point of view, it is problematic that Zarycki's argument is that it does not build on solid quantitative data analysis, but is more a theoretical work.³⁹ It is not exactly clear how the distinguished forms of capital could be measured, as first, no practical guidance has been provided on how to operationalise them, and, second, it is not clear as a part of which of spaces their role and importance should be explored. Regarding the latter point, religious capital could be probably conceptualised as an element of political space (perhaps as a moral dimension), post-aristocratic as belonging to the space of lifestyles. Intelligentsia capital is the most problematic to pin down, as it could relate to either the space of lifestyles (knowledge and preferences of particular forms), or social space.

Moreover, some of Zarycki's reasoning could be questioned on theoretical grounds. For instance, conceptualising post-aristocratic capital as being close to social capital – because, inferring from the definition provided, it seems that is simply a form of embodied capital that refers to certain forms of culture and lifestyle, usually labelled “legitimate culture“. The same goes for “intelligentsia capital” (assuming that it belongs to the space of lifestyles). Of course, there may be some specifically Polish elements of cultural capital, but these could be addressed simply by choosing the right lifestyle and cultural consumption indicators and there is no need to introduce new forms of capital, as too many concepts could lead to confusion rather than enriching the understanding of Polish social space. Another problem is that this approach risks confusing different levels of analysis; for example, oppositional capital seems to have a much more limited (field) scope, in comparison to intelligentsia and post-aristocratic capitals, which seem to be more applicable to spaces (e.g. social or symbolic). However, yet another interpretation is possible – as these capitals seem to be related primarily to people located higher up in social space, they could be much more useful for the analysis of elites/the field of power. Finally, what is more it is not entirely clear how some forms of capital differ from

³⁹ The only empirical and quantitative verification offered by Zarycki has taken the form of a research project conceived as a comparison of future members of the intelligentsia in Poland and Russia and the role which cultural capital plays in their lives, conducted among students living in Warsaw and Moscow, exploring some aspects of their lifestyle, their understanding of intelligentsia and the role played by this group in society. Although the conclusions of this project are definitely interesting, their general importance is still quite limited, firstly because of the specific sample (students only) and secondly, because it has been focused only on one group, so obviously it cannot serve as a source of information concerning the structure of the social space in general (Zarycki 2008: 149–262).

others, for instance, would there not be a good deal of overlap between post-aristocratic and intelligentsia capital?

These problems are not necessarily fatal to the whole idea of introducing local-adjusted forms of capital in Poland, but unfortunately, Zarycki has not provided answers to these questions, and, unlike in the work of Cveticanin and Popescu (2011), these forms have not been tested in empirical research. Thus, to reiterate, we neither know how exactly one should operationalise them, nor what would be their empirical value and usefulness.

A very careful reading of Bourdieu's ideas deployed to uncover some aspects of the class structure of Polish society as seen through Bourdieusian lenses has been proposed by Gdula and Sadura (2012). Their study is based on qualitative data and is an attempt to explore the issue of class lifestyles in Polish society. The authors claim to define classes "similarly to Bourdieu". This means relating to the combination of various forms of capital, however no precise details have been provided here other than "only crossing of these criteria (that is, forms of capitals, P.M.) and their mutual relations have been decisive for the choice of respondents and qualifying them to the appropriate classes" (Gdula and Sadura: 8). They define forms of capital in the following way:

1. economic – "ownership or remuneration from work, in addition, we taken into account the type of profession, with the most important distinction between intellectual and manual labour, and the fact of being in control of work of others or being subjected to control";
2. social – "the number of ties and connections"
3. cultural – "conceptualized (...) mainly in relation to the level of education"

They have decided to distinguish three classes: upper, middle and working-class. In the first one the following groups, defined on the basis of profession, have been included: general managers earning four times more than the value of national wage, independent professionals (in the sense of the French *profession libérale* - for example, lawyers or physicians), university professors and assistant professors, independent professions related to culture. Such a defined upper class is, according to the authors, similar to the dominant class as defined by Bourdieu and could be divided into three fractions: dominant (owners and directors), intermediate (professionals) and dominated (academics and artists). The middle class consists of specialists who do not hold any managerial/directorial functions (employed in public as well as private enterprises), teachers, nurses, owners of small-scale enterprises, crafters and sales personnel

employed in specialist shops (e.g. galleries). Finally, the working-class is composed of skilled and unskilled workers, unskilled service workers, manual labourers,⁴⁰ people socially “excluded” (permanently unemployed, living in poverty) have not been included. This conceptualization of class is certainly the closest to the Bourdieusian logic in the Polish literature.

The study’s main conclusion has been that for each of these classes a distinct lifestyle, and thus habitus, exists. Interestingly, they have not been able to confirm the existence of one, dominating and clear-cut version of legitimate culture and hence they have come to the conclusion that each class habitus and lifestyle forms a “rivalling universality”.

Whilst generally very interesting and valuable, the analysis by Gdula and Sadura has some important shortcomings (again, looking from the point of view of the approach taken in this thesis). First of all, it is based on a quite specific sample of qualitative in-depth interviews, coming from four separate research projects concerning various issues, some of which are rather peculiar, such as attitudes towards pets or views on the bicycle as a means of urban transport. Most importantly, the sphere of cultural consumption is absent here (however, one has to note, the authors have proved this data to be useful anyway thanks to a skilful and creative analysis). Secondly, because no quantitative data has been available, Gdula and Sadura have not been able to use any statistical tools and hence they could not try to construct Polish social and symbolic spaces.

The study conducted by Goryszewski (2014) may serve as a kind of a supplement to that of Gdula and Sadura. He has tried to explore the “styles of consumption” of the Polish upper class, focusing on four principal areas: cars, housing, clothing and free time activities. The main contribution of this work is the observation that the habitus of the Polish upper class could be perceived as a combination of dispositions characteristic of other classes, as the upper class was established relatively recently and earlier its members might have belonged to other classes. Although Goryszewski claims to be inspired by Bourdieu’s theory, in his theoretical framework the understanding of the upper class defined solely as business elite is problematic as it neglects the internal variation of the upper class according to capital composition – the cultural and balanced fraction are here missing. It also seems that the author could have delved

⁴⁰ The authors do not give a detailed definition of this group.

more into consideration of the key variables that influence one's habitus, of which the social origin of respondents would be key.

Recapitulation

The chapter has discussed what kind of case Poland is. The starting point has been the concept of a state-socialist social space characterized by a different hierarchy of capitals, with the leading role of political rather than economic capital. As we have seen, this characterization is generally confirmed by the non-Bourdieuian research (the only available source of empirical data), though the extent of the distinctiveness of the class and stratification system under state-socialism has been often exaggerated, as the link between such fundamental elements of social position like income, education and occupation largely resembled other industrial countries. Moreover, there was a strong link between the social position and class, and even some signs of a division resembling capital composition. The conclusion from this part of the analysis is that Poland, even in the state-socialist period, was not *that* different. When the systemic transformation started, the institutional basis of the old system disappeared largely disappeared with the disbanding of the communist party and many of its satellite organizations. This, however, did not lead to an immediate devaluation of political capital. Although parts of the *nomenklatura* struggled to maintain their privileged position (especially members of the state and party apparatus with low level of cultural capital), many managed to benefit from the changes relying on a combination of political and cultural capital. Nevertheless, it seems that political capital, considered as a the primary source of differentiation operating at the most general level of the Polish social space lost its role in the post-1989 Poland due to the decomposition of its institutional basis in the form of the communist party and other organisations controlled by it. However, it could not be ruled out that the role of political capital could be more prominent in some of the subfields of the Polish society, for instance the field of economy or the field of power. It also seems that the direction of changes in Poland has generally brought it much closer to the societies and economies of Western Europe, rather than generated some specifically Polish characteristics of the class and stratification system. The most important changes have been the rising role of economic capital, the increasing conversion rate of cultural to economic capital, and, most importantly, a set of profound changes related to post-industrialisation. Considering the above, and also the fact that no fully convincing conceptualisation of possible local forms of capital has been proposed (in the fashion of the contribution by Cvetičanin and Popescu, 2011), it is reasonable to proceed

further with the investigation of the structure of the Polish social space is to refer to the “standard” model applied in Denmark, Norway and the UK. Such investigation is necessary to properly address the issue of applicability of Bourdieu’s model to the Polish context, something that so far has not been analysed in a fully comprehensive way. The next chapter presents the details of the process of the construction of the Polish space and reports its findings.

Chapter 3: Methodology: An Introduction to Multiple Correspondence Analysis

The main goal of the thesis is to offer an empirical account of the problems presented in the introductory section. The analysis is quantitative, and two statistical techniques in particular are central to it: multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) and cluster analysis. Even though MCA has recently gained more legitimacy in the social sciences in the UK, some still approach it with suspicion, so a longer introduction to the basic concepts of MCA is considered necessary. Additionally, I hope to provide here a practical aid to interpreting the analyses presented in the thesis. The chapter starts with an introduction to the core ideas of geometric data analysis (GDA), of which MCA is a variant, and MCA itself, including their relation to mainstream multivariate statistical techniques like multiple regression. Next, the connection between GDA/MCA and Bourdieu's theory will be presented. The second part of the chapter is then a technical introduction to correspondence analysis, in which the key elements are demonstrated with a simple example. All primary steps involved in the construction and interpretation of an MCA model are discussed. The chapter closes with a short overview of cluster analysis, which is commonly used as a technique complementing MCA and allows to achieve a more in depth understanding of internal diversification of space obtained through MCA.

The tenets of geometric data analysis

The somewhat contested status of MCA is to a large degree related to the history of its development and reception in the Western English-speaking countries (primarily, the UK and USA). Some of the founding ideas of correspondence analysis (CA), a sister technique preceding MCA, date as far back as the 1930s (for the CA/MCA history see Greenacre, 1984), though its development in a fully separate form as it is known today is ascribed to the work of French statistician Jean-Paul Benzecri in the 1960s. In the 1970s, CA and MCA became popular tools of analysis of survey data, but their recognition was limited only to France. The 1980s brought a breakthrough, when the international career of the technique started (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010: 3). However, this did not mean that MCA was fully accepted in the social sciences (Roux and Rouanet, 2005: 14). One should also mention that MCA is not an exclusively French thing, as an independent tradition of MCA developed almost

simultaneously in the Netherlands between the 1970s and 1990s, a fact that it is not always acknowledged (for the comparison of the two traditions see Di Franco, 2016).

The primary goal of MCA is a graphical presentation of the relationships between rows and columns of a table in the space of lower dimensionality, that is, in a simplified form, but at the same time, with as little information loss as possible. MCA then aids understanding of data in a twofold way: firstly, through reduction of data dimensionality, and, secondly, through visual representation. In consequence, MCA makes it possible to uncover the structure and associations of data. In this sense, MCA is similar to other data dimensionality reduction techniques like exploratory factor analysis or optimal scaling.

MCA is a form of geometrical data analysis (GDA) and shares the core characteristics with other statistical techniques belonging to the group. GDA is often presented as a part of a more general approach in social sciences opposing the “sociology of variables” in favour of a more holistic one exploring social reality through the analysis of the complexity of interrelations between variables. The statistical mainstay of the “sociology of variables” is multiple regression, a statistical technique that rapidly gained popularity in Anglophone social science from the 1970s onwards. Modelling social reality with the use of linear regression is underpinned by a certain model of causality – there is a clear division between the explained phenomenon (dependent variable) and the set of explaining factors (independent variables) which are thought to be acting separately from each other. The aim of regression analysis is then to test whether variables of interest have an independent effect. These effects are additive (Bry et al., 2016). Whilst it is possible to include interactions between independent variables in a regression model, it is “relatively uncommon practice” and “the multiplication of combinations quickly becomes unworkable” (Bry, Robette, and Roueff 2016: 1010). There are several assumptions implicit in this causal model. The first is that the factors have the same meaning, regardless of the context (i.e., ‘all things being equal’) e.g. the meaning of a degree is the same across different occupations. This is problematic: it is impossible to fully reproduce the experimental framework known from the natural sciences and control all possible intervening factors, as there could be no information for some, or it is hard to reduce to an easily measurable form. Secondly, the independence of cases is also assumed. Finally, reversibility is assumed, i.e. when the causing factor disappears, the situation goes back to the previous state (Bry et al., 2016). This approach amounts to what Ragin (1987) called “net effects thinking”.

GDA approaches the problem in a different way. There are three principles of GDA (Le Roux and Rouanet 2005: 5-6). First, GDA is based on geometric modelling, that is, transforming a cross-table into two clouds of points in a geometric space: a cloud of categories, where points represent categories of variables, and a cloud of individuals, where points represent individual cases.⁴¹ Second, GDA is based on a formal approach, meaning that it is based on the theory of linear algebra, so GDA proceeds through decomposition of tables by searching for eigenvectors. This can be achieved in various mathematical ways (see Beh and Lombardo 2014, chapter 3). Thirdly, GDA is first and foremost descriptive, its goal being description of the structures in data rather than testing pre-formulated hypotheses. As Benzecri famously said: “The model should follow the data, not the reverse!” (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 2). This contrasts with the approach of mainstream multivariate analysis, which is quantitative in the sense that “numbers are the basic ingredients and the end products of procedures”), based on a matrix approach (“procedures are defined and proofs are conducted exclusively by matrix operations”) and sampling-oriented (“any data set is reputed to be a sample and treated as such: modelling, fitting and testing”) (Le Roux and Rouanet 2005: 6).

Importantly, the last principle (descriptiveness) does not mean that GDA (and MCA) result in a kind of ‘anything goes’ analysis. Quite the contrary – a researcher has to refer to a relevant theory which plays the key role in choosing the variables to be analysed. GDA is a *mathematical frame model* which has to be filled with the right data. According to Benzecri, a frame model should meet the criteria of homogeneity and exhaustiveness. Homogeneity refers to the requirement for the included variables to be of ‘the same nature’, and exhaustiveness means that they should offer a decent representation of the field of interest. The second criterion is somewhat at odds with the principle of parsimony which underlies the philosophy of modelling reality in many ‘conventional’ statistical approaches (Roux and Rouanet 2005: 14, Hjellbrekke 2019: 6). The principle of exhaustiveness could be fulfilled because GDA is especially powerful for analysis of large tables, that is, those consisting of many rows and columns. In MCA this means the possibility of simultaneously analysing and uncovering associations between dozens of variables, something unfeasible in multiple regression (e.g. due to multicollinearity) or latent class analysis (due to sample size constraints). Moreover, MCA does involve statistical inference (checking statistical significance of the elements of an MCA model is possible) and explanatory interpretation (through the analysis of structuring factors).

⁴¹ More precisely ‘statistical individuals’, as rows in the table can represent any kind of observations (e.g. firms, states etc.) and not necessarily respondents in a survey (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 2)

There are three primary statistical techniques in GDA which serve for analysis of three different types of tables (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 2):

- contingency tables – correspondence analysis (or *simple* correspondence analysis to distinguish it from MCA)
- individuals x categorical variables – multiple correspondence analysis
- individuals x numerical variables – principal components analysis.

The place of MCA in Bourdieu's theory

Importantly, GDA, and MCA more specifically, are said to correspond closely to the logic of Bourdieu's theory, and he on several occasions has declared MCA to be the best available technique to investigate social reality in accordance with his ideas. There are a few "elective affinities" between GDA and the core elements of his social theory (Le Roux and Rouanet 2005: 11), specifically the concepts of field and social space. The latter presuppose a relational approach, spatial representation and multidimensionality (Lebaron, 2018).

Firstly, MCA models social reality in terms of relations and oppositions via analysing distances between individuals, and between categories, which suits the key philosophical ideas underlying Bourdieu's theory, that is, the focus on oppositions underlying reality. This is rooted in the tradition of French structuralism, and the idea of overcoming the substantialist mode of thinking in favour of the relationalist one, this distinction being borrowed from the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer. This was summarized by Bourdieu in a widely cited quote: "I use Correspondence Analysis very much, because I think that it is essentially a relational procedure whose philosophy fully expresses what in my view constitutes social reality. It is a procedure that 'thinks' in relations, as I try to do it with the concept of field." (Preface to the German edition of *Le Métier de sociologue*, 1991, cited in Lebaron 2018:7).

Secondly, MCA maps offer a graphical spatial representation of the structure of the field of interest (e.g. the social space, the field of artists etc.), where individuals are positioned relative to each other, i.e. in terms of distance and directionality, according to their characteristics relevant in this field.

Finally, multidimensionality refers to the need for exploring social reality through a careful investigation of a wide range of interrelated and mutually influencing factors.

Multidimensionality in this sense is closely related to the idea of “the structural causality of a network of factors” introduced by Bourdieu (1984: 107), which is at odds with the ‘net effect’ and ‘all things equal’ thinking. According to Bourdieu, such a network of factors “is quite irreducible to the cumulated effects of the set of linear relations, of different explanatory force, which the necessities of analysis oblige one to isolate, those which are established between the different factors, taken one by one, and the practice in question; through each of the factors is exerted the efficacy of all the others, and the multiplicity of determinations leads not to indeterminacy but to over-determination.” (Ibid)

Bourdieu provided a few examples when discussing how classes and class fractions were defined in *Distinction*. So, firstly, the factors constituting classes are inter-dependent on each other, but some of these are more important than others (i.e. have a “greater functional weight”, Ibid). Capital volume and composition determine what specific effect factors like age, sex or place of residence would have on cultural practices, for example. Secondly, the relationships between factors are complex and often reciprocal or even circular. A good example provided by Bourdieu is the relationship between income, age, education and occupation. The influence of age on the level of income depends on the educational level and occupation, and occupation itself depends on educational level (Ibid: 104). Interrelated variables could be then be thought to form a cluster of inseparable factors, like, in Bourdieu’s example, the yellowness and acidity of a lemon (Ibid: 107). He provides several similar examples of how various factors bundle together in a way hard to untie. In statistical terms, what Bourdieu describes here (save for the feedback effects) are examples of moderator variables and interactions, and addressing these effects, as has been already mentioned, is possible in multiple regression, though including all such effects in order to reflect the complexity of relationships would be unfeasible. It is hard to say whether Bourdieu was unaware of the possibility of including interactions in multiple regression models, or whether he considered this to be an unsatisfying solution.⁴²

Does that mean multiple regression should be excluded altogether as a tool of statistical analysis as being by definition in disagreement with the tenets of Bourdieusian thinking? It seems that there is no straight answer to these questions. The general tendency is that regression is hardly used in any of the recent Bourdieusian research projects. On the one hand, some

⁴² From the literature cited in his works, e.g. in *Distinction*, one has an impression that Bourdieu was well oriented in the debates methodological and statistical debates, and, for instance, his opinion on regression was informed by Jean-Paul Benzecri’s articles on the matter. (Bourdieu 1984: 571)

scholars have explicitly rejected multiple regression and latent class analysis, a position met with suspicion and incomprehension (see Chan and Goldthorpe 2007; Wuggenig 2007). Others signalled hostility towards other methods which are related/involve some form of regression at some stage, like path models and factor analysis (Rosenlund, 2014). On the other hand, it seems that the issue is not about jettisoning regression altogether, but rather about putting it to work for a relational Bourdieusian framework. This means that regression could be used, e.g. to estimate the strength of some effects, but only in later stages of analysis, when the structure of associations underlying a field of interest has been already uncovered with the use of GDA techniques. An example is use of ANOVA, arguably a *linear thinking* technique, to determine the strength and significance of the relationships between points in the MCA space (Flemmen et al., 2018a) (Roux and Rouanet 2005: 17, 267-268) There is also a possibility to devise entirely new approaches, integrating existing techniques. For instance, Standardized Factor Analysis combines MCA, multiple regression and PCA to produce a version of the investigated space (e.g. a space of lifestyles) where structuring factors (e.g. age and gender) are systematically controlled, thus retaining the relational logic and at the same time introducing the control of particular factors (Bry et al., 2016). It is also yet a question to be answered (or actually to be properly asked first) whether advances in statistical modelling, e.g. multilevel and structural equation models, could be used within the Bourdieusian framework without violating its core ideas.

As a final remark, one could add that what is certain is that the Bourdieusian framework is first and foremost opposed to a blatant form of the sociology of variables, rather widespread in parts of contemporary social research, where a researcher defines the research object only very crudely, paying little attention to the explication of the theory behind the conclusions drawn from data analysis and instead throwing into analysis anything that is available and somehow related to the topic, before then trying to derive from the analysis a supposedly coherent theory. In the author's opinion that is the case of the so-called 'omnivorousness thesis' to be discussed in the following chapters.

Introducing the key concepts – correspondence analysis of a 4x4 table⁴³

⁴³ All of the equations are taken from Hjellbrekke (2019).

The algorithm behind CA and MCA is exactly the same, but as the input table has a less complex and more straightforward form (a simple contingency table in CA and indicator matrix in MCA), it is much easier to introduce and explain the key concepts of both techniques using an example of a CA. A simple 4x4 contingency table crossing four categories of respondent's education with a simplified four category father's class will be used for this purpose. The basic concepts and logic of correspondence analysis are the same as one uses to interpret the relationship in a table. There are a few basic concepts needing to be explained in order to understand how CA/MCA works: row/column profiles, average profiles, masses and the Euclidean distance (Greenacre 1994).

Once the data is cross-tabulated it could be presented in various forms, the most basic being simply raw frequencies. However, the frequencies are usually recalculated to be expressed as percentages, rather than raw numbers, since it allows for a more convenient interpretation and facilitates drawing meaningful conclusions about differences between the groups. A profile is then a set of percentages calculated for a row or column of frequencies by dividing each cell (called *a profile element*) by the sum of all frequencies in this row/column (Greenacre 1994: 9). In the example table, father's class is in the rows and respondent's education in the columns, and as we would assume that it is the former than influences the latter, the choice of row percentages is obvious and it will be used to introduce the key concepts. However, in correspondence analysis row and column proportions form two separate but interconnected parts of the analysis, which will be addressed in more detail later.

Table 1. Father's class by respondent's education, row percentages.

		Respondent's education				Row mass
		primary	vocational	secondary	degree	
Father's class	father service class	5%	8%	34%	53%	15%
	father white collar	5%	19%	43%	32%	12%
	father peasant/farmer	31%	28%	30%	12%	25%
	father working class	15%	28%	41%	16%	48%
	Average row profile	16%	24%	37%	22%	

Source: the data from PGSS wave 2010.

In the example table, a row profile for 'father working class' is the following set of percentages: 15, 28, 41, 16. Each of the three remaining father's class categories rows also have

such a row profile. In addition to these four row profiles, an average profile is calculated, which expresses the distribution of the education categories in the total sample of respondents, which is simply the bottom row of the table with marginal distributions. Four column profiles and the average column profile are calculated in an analogous way.

The next step in the analysis of this table would be investigating whether these four profiles diverge from the average profile, and if so, to what extent: the greater the difference between the elements of a row profile and the elements of the average profile, the stronger the relationship and the more dissimilar this row category is from the general population relative to its education profile. Thus, it could be seen that the differences relative to the average profile (in percentage points) are particularly large for *father service class* (respectively, -11,-16,-3,31), large for *father white collar* (-11,-5,6,10) and *father peasant/farmer* (15,4,-7,-11), and relatively small for *father working class* (-1,4,3,-6), meaning that the education outcomes of the children of service class, white collar and peasants differ from an average person to much a larger degree than those of the children of working class. Moreover, one can also compare row profiles with each other. The most telling example from the table in question is a comparison between the row profile of *father peasant/farmer* with *father service class* – the distances are substantial (26,19,-4,-41). It is then clear that children of peasants/farmers in comparison to children of service class much more often end their education on primary and vocational level and much less often continue to secondary and tertiary levels.

In correspondence analysis these very basic ideas are taken to a higher level. The row profiles could be thus understood as points in an n-dimensional space (in this example, four-dimensional, as there are four columns), where coordinates are simply profile elements. The aim of correspondence analysis is then to represent the associations between rows and columns of the table in such a way that each row profile becomes a point in a multidimensional space with a barycentric coordinate system. The average profile becomes the central point zero, called the barycenter, from which distances to all other row profiles points are calculated (Hjellbrekke 2019).

The distances in correspondence analysis, above analysed in terms of percentage points, are measured as weighted Euclidean distances, also known as chi-square distances, that is, a square root of sum of squared differences between elements of a row/column profile points, weighted by the corresponding element of the average profile. For row profiles:

$$d_{i,i'} = \sqrt{\sum_j \frac{(a_{ij} - a_{i'j})^2}{c_j}}$$

where i and i' are two points (row profiles) of interest, a_{ij} and $a_{i'j}$ are the profile elements for the column j , and c_j is the mass of the column j .

For column profiles:

$$d_{j,j'} = \sqrt{\sum_i \frac{(b_{ij} - b_{i'j})^2}{r_i}}$$

where j and j' are two column points (column profiles) of interest, b_{ij} and $b_{i'j}$ are the profile elements for the row j , and r_i is the mass of the row i . Mass, another term specific to correspondence analysis, is simply the proportion of a given column/row in the total sample.

The weighting in the above equation is performed so that each profile contributes to the analysis according to its share in the total sample and to take away the effect of large frequencies having bigger variance (due to sheer number of observations), which would cause the calculated distance to be higher. It also makes the contribution of less frequent categories higher (Greenacre 1994:11).

For instance, the distance between the row profiles *father service class* (FSC) and *father peasant/farmer* (FPF) is then calculated in the following way:

$$\begin{aligned} d_{FSC, FPF} &= \sqrt{\frac{(0.05 - 0.31)^2}{0.16} + \frac{(0.08 - 0.28)^2}{0.24} + \frac{(0.34 - 0.30)^2}{0.37} + \frac{(0.53 - 0.12)^2}{0.22}} \\ &= 1.16 \end{aligned}$$

From the example table one would expect that this distance should be larger than the one between *father service class* and *father white collar* and this is indeed confirmed, as for the latter the distance equals only 0.51.

A distance can be also computed between a row profile and the average row profile:

$$d_{i,G} = \sqrt{\sum_j \frac{(a_{ij} - c_j)^2}{c_j}}$$

and between a column profile and the average column profile:

$$d_{j,G} = \sqrt{\sum_i \frac{(b_{ij} - r_i)^2}{r_i}}$$

The initial conclusion about the distance of row profiles from the average profiles is then also confirmed. The profile for *father working class*, which does not diverge much from the average profile, is at 0.17 much smaller than 0.78 for *father working class*.

Finally, when analysing a contingency table, one is also interested in the overall strength of the relationship. The most basic and at the same time most commonly used statistic is chi-square, which for the analysed table equals 176.9. In a correspondence analysis, a different measure, though directly related to chi-square, called inertia is used. Inertia, ϕ^2 , reflects the degree to which the row points are dispersed around the barycenter, hence its value is dependent on the distances of these points from the barycenter:

$$\phi^2 = \sum_i r_i d_i^2$$

where d_i^2 is a squared distance of a row profile and r_i is the mass of this row.

Inertia is then a sum of squared distances (d_i^2) between each row profile and the average row profile weighted by the profile's mass (in this case row mass, the statistic calculated for column profiles weighted by column masses would give the same value). The greater the distances and thus dispersion, the greater the value of inertia. Moreover, if two row profiles had an identical distance from the average profile, their mass would have a decisive role in determining the amount of inertia these point produce. The name inertia invokes a metaphor from mechanics – the barycenter is here the centre of gravity which depends on the mass of elements and their distance from the centre (Greenacre 1994: 12). Inertia is also directly related to the value of chi-square and could be calculated in the following way:

$$\phi^2 = \frac{\chi^2}{N}$$

For the example table this gives:

$$\phi^2 = 0.78^2 * 0.15 + 0.17^2 * 0.48 + 0.45^2 * 0.25 + 0.37^2 * 0.12 = 0.169$$

or

$$\phi^2 = \frac{176.9}{1048} = 0.169$$

The maximum theoretical inertia for the example table, assuming complete dependence between rows and columns, that is, a situation when e.g. 100 percent of people whose father are peasants have primary education, 100 percent of those with working class father having a vocational diploma and so on, would equal 3 and the row (and column) points would be at the maximum possible distance from the barycenter.

The next key issue is the dimensionality of the space of points calculated, which is dependent on the table itself (and hence on the way in which data are coded). The maximum number of dimensions equals whichever is smaller from the number of rows and columns minus 1. In the example the number of rows and columns is identical, so the total number of dimensions in correspondence analysis of this table is 3. The formula simply results from the fact that to represent two points it suffices to draw one line, to represents three points one needs a two-dimensional plane and so on (Hjellbrekke 2019: 13). However, for the analysis to offer a substantial aid to interpretation of the table it has to meet the requirement of dimensionality reduction. Subsequent dimensions are calculated in such way that the first dimension reflects the distances as accurately as possible (in terms of weighted least squares) and that the amount of inertia explained by this dimension is as high as possible, and the residual inertia as low as possible, the second dimension is again calculated to reflect the remaining information (the residual inertia from the first step) as accurately as possible and to limit the amount of residual inertia and so on (Greenacre 1994: 15-16). It could be also said that the first dimension captures the most important oppositions between the points, the second dimension the second most important oppositions and so on (Hjellbrekke 2019: 16).

How important exactly the oppositions on a given dimension are is read from the amount of inertia it captures relative to the total inertia (as it is in factor or principal component analysis). The amount of inertia accounted for by a given axis is its eigenvalue denoted by:

$$\lambda_i = \sum_i r_i f_{it}^2$$

where r_i is the mass of a given row and f_{il}^2 is the squared coordinate of this row on the given dimension. Considering that the inertia accounted for by subsequent dimensions gradually diminishes, it also implies that, on average, the absolute value of the scores on subsequent dimensions also gradually diminishes. When the inertia of a dimension is calculated as the proportion of the overall inertia, that is, as a percentage, it allows for a comparison between the dimensions and their relative importance. In the analysed example the inertia accounted for by the first dimension equals 0.144, which is 85.3 percent of the total inertia, a very high value, signalling that most information in the table could be summarised reasonably well with just one dimension.

Moreover, from the above equation, it also follows that each element of the sum (rif_{il}^2) gives information on how much of the inertia of a given dimension comes from this row. It also follows that by dividing a rif_{il}^2 by the overall inertia of a given dimension one expresses this quantity as a proportion of the row's inertia in the dimension inertia, which is called relative contribution:

$$ctr = \frac{rif_{il}^2}{\lambda_i}$$

Relative contribution of a category depends then on its distance from the barycentre/average profile and on the size (mass) of this category. It aids interpretation of the model by identifying the categories which account for the largest parts of the dimension inertia and which should be considering the defining elements of the opposition observed on this dimension.

In the analysed example, the amount of inertia accounted for by the row categories is then as follows: *father service class* 0.084 ($0.15 \cdot 0.757^2$), *father white collar* 0.015 ($0.12 \cdot 0.343^2$), *father peasant/farmer* 0.040 ($0.25 \cdot 0.402^2$), *father working class* 0.006 ($0.48 \cdot 0.112^2$), which add up to 0.144. The category *father service class* has the largest contribution of 58 percent, followed by *father peasant/farmer* contributing 28 percent, *father white collar* 10 percent and finally *father working class* 4 percent. What is evident from this example is that large mass alone is not enough to make the contribution high (e.g. the case of the category *father working class*), but in less extreme cases it might happen that a similar contribution of two points could be resulting from, in one case, a moderate distance (coordinate) and a high mass, and in the other a large distance and a low mass. The selection of the categories to be used to interpret the axes, called *explicative categories*, is done by comparing them to the average contribution, which is calculated as 100 divided by the number of categories, and


choosing the categories with a contribution higher than this average. In this case the average contribution equals 25 percent, thus only two categories, *father service class* (58 percent) and by *father peasant/farmer* (28 percent), should be used to define the opposition reflected by the first dimension.

So far, all calculations have been based on the row profiles/categories, but, as has been already mentioned, the analogous set of calculations is performed for column profiles. In the example it seems somewhat counterintuitive as one's level of education could hardly considered to have an influence on one's father class. However, this part is of equal importance for the final outcome of correspondence analysis: a map presenting the two set of points simultaneously. Although these sets of points are not directly comparable, as they are computed within the respective set and this is reflected by the coordinates, the coordinates could be recalculated to allow for a comparison (for details see Hjellbrekke 2019: 22).

The graphical outcome of correspondence analysis is usually presented as a symmetrical graph on which the row and column points are displayed simultaneously. The map resulting from correspondence analysis on the example table should be then interpreted in the following way (figure 1). Firstly, the opposition on the first dimension is between the *father peasant/farmer* and *father service class*, which are positioned at the opposite sides of the graph. This should be read exactly in the same way as it was read from the table. When level of education is concerned, the categories *father peasant/farmer* and *father service class* are the most dissimilar from each other and from the average profile, hence the highest distance on the map is between them, and between each of them and the point 0. When we look on the map from the column points perspective, we see that the opposition is between *edu r primary* and *edu r degree*, which is read as the dissimilarity of these points relative to their relationship with father's class. Regarding the distances between the categories of respondent's education and father's class, these could not be interpreted as exactly reflecting the strength of the relationship, but their position relative to each other could be taken as a sign of the direction of the relationship. Thus, one can say that service class fathers more often than average and more often than any other group have children who have a degree (and vice versa), and that peasant fathers more often than average and more often than any other group have children with primary education. This does not, however, mean that *all* service class fathers have children who have a degree, and nor that *all* respondents with degrees have service class fathers (and the same is true for peasant fathers and those with primary education). The contribution of the

second axis (14.6 percent) is much smaller, meaning that it does not introduce much to the understanding of the table. The interpretation is also apparently difficult, since it seems that the second dimension opposes the extreme level of analysed variables to the middle level. However, such a pattern signals the possibility of the *horseshoe effect* at work. Of course, for such a simple table the value of using correspondence analysis is very limited, but for larger tables, especially when relationships are not linear, it is a very useful aid of analysis.

Figure 1. CA Two-dimensional solution



A solution for analysis of more than two variables at a time – multiple correspondence analysis

The example table is a simple cross-tabulation of two variables, and for such tables, even when these are large, simple correspondence analysis is usually the best choice. However, when one wants to analyse more than two variables at a time, the situation gets more complex. Whilst it is still possible to proceed with simple correspondence analysis in such cases by combining information in a stacked table (so one could, for instance, include additional columns with information on father's education), a recommended approach is to run a different version of the analysis, namely MCA (Hjellbrekke 2019: 31). The algorithm underpinning MCA is the same, but the input table being decomposed is different – it takes the form of either the Burt matrix or the indicator matrix. The Burt matrix is a table containing all possible two-way cross-tabulations, including a cross-tabulation of a variable with itself. An indicator matrix is a table where a row represents an observation in the dataset (thus there are as many rows as there are observations), and columns represents variables included in the analysis recoded to a binary format, therefore each category of analysed variables is represented by a separate column, which can take the value of 1 for the category corresponding to a given observation, or the value 0 for other categories of the variable (MJ Greenacre, 1994). In the French tradition of MCA, the indicator matrix is the usual choice as it allows for analysis of the cloud of individuals, an important part of the process of interpretation of a MCA model (Hjellbrekke 2019: 32-33).

Comparison of CA and MCA

Although the overall logic of the analysis and its interpretation is largely the same in MCA as in CA, some details differ. First of all, the formulas for calculating distances in the clouds are different. The problem can be viewed either from the point of view of individuals (distances in the cloud of individuals, that is, rows in the indicator matrix) or categories (distances in the cloud of categories, that is, columns in the indicator matrix). The rules for determining distances between individuals are straightforward. The overall distance between two individuals is a sum of the distances from all questions included in the analysis. If the individuals have the same value (category) on a given question, the distance on this questions equals 0, if they have the same values on all questions, the overall distance is 0 and these two individuals occupy exactly the same place in the space and have identical scores on all

dimensions. What follows from this is then that the proximity between individuals in the space results from the similarity of the pattern of their answers/values on the questions/variables in the analysis, the more dissimilar the pattern, the larger the distance between individuals. The distance, however, depends also on the relative size (frequency) of the categories two individual choose, the smaller the size of the chosen categories, the greater the distance:

$$d_q^2(i, i') = \frac{1}{f_j} + \frac{1}{f_{j'}}$$

where i and i' are two different individuals and f_j and $f_{j'}$ the relative frequencies of the categories chosen by these individuals.

The same property is also true for calculating distances between individuals and the mean point of the cloud – choosing a less frequent category produces larger distance:

$$d(k, G) = \sqrt{\frac{1}{f_k} - 1}$$

For categories, the distance is also dependent on the relative frequency of these categories and on the proportion of individuals they share:

$$d(k, k') = \sqrt{\frac{1}{f_k} + \frac{1}{f_{k'}} - 2 \frac{f_{kk'}}{f_k f_{k'}}}$$

If then two categories completely overlap, they are necessarily of the same size and the proportion of shared individuals equals 1, therefore the distance equals 0. If the opposite is true, and the categories do not overlap at all, that is, they do not share any individuals, the distance (for a given combination of the relative frequencies of these categories) is at its maximum.

The relationship between the individuals and categories is such that each category is at the mean point (barycenter) of all individuals who choose/have this category. From this it follows that if two categories are positioned close to each other, they overlap to a degree because they are partially composed of the same individuals or individuals who have a similar pattern of responses across variables. When two mutually exclusive categories of single

variable are located in proximity, this means that the individuals belonging to these categories are similar regarding their patterns of responses/values on other variables. (Hjellbrekke 2019: 35)

Something else that changes is how inertia is calculated. In MCA it could not be interpreted as a measure of the strength of the associations in the table as it is in CA. (Hjellbrekke 2019: 35). This is the case because in MCA inertia is directly dependent on the way data is coded:

$$\frac{K}{Q} - 1 = \phi^2$$

where K is the number of categories and Q the number of variables.

This then means that the higher the number of categories for a given number of variables, the higher the inertia. The lowest possible value of inertia is observed for a set of binary variables and in this case equals 1. This also means that the way in which categories contribution are calculated changes, the total contribution of a category:

$$Ctr_q = \frac{K_q - 1}{K - Q}$$

where K_q is the number of categories for this variable.

The practical takeaway from this property is that one should avoid combining in one analysis variables with a very different number of categories as this by definition leads to an imbalance between the relative contributions and runs a risk of attributing importance to a variable whose position is due to the ‘artificial’ effect of coding.

The contribution of a category is calculated as:

$$Ctr_k = \frac{1 - f_k}{K - q}$$

where f_k is the relative frequency.

Finally, the contribution of a category to the axis inertia is:

$$Ctr_{kl} = \frac{fk}{Q(f_{kl})^2}$$

where f_{kl} is the category's coordinate on this axis. The above equations imply that the total contribution of a category is dependent on its relative frequency ($1 - f_k$ in the numerator), thus the smaller the frequency, the higher the contribution. However, in the case of the contribution to a given axis the smaller the category, the smaller the contribution of this category to the axis for a given score (coordinate), but one has to remember, as has been presented above, that the coordinate represents the distance of the category from the barycenter, and this distance is itself dependent on the relative frequency of the category, hence this is only seemingly a paradox.


Another difference is that the number of dimensions in an MCA model is always much higher than in CA. The number of dimensions is calculated as the number of categories minus the number of questions (Hjellbrekke 2019: 36). This results in a considerable difference in the number of dimensions between CA and MCA – it is substantial even for a relatively small example table. This means that in MCA the amount of inertia explained by a given dimension is necessarily underestimated, or, more precisely, the amount of substantial inertia is underestimated. In CA and MCA alike, the eigenvalues by definition could not be higher than 1, which means that in MCA there is a clear theoretical threshold of inertia that could be explained by a dimension that equals $1/\text{overall inertia}$ (Ibid). Due to this property of MCA a different way of calculating the amount of explained inertia has been proposed, known as the modified rates of explained inertia. The idea behind this calculation is to make the rates in MCA resemble those one would get in CA of the same data (for the formulas see Hjellbrekke 2019: 36-37).

Finally, there is a question of how many dimensions one should interpret. There are a few ways to determine this, usually used together. First, one can observe the change in the explained inertia between the subsequent dimensions, the dimensions to be retained being those which offer a substantially higher gain in comparison to the next dimension. Second, a Kaiser's criterion could be used, that is, one should retain as many axes as is needed to exceed 80 percent of the overall explained inertia. Thirdly, interpretability should also serve as an important criterion – it may happen that axes meeting the statistical criteria do not have a meaningful sociological interpretation, or that axes which are slightly below the threshold according to

these criteria should still be interpreted, as they e.g. reflect a theoretical expectation and/or corroborate findings from other times and places (Hjellbrekke 2019: 18; Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 51-52).

All these differences notwithstanding, CA and MCA are still very similar techniques, producing maps which lead to similar conclusions. As can be seen on graph 2, the MCA map reproduces exactly the same oppositions. Distances in absolute terms are higher (*father service class*, *father peasant/farmer* on the one hand, and *education r primary* and *education r degree* are positioned further from the remaining points), but in relative terms they still reflect the same pattern. The potential horseshoe effect is pronounced.

Figure 2. MCA, Two-dimensional solution



Analysis of the cloud of individuals

There are several steps of the analysis of the cloud of individuals. One should start with examining the shape of the cloud, looking for irregularities and patterns. This is done throughout the process of the construction of a model when irregularities point to a possibility of imbalance in categories' contribution and outliers affecting the shape of the cloud. It is also valuable for the final model, as the shape of the clouds on certain dimensions can have a substantial meaning, e.g. the conical shape of the cloud of individuals in social space models, revealing greater variation of capital composition for high level of capital volume than for low volume. In the second step, one can examine the way in which individuals belonging to the categories of interest are distributed along the analysed dimensions. This could be done using concentration ellipses, which are 'geometric summaries of subclouds in a principal plane' (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 69) graphically presenting the boundaries of the ± 2 standards deviations in a two-dimensional distribution (86.47 percent) (Hjellbrekke 2019: 51). Thus one can compare how homogeneous compared groups are relative to the model dimensions and visually assess whether groups differ in the way their individuals are distributed along the dimensions. This could, for instance, reveal that one group is distributed primarily along the first dimension, whilst another is distributed mainly along the second. One can also investigate which groups overlap and to what extent, thus determining their degree of (dis)similarity and distinctiveness.

Specific MCA

In survey research it often happens that the available data have some shortcomings, one of the common problems being missing data (missing answers), but also other "junk categories" like "don't know" and other similar answers (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 62). The way to deal with this issue is to deploy a version of MCA called *specific MCA* which allows one to set some categories as passive, that is, to exclude them from the set of categories determining the shape of the clouds. In other words, the distances to and associations between passive categories and active categories are not taken into account in determining axes. There are also other situations when setting certain categories as passive is advised (Hjellbrekke 2019: 57-58):

1. for categories smaller than 5 percent of the sample – this is performed in order to avoid very small groups determining the shape of the clouds and dimensions, which is directly

related to the way in which distances are calculated (the smaller the relative frequency, the bigger the distance). Quite often these categories overlap with “junk categories”

2. to exclude single categories which have a disproportionally large effect on the model, either through a contribution which overshadows the contribution of other categories or through a very large distance which distorts the shape of the clouds, in both situations obfuscating relevant and substantial variation in the data.
3. setting some categories as passive could be also useful to determine the stability of a model/dimension.

Specific MCA differs slightly from classic MCA in regard to two characteristics. In comparison to regular MCA the number of dimensions is the same only when all variables have one passive category, otherwise the number of dimensions is defined as $K' - (Q - Q'')$, where K' is the number of active categories, Q the number of all variables in the model, and Q'' the number of variables with at least one passive category. The overall inertia will also be somewhat smaller (Ibid: 58).

Supplementary variables and structuring factors

Going beyond description of the data done within the limits of the set of active and passive categories included in the model, that is, within the limits of a certain field of interest, is achieved by projecting the position of ‘supplementary’ variables into the space. Similarly to passive categories, supplementary variables do not affect the shape of the clouds in any way. Introducing supplementary variables takes the analysis a level higher and allows one to draw conclusions on the relationship between a given field and some external relevant factors. These could be ‘structuring factors’, that is, “descriptors of the two basic sets that have not served to define the distance between individuals; and by structured data, we designate data tables whose basic sets are equipped with structuring factors” (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 68).

However, to speak of analyzing data in terms of structuring factors rather than simply supplementary variables, one needs to take a few more steps. Firstly, one should examine the distribution of categories of a supplementary variable relative to the axes, looking for patterns. If some categories are found to be visually related to a dimension, it could be checked whether the score of the category on this axis is statistically significant by running a ‘typicality’ test. It is also possible to run such a test in order to check the significance of the position of a category on both axes. Secondly, if some categories of a supplementary variable are found to be related

to the opposition defining a given dimension (that is, they are at the opposite sides of the map), the strength of this association could be assessed. When these are expressed in standardized coordinates one can calculate the deviation between categories as the absolute difference between the points coordinates. The deviations larger than 0.5 should be considered to be “notable” and larger than 1 as “large” (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 59). Thirdly, one can also investigate the clouds of the individuals of a category of a supplementary variable of interest in a similar way that this is done for the global cloud of individuals.

Methods of sectoring the space – cluster analysis

Another form of analysis of the cloud of individuals is through detailed analysis of the sectors of the space. This could be done manually by slicing the space into sectors representing different combination of values on the dimensions of interest, or the division could be aided by cluster analysis. The first solution, even though very simple, in certain situations could be a preferable, e.g. when the goal is to simply reflect certain combinations of levels of the dimensions, as in the case of slicing a model of the social space into nine sectors in many studies (e.g. Prieur et al, 2008). The second solution is more objective and less arbitrary, though still only to a certain extent as the decision on the number of clusters is up to the researcher. Cluster analysis then complements MCA by facilitating description as it is easier to characterize groups of individuals than a continuous space. The description of clusters is achieved through comparing the average (for numerical variables) or the cluster profile (for nominal variables) with the global average/average profile. The statistical significance of these distances is tested, constituting the set of features which are said to be characteristic for a given cluster. These features could be then sorted according to the strength of the effect, that is, the extent to which a certain feature of a cluster deviates from the general trend in the sample/population (Lebart, 1994). One can also draw conclusions from the composition of such a set of features. The presence of some characteristics and the absence of others often yields valuable insight into the cluster’s character.

Cluster analysis is an invaluable tool for statistical classification and for this reason it is popular across various disciplines of science. This has contributed to the proliferation of different methods of clustering. Two methods of clustering can be considered to be the most popular, at least in the social sciences: hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) and k-means clustering. Some advise that HAC should be used with small samples, whilst for samples

equal or larger than 200 the k-means method should be applied (Bacher, 1996; Norušis, 1994). There are also hybrid/mixed methods combining both procedures.

At the beginning of the HAC procedure all cases are considered to be separate clusters. In the first stage of clustering the two most similar observations are grouped to form the first bigger cluster, then in the second stage the next observation in the order of similarity is assigned to this cluster, or a new cluster is formed from other two most similar observations (Norušis 1994: 85). There are two parameters that determine how exactly the clustering procedure is performed. First, one needs to decide on the way in which the distance/proximity between points is measured. There are a lot of different measures, a commonly used one being the familiar squared Euclidean distance (Norušis 1994: 84, for a discussion of other measures see ch. 5). Second, one needs to choose the criterion on which cases are grouped. For instance, the simplest criterion is the single linkage technique which groups the two nearest observations in terms of the raw distance. There are many other methods (e.g. complete linkage, the furthers neighbour), but in the French GDA tradition Ward's method is used (Hjellbrekke 2019: 84). This is one of the methods to be used with numerical variables e.g. MCA factor scores. It also entails using the squared Euclidean distance (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 2005: 230). In Ward's method, in the first step the means for all variables (that is, the ones on which the clustering is based) are calculated for each cluster (in the first step these are then values of these variables for each observation). In the next step, the distance to the cluster means is calculated for each observation and then these distances are summed up for all cases. The clusters that merge at each step are those which minimize the increase in the overall sum of the squared within-cluster distances (Norušis 1994: 98). The method results in clusters which are as homogenous as possible (that is, have the lowest intra-class variance) and as heterogeneous from other clusters as possible (that is, have the highest inter-class variance) (Hjellbrekke 2019: 82-83). The method tends to produce clusters of comparable size and spherical shape (Everitt 2011: 79).

The k-means method is based on nearest centroid sorting – a case is ascribed to this cluster for which the distance between the case and the center (centroid) of the cluster is the smallest. In some cases the center of the clusters are known, as this could stem either from theory or from earlier clustering procedures. When the centroids are unknown they are estimated from the data in an iterative process. The main difference between the two methods of clustering is that in the k-means method the researcher has to define the number of clusters (Norušis 1994: 111). Some statistical packages (e.g. SPAD) include an algorithm combining both methods. In SPAD the method is called mixed clustering. In the first step the clustering is

performed by crossing several initial partitions or the clustering results from the k-means where the centroids are either random or determined by the researcher. In the second step, these initial clusters are aggregated by the HAC method, allowing for a stable solution.

Whatever the method used, there are some principles which should be followed to achieve a meaningful clustering (Bacher et al 2011: 18):

1. internal validity:
 - a. the clusters should be homogenous, that is, the observations grouped in the cluster should be similar,
 - b. the clusters should be isolated from each other, that is, the observations grouped in different clusters should be dissimilar,
 - c. the clustering should be able to explain the variation in the data,
2. interpretability: an easy and meaningful interpretation of the clusters should be possible,
3. stability: minor changes in the data should not be able to drastically the solution,
4. external validity:
 - a. the cluster should correspond to some external factor in a way which could be theoretically predicted.

Data used

The Polish social space is constructed using the data from the 2010 wave of the national social attitudes survey (Polski Generalny Sondaż Społeczny, PGSS) and the 2009 wave of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Although these two studies have been published independently as separate initiatives, the Polish segment of the ISSP was actually a part of the same survey as the PGSS and was conducted on exactly the same sample.⁴⁴ The datasets have been merged and eventually, the procedure yielded a dataset offering a very reasonable choice of indicators of capital, especially for secondary data, based on a random nationally representative sample of 1263 respondents.

The data used to construct the space of lifestyles come from a survey conducted by Statistics Poland in 2009 as a module of the Household Budget Survey. The research was conducted on a nationally representative sub-sample of 4702 households with 13494 people, out of whom 10881 have been given the cultural participation module questionnaire and 9354

⁴⁴ The ISSP module attached as an extra part of the main PGSS questionnaire.

have answered it. However, as this group included people living in the same household, a single person has been randomly drawn from each household to avoid analysing individuals not independent from each other. This sample is then only an approximation of a nationally representative sample of individuals. The final sample includes 4388 adults (≥ 18 years old). Overall quality and usefulness of these data from a sociological point of view is mixed. On the one hand, it covers a lot of different aspects of cultural consumption and it thus certainly facilitates going beyond the level of (over)simplification characteristic of a lot of omnivorousness studies reported in the last chapter. On the other, however, it suffers from limitations typical of secondary data sources produced by official national statistical offices designed to serve the interests of other state-funded bodies dealing with culture and thus lacking explicit and well-defined hypotheses of sociology.

Recapitulation

This chapter has provided an overview of the method to be used in the forthcoming analyses. We have seen that geometric data analysis is, in many ways, opposed to linear techniques of multivariate analysis like regression analysis, as well as the ‘sociology of variables’ that goes along with it, and fits with the relational philosophy underpinning Bourdieu’s model of the social space and fields. The most commonly used GDA technique among those inspired by Bourdieu is MCA, which is an extension of simple CA to a table crossing individuals with variable categories. We have run through the core elements of MCA to determine that the key features to be examined are the number of axes to be retained, the proportion of inertia explained by each axis, the contribution of categories to the retained axes and, in order to progress toward structured data analysis, the correspondence with supplementary variables. We finished by discussing the use of cluster analysis as a means of isolating sectors of the MCA space as internally homogenous and heterogenous from others as possible.

Chapter 4: Construction of Polish Social Space

The chapter proceeds with the construction of the Polish social space. In the first step, the variable choice in other studies is discussed, what is then confronted with theoretical arguments and practical aspects related to the availability of the indicators in the data. The main part of the chapter offers an interpretation of the model and its dimensions. Next, the relationship with relevant supplementary variables is presented. The final part is a detailed analysis of the nine sectors of the space taken to represent nine class fractions of the three *analytical classes*: dominated, intermediate and dominant.

Variable choice in other studies

Although it seems that all researchers inspired by Bourdieu's would agree that the social space should be operationalized in terms of three aspects – cultural capital, economic capital and relevant 'work-related' variables – it is less clear which particular variables should be chosen as indicators of these aspects, and not much discussion has been devoted to this problem. The reason for that might be perhaps twofold: a limitation of space and/or the implicit assumption that the issue is somewhat obvious and self-explanatory. On this backdrop two studies stand out as offering some discussion of what variables should be included as measures of these factors: Rosenlund (2014) and Melldahl and Börjesson (2014).

The key recommendation regarding indicators of economic capital is that these should be well differentiated, reflecting various aspects of one's material standing. Melldahl and Börjesson (2014) stressed the importance of differentiating between income and wealth (the latter defined as "durable—and transferable—assets", Ibid.: 141) and, going further, postulated that to widen the definition of economic capital one must include not only information about possession but also "on (...) disposition towards the production, distribution and consumption within different fields". (Ibid.: 139) ⁴⁵ In a similar fashion, Rosenlund (2014) warned against limiting the choice of the indicators of economic capital only to income as it alone fails to capture the complexity of one's economic situation on a level required for a meaningful construction of social space. In practice, the majority of researchers have met the above condition. Although income is undoubtedly the central variable deployed in all studies (in most cases measured as household income, sometimes as household income per capita or

⁴⁵ However, they did not fulfil this postulate in their own variable choice.

personal income), other indicators were included as well, most often ownership and value of real estate assets (residence and/or summerhouse). Slightly less frequent has been inclusion of car ownership and value, and some measures of accumulated wealth (in various forms such as investments, savings, shares, bonds, art collection). Finally, it has to be noted that the variable choice is to a certain extent dependent on the national context as there are local variations of relevant components of economic capital, such as boat possession and value in Norway or land possession and acreage in Serbia.

There seems to be a consensus regarding the choice of indicators of cultural capital, as most researchers have tried to include indicators of at least two of the three forms of cultural capital distinguished by Bourdieu (1997), some of them succeeding in putting all of them into their models. All studies include respondent's level of education, and most of them also the field of study, taken to be the most general and widely available measure of institutionalized cultural capital and, more generally, an indicator of the overall level of symbolic mastery, sometimes also called "the scholastic component of cultural capital", (Flemmen 2014: 550). Embodied cultural capital (also labelled as "inherited cultural capital" by Prieur et al. 2008: 55) was in most cases measured through parental level of education (father and/or mother, or whichever higher from both). Some studies included a variable tapping into how "cultured" one's family home was by asking about the number of cultural artefacts and activities in the home when the respondent was growing up. (Flemmen et al., 2018a, 2018b). A less frequent choice is inclusion of a sibling's level of education (e.g. in the form of the number of siblings with higher education, see Flemmen 2013) or capital of close friends (Rosenlund 2014, Skjøtt-Larsen 2012).⁴⁶ Other researchers deployed measures of objectified cultural capital in the form of possessing a book collection (Skjøtt-Larsen, 2012) or used some elements of taste as a proxy for overall cultural capital (musical taste in Cvetičanin and Popescu, 2011). It is important to note that this is a tricky choice as it means conflating social space with space of lifestyles. Finally, a popular choice has been father's occupation. Some classified this as belonging to the group of work-related variables (Prieur et al. 2008), but it is perhaps more accurate to treat it as a measure of social trajectory and social conditions in which one has been brought up or as another proxy for parental capital (this is how this variable has been classified in Atkinson and Rosenlund 2014).

⁴⁶ Skjøtt-Larsen's argument is that one's choice of friends in this regard may serve as an additional indicator of one's cultural capital, but it is somewhat controversial as it to some extent it mixes cultural capital with social capital.

There is more variation regarding the choice of variables related to paid employment. Most of the studies from Scandinavia have taken into account the sector of employment (public vs. private), which is an important factor in these countries due to the large size and distinctiveness of the public sector. Another common variable is respondent's occupation. The only explicit rationale here is that it reflects differential career prospects, including prospects of salary increases (Flemmen, 2014). In some projects this variable has been omitted in favour of employment status and industry (Atkinson and Rosenlund, 2014). A closer examination of how the occupation variable deployed in these studies was constructed (that is, how occupations were categorized) reveals that in comparison to typical occupational schemas (e.g. ISCO) it contained a lot of additional information pertaining to industry and/or employment status. Flemmen et al. (2018) have introduced a distinction for each occupational group (workers, professionals, managers) into those employed in "health, care, education" and those employed elsewhere. Moreover, the study includes 'self-employed' as a category of the occupation variable. The authors do not offer any explanation for using such a categorization but one can presume that it has been devised with the intent to capture a different capital composition characteristic for the "health, care, education" industries and by extension also for the public sector (not included in this particular model) as these services are mostly situated in it. It might appear that such differences in the grand scheme of things are only minor technical details, but they seem to strongly influence at least some aspects of a model. The models in 8a) and Flemmen et al. (2018b) seem to be based on the same data and almost exactly the same configuration of variables with the only difference being that the latter includes the occupational variable, whereas the former is based solely on the indicators of capital. Yet, the amount of inertia explained by these two dimensions is very different: 84% for the former and only 53% for the latter. Another interesting occurrence is that in the version of the model based only on the capital indicators (no work-related variables) the composition dimension relative to the volume dimension is rather weak (11% to 73%), whilst in most other Scandinavian models, which included work-related variables, this ratio is much more balanced. This then points to a possibility that the inclusion of work-related variables adds more weight to the capital composition dimension. Finally, there are also studies which have not included the work-related variables at all (Cvetičanin and Popescu, 2011; Melldahl and Börjesson, 2014).

The last question concerns the number of variables from each group to be included in the model. Rosenlund recommends including 4 to 5 indicators of economic capital, 2 to 3 of cultural capital and 2 to 3 related to work, which would give a set of 9-12 variables in total.

(Rosenlund 2014:166) Unfortunately, he has not included any logical rationale for this – it seems to be based on his experience working on multiple models of social spaces across countries more than anything else – and it might be seen as a somewhat controversial decision as it leads to an imbalance between economic and cultural capital indicators.

The variable choice

The choice of indicators of capitals made in other studies discussed above was taken as a general guiding principle with two goals in mind: firstly, to offer the best representation of the relevant forms of capital as the data at hand allows; and secondly, to make choices similar to these studies, thus allowing for a meaningful comparison, but not necessarily identical, remembering the need to take into account Polish specificity.

The final dataset consists of a few high-quality indicators of economic capital from which the following are included in the final model. Household income (from all sources, measured in Polish Zlotys,) is intended to reflect one's current financial situation. It has been chosen over personal income with the rationale that it represents one's actual overall financial situation more accurately. This is followed by three indicators reflecting different kinds of possessed and accumulated wealth, two of which pertain to real estate assets, that is, home ownership and value⁴⁷, and a binary summerhouse ownership variable, the third indicator capturing more readily available component of wealth in the form of the amount of savings possessed.⁴⁸ The number of categories of these variables and their distribution should allow for representing different levels of affluence. The household income divided into five roughly equal categories and home ownership into four, and this should be able to capture the material standing at all levels of wealth, whereas savings and especially summerhouse ownership, having much more skewed distribution (25 percent having any savings, 6 percent being owners of a summerhouse) should identify the most affluent individuals.

⁴⁷ Importantly, the way in which the question is asked – 'How much money would be left if the home you and your family live in was sold without any debts?' – allows to capture the actual financial potential and the overall household's material situation more accurately. However, the drawback of this formulation is that the question turned out to be hard to answer, resulting in a very high number of the 'can't choose' answers. Nevertheless, after some cleaning using other variables in the dataset related to house characteristics, the variable is considered to be still of higher value and better suited for the task than a combination of some other variables containing information on home characteristics (e.g. home ownership and size in sq. meters).

⁴⁸ Again, the formulation of the question covers more than just money savings, potentially including various saving and financial instruments: 'About how much money would be left if you and/or your immediate family converted to cash all savings?'.

The dataset also offers a selection of high-quality indicators of cultural capital, similar to those deployed in the studies discussed above. First, respondent's level of education serves as a measure of institutionalized cultural capital, but is also taken to be the most general available indicator of the overall level of cultural capital. It is complemented by two indicators of embodied or inherited cultural capital, both related to the conditions shaping one's habitus when one was growing up, that is, the number of books in the family home when the respondent was 14 years old and father's level of education. The model also includes father's occupation when the respondent was 14 years old, which is not a direct measure of inherited cultural capital but arguably it is a very important factor shaping one's habitus and embodied capital. What is more, it is probably the best available indicator of social trajectory.

The choice of the work-related variables, for the reasons stated above, is less straightforward. Here, I decided to follow Atkinson and Rosenlund (2014), by including industry and employment status rather than respondent's occupation. In this way, it is possible to capture the most important work-related effects shaping the volume and composition of capital, but at the same time avoiding imposing directly the influence of occupation, thus allowing for testing the relationship between the social space and the occupational structure without risking a circular argument. Sector of employment, i.e. public vs. private, was also considered but it contributed the least from the group of work-related variables and at the same its inclusion distorted the shape of the map, suppressing and obscuring some of its important features. Nevertheless, sector of employment is still considered to be important and its relationship to the social space is taken into consideration by treating it as a supplementary variable (that is, not determining the shape of the model).

Finally, the author was not able to test empirically whether any effect of political capital is discernible in the social space because the question on the membership in the communist party was not asked in the 2010 wave of the Polish General Social Survey, and nor was the question on current membership in parties or other political organisations.

Missing values and categories below 5% are treated as passive (that is, they do not actively shape the geometrical solution).

General description of the model

The model of the Polish space is dominated by the first dimension, which explains 66.1 percent of the total variance. The second dimension accounts for 11.3 percent of the variance

and the third a further 5.2 percent. However, only the first axis, interpreted as a capital volume dimension, and the third, taken to be reflecting the capital composition principle, could be meaningfully interpreted. The second dimension reveals a well-known and quite common phenomenon for data dimensionality reduction techniques (though not so eagerly reported by most researchers): the Guttman effect, also labelled the horseshoe effect. The problem occurs when a set of highly correlated ordinal variables is included in a model, resulting in a situation where some of the subsequent dimensions are not independent of each other (Hjellbrekke, 2019: 96). This results in a dimension that opposes on the one side the extreme values, the highest and the lowest, to the middle values on the other. When the scores of this dimension are presented together with scores from the dimension reflecting the volume/intensity of the analysed phenomenon (usually the strongest first dimension), a characteristic parabolic shape appears. It is sometimes recommended to treat such a dimension as a pure mathematical artefact. In some cases, however, a dimension of a similar shape might have a meaningful interpretation, e.g. in relation to people's views on some issue it plausible to find the distinction between those who have a clear opinion, positive or negative, and those who are undecided. However, this is not the case of the model in question.

For this reason, only the first dimension and the third dimension of the model are interpreted, the second being omitted. A similar strategy regarding the issue of horseshoe has been chosen in Rosenlund (2009) and Atkinson (forthcoming). Nevertheless, the very fact of the occurrence of the Guttman effect provides the first very important insight on the structure of the Polish social space. As has been signalled in the introductory chapter, there is a good deal of evidence that suggests the dominating role of the capital volume principle and, at best, moderate strength of the capital composition principle. Finding the strong horse shoe effect would then confirm this initial diagnosis. The reason for why the horse shoe occurs could be better understood when the first (capital volume) and the third (capital composition) are presented together – the distribution of points representing individuals (the cloud of individuals) forms a characteristic conical/funnel shape that amounts to the fact that the variance of the capital composition dimensions depends on the value on the capital volume dimension, the higher the score on the former, the higher the variance of the latter (Figure 3). This is evident when the standard deviations for the different levels of capital are compared – in the low capital sector it equals 0.22, in the middle 0.35 and in the high 0.53. A similar conical shape of the social spaces has been found in the studies from other countries, though most probably the proportion must have been different enough, in favour of this part of the space

where there is more variance on the capital composition dimension, to render the capital

Table 1	Capital Volume	Capital Composition
	Contribution (% of total axis's variance)	Contribution (% of total axis's variance)
<u>Economic capital</u>		
Household Income		
0-1350 PLN	3.53	
4000+ PLN	5.74	4.39
Summerhouse ownership		
Owns a summerhouse	2.13	4.41
House ownership and value		
Does not own a house		6.07
100-199k PLN		5.32
200k+ PLN	3.38	3.39
Savings		
Up to 15k PLN		3.39
Over 15k PLN	4.90	4.86
<u>Cultural capital</u>		
Respondent's education		
Primary education	3.87	
Vocational education	3.16	
Secondary vocational education		3.49
University degree		
business/technical/medical	4.74	6.43
University degree arts and humanities	4.88	6.76
Father's education		
Primary education	4.90	
Secondary education	2.73	5.25
Degree education	9.92	
Father's occupation		
Official/manager	3.40	
Professional	6.54	
Clerk/service worker		2.48
Peasant	2.96	3.31
Number of books in home when 14-16 years old		
Around 10 books	4.31	
Around 50 books		2.63
More than 200 books	8.83	5.78

composition axis stronger, pushing it forward in the hierarchy of dimensions in terms of the variance they explain.

Table 1. Social space. Modalities with above average contributions to the dimensions.

Table 1	Capital Volume	Capital Composition
	Contribution (% of total axis's variance)	Contribution (% of total axis's variance)
<u>Work related variables</u>		
Industry		
Primary and secondary industries	2.23	
Professional and financial services	2.42	
Public services	2.29	4.46
Employment status		
Self-employed		3.80
Manager		2.96
Employee		3.47
Supervisor		2.69

Figure 1. Axis 1 & 2. Space of individuals.




Figure 2. Axis 1 & 2. Active variables.





Figure 3. Space of individuals. Axis 1 & 2.



Nevertheless, although the capital composition might be of smaller strength, its overall importance should still be considered valid and worth further exploration. Firstly, the fact that the second dimension could be said to be an artefact renders the figures of the explained inertia somewhat problematic and the rather small amount of variance explained by the third dimension is of lesser concern. What is more important is that the third dimension, and as a result the overall shape of the social space, meets other important criteria of further validation. Firstly, the shape of the cloud of individuals is even, with no visible disturbances and irregularities, and most importantly with no trace of any residues of the Guttman effect. Secondly, the model is stable in the sense that a similar shape of the social space is obtained with other combinations of variables and with other categorizations of the variables included. Most importantly, the same overall shape is visible in a model without the work-related variables and in a model where there is no distinction between the economic/technical degree and general degree for the respondent's education variable. Thirdly, as presented below, the whole logic of the space, in terms of the positions of the key categories, the composition of the particular regions of the social space as well as the secondary characteristics, that is, the relationships with such external variables as occupation, gender or age, are in line with the theoretical expectations and the patterns observed elsewhere.

The capital volume dimension

The first dimension is shaped mainly by two factors: cultural capital, the largest contributor to this dimension accounting for 50 percent of the overall inertia, and economic capital, accounting for substantially less (25 percent). Father's occupation has a prominent contribution of 14 percent to the axis. Work-related variables (status of employment and industry) have a noticeably lower contribution of 11 percent.

Examining the structure of the first dimension more closely, it can be seen that all indicators of cultural capital have almost the same contribution, in the range 15-18 percent. When father's occupation is taken together with measures of parental capital it is clear that the effect of social origin is very strong, contributing almost one third to the overall inertia of this dimension. The most prominent measures of economic capital on the volume of capital dimension are household income, which contributes 11 percent, followed by savings and home ownership and value. Summerhouse ownership turns out to be of lesser importance (two

percent), which is expected considering the variable's distribution.⁴⁹ However, the low score of the home variable is arguably more surprising, even taking into account a potential issue signalled earlier with home ownership being a powerful indicator of economic capital in Poland. This might be one the late effects of the state-socialist housing policy which made the distribution of this kind of wealth much more equal than observed elsewhere. Finally, industry contributes 7 percent and employment status a further 4 percent.

⁴⁹ The variable summerhouse ownership has only two categories, and the category contributing above the average is small [n=75, 6%]. Limiting overall variable inertia further is the fact that the remaining category of no summer house ownership is characteristic for the vast majority of the sample, meaning it does not contribute much to any dimension.

Figure 4. Social space. Map of active categories with above average contribution.





Figure 5. Social space. Active modalities trajectories.



The next step is an investigation of the position of the above average contributors relative to each other, looking for oppositions defining each end of the first dimension. The points form a clear pattern: on the left, negative side we see that the outermost modalities are those reflecting the lowest level of both kinds of capital, whilst the categories reflecting a high level of capital are situated on the right side of the graph. Such a pattern clearly reflects the capital volume principle and this dimension could certainly be labelled as the capital volume dimension. We then see the following pairs of oppositions. Starting from educational capital, respondent's primary and vocational education on the left is opposed to a degree (of any kind, both technical/business and a degree in humanities) on the right. Regarding embodied or inherited capital, 0-10 books in the family home is opposed to having had over 200 books, and a father with primary education stands in opposition to a father with a degree or secondary education. There is also a strong link to father's occupation: occupational groups related to high social position are positioned on the right side of the graph, having a professional father being the largest contributor and being located farthest on the right, and one's father being an official/legislator closer to the origin and with a lower contribution. These two groups stand in opposition to coming from a family where the father was a peasant, which is located on the left. The points representing father's occupation are positioned close to those coding father's level of education, which indicates that these two variables are in close relationship. A professional father and father having a degree are also the farthest modalities on the right. All this proves that social origin plays a very important role on the first dimension and points to a high degree of inheritance of social position, thus confirming the findings of earlier studies of the Polish social structure and stratification.

Looking at economic capital, the contrast runs between the lowest income group (0-1350 PLN) on the left and the highest (4000+ PLN) on the right, followed by the opposition between non-ownership and ownership of a low-value home on one side opposed to ownership a high-value home on the other.⁵⁰ Not having savings versus the highest amount of savings, and finally not possessing a summer house versus owning one, round out the polarity.⁵¹ The position of the

⁵⁰ It has to be noted that home non-ownership and ownership of a low-value home have a below average contribution but they are still positioned in the expected place, so it is justified to report this as the opposition between non-ownership/low-value vs. high-value ownership. On another note, the very numerous missing 'can't choose' category is positioned in the middle, which proves there is no systematic effect behind the choice of this category (at least not related to the variables in the model), which overall strengthens the case for including this variable.

⁵¹ The category 'no summerhouse' has a contribution far below the average but, as explained in a previous footnote, this is expected as it characterises the vast majority of the sample (94%). Thus it simply could not be contributing much any to any dimension. This obviously means that having a summerhouse is characteristic only of a fraction of the individuals situated on the right side of the map.

points representing high level of economic capital relative to each other is also to some extent related to the number and size of the categories of their variables. The outermost modalities, summerhouse ownership and possession of savings over 15 thousand PLN, are small and represent the highest level of wealth, thus being very distinctive, whilst the income category 4000+ PLN and home value over 200 thousand PLN are much larger, hence more widespread and much less distinctive by definition.

The volume of capital is related to a number of other features. The low level of economic and cultural capital is also closely associated with individuals working in primary and secondary industries, whereas high volume of capital is related especially to employment in public services and education, and professional and financial services. The volume of capital is also associated with status of employment, though the link is of secondary importance in comparison to other variables as none of the modalities of this variable contribute above the average. The level of control over others' work is positively related to the volume of capital: managers are positioned far to the right which means that this position offers access to high level of capital, and the relationship for supervisors is weaker but nonetheless volume of capital being higher than average is still associated with them. Being self-employed outside of farming has a very similar position to supervisors. On the other end of the graph, the passive category of 'self-employed farmer' is positioned far to the left, which indicates that their volume of capital tends to be lowest in comparison to other employment status categories. The largest modality, employee, is also positioned on the left, but much closer to the middle of the graph, which means that it is associated with slightly lower levels of capital than the average. Finally, the individuals who have never worked, a passive modality, have a score on the first dimension close to the origin meaning that their stock of capital is middling.

The capital composition dimension

The capital composition dimension, similarly to the volume dimension, is shaped primarily by the indicators of economic and cultural capital. The balance between the two forms of capital is in this case even, both contributing 35 percent. The work-related variables play a much bigger role in shaping this dimension as their contribution is almost doubled in comparison to the first dimension (21 percent). The structure of the contribution of the economic capital indicators is different too, as wealth is in this case more important – home

ownership and value come first, contributing 15 percent, followed by savings (10.5 percent), and household income and summerhouse ownership, both contributing 5 percent. Out of the indicators of cultural capital, respondent's education has again the greatest weight (18 percent), followed by the rough number of books in the family home (9 percent) and father's education (9 percent). Father's occupation is again an important factor, with a contribution of 9 percent. Finally, status of employment is one of the most important contributors (13 percent, the third greatest contributor to this dimension), industry having a smaller, but still very significant contribution of 9 percent.

In the next step, similarly as with the first dimension, the location of the most relevant category points in relation to each other is analysed in order to pull out the major principles of opposition. The most important observations come when one interprets the positions of the points representing economic and cultural capital jointly. Thus the top side of the map is dominated by various modalities representing high economic capital, the cultural capital categories are much fewer but those which appear on that side indicate lower levels of cultural capital or cultural capital of a vocational/technical/economic character. The most influential modalities pertaining to economic capital on this side are then the two top home value categories (100-199k PLN and 200k+ PLN), both categories related to having savings (below 15k PLN and above 15k PLN) and the top income category. From the cultural capital indicators, meanwhile, the defining ones are: first, in the middle volume of capital area, secondary vocational/technical education and 50 books; and second, the category of technical/business degree, which has one of the highest contributions for a single modality on this dimension (6 percent).

A reverse pattern is observed at the bottom of the graph. Here, the majority of the modalities having a high contribution and a high score are the ones representing high levels of cultural capital. These include parental capital (father having secondary education or a degree, though the contribution of the latter is below the average), embodied capital (over 200 books, with a high contribution of 6 percent) and finally educational capital (a general/humanistic degree contributing 7 percent, thus mirroring the strength of technical/economic degree positioned at the opposite side and clearly pointing to a very important role played by this opposition in the high-capital area). The only notable categories related to economic capital on this side are no home ownership and the lowest income group of 0-1350 PLN. When the position of the points on the graph is considered simultaneously on the volume and composition dimensions, a characteristic pattern appears: the level of cultural capital rises diagonally,

forming a line going from the upper-left quadrant to the lower-right quadrant, whereas a similar line for economic capital could be drawn going from the lower-left quadrant to the upper-right.

We can now complement this basic interpretation using the information concerning the distribution of the points representing work-related variables. Employment status is very closely related to this dimension and it is the only variable of which all active categories contribute above the average. The opposition is, on the one hand, between managers and the self-employed, and to a lesser extent supervisors, located at the top of the map and, on the other, employees located at the bottom. Regarding industry, we observe that construction, primary and secondary industries and professional and financial services modalities are associated with a composition where economic capital prevails, whilst public services are associated with the cultural side of the map.

To summarize, observing a pattern of the distribution of the points where a clear opposition between high level of economic capital combined with the (relative) low level of cultural capital at the top of the map and low level of economic combined with high level of cultural capital at the bottom, we can name this dimension the capital composition dimension.

Cloud of individuals – concentration ellipses.

The concentration ellipses of economic capital variables are spread along Axis 1 (capital volume), which means they are more homogenic internally with regards to respondents' capital composition, but more polarised by their capital volume. This demonstrates that these variables are strong indicators of capital composition, as they classify respondents into relatively uniform groups.

This is less clear with the variables measuring cultural capital, as most of them are also visibly spread along Axis 2 (capital composition), what signals a smaller degree of homogeneity regarding capital composition, however, for the modalities measuring high cultural capital (e.g. number of books at home 200+, respondent's education degree level), the alignment with Axis 1 is higher and the ellipses are internally more polarised by capital volume.

The cultural capital variables whose modalities are either consistently spread across Axis 2 or which alignment with Axis 2 diminishes for modalities reflecting high cultural capital are related to paternal cultural capital (father's education and father's occupation)⁵².

The analysis of supplementary variables: occupation, gender, age and sector of employment⁵³

The most important secondary characteristic of a social space is its relationship with the occupational structure. Here I deploy, instead of the raw ISCO groups, a more sociologically loaded re-categorization of the ISCO88 codes borrowed from Atkinson (forthcoming). I also use another re-categorization devised by Atkinson which groups occupations on the basis of their volume and capital composition into class fractions in the Bourdieusian sense (Atkinson, 2017; Atkinson and Rosenlund, 2014). Although the latter categorization is based on UK data, the hypothesis is that the relationship between occupations and capital volume and composition at the most basic level should be roughly similar between the countries. Unfortunately, constructing a similar schema from scratch for Poland is impossible due to the lack of available secondary data providing enough detailed information on occupations regarding their capital stock and composition.

It is observed that, overall, there is a rather strong relationship between occupational groups and the social space. Firstly, on the volume of capital dimension the distinction runs between the high-qualified and well-paid professional and managerial occupations characterized by a high stock of capital positioned on the right and the manual occupations (skilled and manual workers) on the left, with farmers positioned farthest to the left. The low-qualified non-manual occupations are positioned in the middle.

⁵² Details in Appendix.

⁵³ All reported differences are statistically significant at the level of 0.95, unless state otherwise. The inter-cluster differences have been tested using the pairwise test of the equality of column proportions available in the custom tables module in SPSS.

Figure 6. Supplementary variables.




Figure 7. Supplementary variables.





Figure 8. Supplementary variables.



Secondly, there is also a pronounced differentiation along the capital composition dimension, though mostly limited to the high- and middle-capital areas. One then infers that the empirical observations are largely in line with the theoretical expectations: groups for which a given configuration of capital is expected on theoretical grounds are located in the anticipated area of the map and close to each other, and at the same time far away from groups dissimilar in this regard. Hence, teaching professionals, cultural producers, and social sciences and religious professionals are positioned at the bottom of the map (the link for teaching professionals being very strong), whilst legislators/officials, corporate managers and managers of small enterprises are located at the top. The difference between the scores on the capital composition dimension of the two groupings are over 1 standard deviation, which is a very high value in the solution. The occupational groupings expected to have a balanced composition of capital, that is, business and legal professionals, health professionals, and natural sciences professionals and engineers, are indeed positioned in the middle. The pattern becomes even clearer when Atkinson's (2017) class fractions are projected on the map: the cultural dominant are far at the bottom, professions in the middle, business executives, and lower managers and proprietors far at the top.⁵⁴

The differentiation in the middle-capital sector is smaller and less clear, though still to some extent meaningful. There is no clear pattern for occupational groups, as on the one hand some of them are in the positions one would expect (clerks, personal services, teaching associate professionals), but on the others some are not (nurses) or the effect is weak (technicians). However, the pattern again becomes clearer when the class fractions are used in place of the occupational groups. Thus, administrators and cultural intermediaries – class fractions expected to have a portfolio of capital based primarily on cultural capital – occupy a position more to the bottom, cultural side of the graph, whilst technicians, for whom the prediction would be that their configuration of capital is more economic in character, are on the opposite side. The fractions predicted to have a balanced composition, sales workers and white-collar workers, are indeed found in the middle, or at least closer to the middle, than the economic and cultural fractions. Finally, in the low-capital sector, there is difference between farmers and skilled manual workers on the one hand, and the remainder of less-qualified manual workers on the other, though the difference is small.

⁵⁴ In comparison to the UK, the lower managers and proprietors are positioned much higher in the social space, almost exactly in the same place as business executives.

There is no detectable relationship between gender and the capital volume dimension but there is a moderate association between gender and the capital composition dimension. The point for males is positioned at the upper side, informing us that a composition of capital with a dominance of economic capital is more closely associated with men, whilst the point representing females is seen at the bottom side of the graph and indicates that a composition of capital where cultural capital is prevalent is associated with women. However, this effect is rather weak, as the rate feminization of the cultural sector and the rate of masculinisation of the economic sector are fairly low. Compared to a male/female sample split of 48 percent to 52 percent, the split on the cultural side of the model (above the origin) is 58/42 and, on the economic side, 52/48, though high enough to register as statistically significant.

The pattern of the relationship between the sector of economy and the social space is overall quite weak. There is no relationship with the volume of capital and only a limited relationship, though relevant enough to be noted, with the capital composition dimension. We then observe that the private sector is positioned in the top part of the graph, thus being somewhat more closely associated with the economic capital-rich section (60 percent employed in the private sector, 52 percent in the whole sample) whilst the public sector corresponds with the opposite cultural one (57 percent employed in the public sector, 48 percent in the whole sample).⁵⁵

Another important secondary aspect of the social space is its relationship with age. We see that the capital-poor side of the graph is associated with older age groups (AGE_50-59, AGE_60-69, AGE_70-79, AGE_80-89) and the capital-rich side with the younger ones (AGE_18-29, AGE_30-39, AGE_40-49). This is also reflected by the mean age for each half of the model as the value for the high capital side is 41 years whereas for the low capital side it stands at 48 years (the average for the sample as a whole is 45 years). The reason behind this relationship is most probably twofold. Firstly, older generations are, on average, worse educated. Secondly, there is a life course effect on their stock of economic capital as a pension is, on average, much smaller than the earlier income, and the amount of savings is being diminished for those who live off them. There is also prominent differentiation related to age on the capital composition dimension, but limited only to the high capital side – the cultural section is generally younger than the economic one (respectively, the average age is 37 and 44

⁵⁵ Differences being statistically significant.

years old).⁵⁶ This again is a life course effect – accumulation of economic wealth takes time, whilst cultural capital (at least as measured here) is acquired much quicker.

There is also a quite strong association between place of residence and certain areas of the social space. Firstly, there is almost a linear correlation between volume of capital and the population of the place of residence – the more populous the place is, the higher is the level of capital associated with it. Secondly, in the low and middle volume of capital area there is a rural versus urban division on the capital composition dimension. Lower cultural than economic capital is associated with rural areas, while lower economic than cultural capital is associated with living in a town. This could perhaps be related to some extent to home ownership, since house values are much higher in rural places. However, there is no such opposition on the capital composition dimension in the high volume of capital side.

Analysis of the sector of the social space

The next step of the analysis involves dividing the social space into nine groups with the aims of (i) observing how positions of certain categories on the map translate into the composition of the specific regions of the social space and (ii) examining how strong the influence is of particular variables and how well they differentiate individuals on the capital composition dimension, thus offering further validation of the model. The following procedure has been used. First, the sample has been divided into three groups or ‘classes’ of equal size on the volume dimension (dominant/intermediate/dominated), then, second, each of these groups has been further divided into three fractions of equal size according to capital composition. This differs from the way the task has been achieved in some other studies (e.g. Prieur et al. 2008), where the sample was *simultaneously* divided into three groups in relation to the capital volume and another three regarding the capital composition and then the resulting two variables crossed. The procedure employed here better captures the differentiation pertaining to capital composition at different levels of capital, reflecting different variations of the capital composition depending on the level of the capital volume.

⁵⁶ All age differences are statistically significant.

Dominated class

All differences between fractions discussed in this and following sections have been tested using the pairwise test of the equality of column proportions available in the custom tables module in SPSS⁵⁷.

As the differentiation along the capital dimension in the low capital area is generally lower and only some variables have a meaningful contribution, the character of the opposition between the bottom and the top fraction does not reflect the capital composition principle in its pure form. Regarding cultural capital, the differentiation between class fractions of the dominated class is low and all differences between categories of cultural capital indicators come as statistically non-significant. There is much more variation in the distribution of economic capital. First, differences in home ownership and value between the fractions on the opposite sides of the map are very well marked (76 percent of “cultural” fraction does not own one, in “economic” this is true for only 5 percent). Second, the economic section has higher household income (in “cultural” fraction 58 percent are earning 0-1350 PLN) but variables related to wealth like savings and summerhouse are irrelevant in this section (as no fraction possesses any discernible wealth). Having that in mind, I will still use the terms cultural and economic to characterise the fractions, but in quotes to denote their provisional character.

These differences are closely related to some important secondary characteristics which shed additional light on the nature and sociological significance of the divisions in the low volume area. Social origin and family background seem to be key differences, as the majority in the “economic” come from peasant family, whereas the remaining fractions have primarily working-class backgrounds (76 percent in “economic”, 42 percent and “balanced”, 21 percent in “cultural”). Not surprisingly, this is also related to the urban-rural divide and shows the power of rural roots in determining the future: the majority of the “economic” fraction lives in the countryside and a considerable share works as farmers (31 percent to 4 percent in “cultural” fraction). As has been already said, the overall level of both cultural and economic resources is related to age, so the dominated class is older than the average age for the population (there is no difference between the fractions). This results in an over-representation of retired people in relation to other classes and the population average. However, these are not simply retirees, but primarily retirees from the occupations low in the occupational structure.

⁵⁷ The detailed table in Appendix.

To summarize, the differentiation between fractions does not fully correspond to the composition principle as only some variables are relevant in this regard. Still, it reflects a very important social division between people coming from the rural world, both literally in the sense of their place of residence and job, as well as their social origin on the one hand, and those having more working class and urban roots on the other. This is further confirmed by the size of the concentration ellipse for farmers in comparison to the manual and skilled workers ones – there is almost a complete overlap between these categories, but the one for farmers is visibly smaller and lies within the larger ellipses for workers, and to their left side. This means that farmers not only have the lowest levels of capital, but are also very homogenous in this regard. Such pattern is important inasmuch as it proves that farmers in Poland still constitute a somewhat distinct segment of the society.

Intermediate class

In comparison to the dominated class, the variation between fractions in the intermediate class is more prominent and in line with the logic of the capital composition principle. Firstly, the distribution of the cultural capital indicators forms a gradient from higher levels in the cultural, middling in the balanced fraction, to lower in the economic fraction. Secondary education is the modal category in all fractions, but its size relative to other modalities differs markedly between the fractions. In the economic fraction it characterises almost 70 percent, while the comparable figure in the cultural fraction is only 47 percent. Moreover, the division between general and technical education is already present in the intermediate class, as the proportion of the holders of general diplomas relative to technical ones in the cultural fraction is almost equal (21 percent to 27 percent), whereas in the economic fraction technical diplomas dominate (58 percent to 13 percent). Moreover, the percentage of people having a degree is significantly higher in the cultural fraction (21 percent, only 4 percent in balanced and 2 percent in economic). The pattern is even clearer for parental/embodied cultural capital measured by father's education and the number of books in the home when the respondent was 14 years old, the economic fraction having a much larger share of less educated fathers (98 percent having either primary or vocational education versus 62 percent in cultural) and fewer books than the cultural fraction (16 percent having 0-10 books and 0 percent having 200 books or more versus 10 percent and 17 percent respectively for cultural fraction), and the balanced fraction falling in between.

A reversed pattern is observed for economic capital – the economic fraction is characterized by higher levels than the cultural fraction, the balanced fraction again being in the middle. This pattern is valid for all indicators of economic capital, both reflecting more day-to-day financial resources (the average household income in the economic fraction is higher by almost 50 percent), as well as accumulated wealth (home and summerhouse ownership, savings possession). There is a marked difference in home ownership, the cultural fraction on average not owning one (63 percent), and if so, these are less valuable properties (majority – 19 percent - has a home valued less than 99k PLN), whilst the majority of the economic fraction are owners (92 percent), and their homes worth more (45 percent has a home valued more than 200k PLN). Possession of savings and a summerhouse in the intermediate class is still very rare, but the economic fraction differs markedly from the balanced and cultural fraction in this regard (25 percent has some savings, in cultural fraction only 1 percent and in balanced 6 percent).

There is also a division pertaining to employment status running along the line employee vs. other statuses, the former characterizing the absolute majority of the cultural fraction (76 percent), whilst the economic fraction has a sizeable share of self-employed, managers and supervisors who together outweigh employees (49 percent to 36 percent). In terms of industry characteristic for the opposite sides of the capital composition division, the division is primarily about being employed in public services in the cultural fraction vs. working in the primary and secondary industries in the economic fraction (50 percent and 36 percent respectively).

Dominant class

In the dominant class the capital composition principle is observed in its full form. Starting from educational cultural capital, similarly to the intermediate class, there is a very marked division between economic/technical degree and other degrees (65 percent to 1 percent in cultural fraction and 13 percent to 39 percent in economic). Parental capital also plays an important role in differentiating the fractions what manifests as a contrast between fathers with basic vocational vs. those with secondary education (6 percent in cultural and 36 percent in economic). This is certainly an important difference as these types of diplomas have very different symbolic connotations. However, the share of people whose father has a degree is much more even (not great enough to be statistically significant). The reason for this is that the

holders of two types of degrees have similar profiles in terms of father's education. The relationship is clearer for father's occupation. Next, there is a marked and statistically significant difference in regard to the number of books in the home when the respondent was 14 years old. In the cultural fraction 70 percent of people had around 200 books or more, whilst in the economic fraction only 27 percent did, the most numerous in the latter being 50-100 books (58 percent).

The relationships between the fractions pertaining to their stocks of economic capital are also well-pronounced and related to both household income as well as wealth. There is a gradient of the modal household income, the highest being in the economic fraction (5850 PLN), it being lower in the balanced fraction (4844 PLN) and the lowest in the cultural fraction (4011 PLN). The individuals in the economic fraction are much more likely to own a home than those in the cultural fraction (only 4 percent of non-owners in the former in comparison to 29 percent in the latter) and their homes are on average worth more, though it must be noted that the cultural fraction is quite non-homogeneous in this regard as 31 percent of them are found in the highest home value category. In terms of the summerhouse ownership as well as possession and value of savings, there is again a gradient pattern, the economic fraction being the wealthiest by a large margin, the cultural the poorest and the balanced falling in between (no savings, respectively, 88 percent – 66 percent – 38 percent; savings above 15k PLN 9 percent – 23 percent – 46 percent; summerhouse, 2 percent – 14 percent – 28 percent).

Finally, the above regularities are related to the same industries and employment statuses as has been observed in other countries. Hence, similarly to the intermediate class, there is distinction between being an employee, the dominant status in the cultural fraction (67 percent), and being either a manager, supervisor or a self-employed, heavily over-represented in the economic fraction (23 percent – 25 percent – 20 percent respectively), the balanced fraction presenting a more balanced mix of the above. The fraction differentiation related to industry is also very pronounced: the individuals in the cultural fraction employed in the public sector are over-represented by a ratio of 2.5 in comparison the economic fraction, whereas those belonging to the latter fraction are over-represented compared to the former in the following industries: professional and financial services (by 4.3), construction (8.1)⁵⁸, primary and secondary industries (4.3). The public services are also very characteristic for the cultural

⁵⁸ Although the ratio is the highest, the size of these groups is small, thus rendering the difference not statistically significant.

fraction in comparison to the whole population (its members being 2.8 more likely than the population average to be employed there), whereas the professional and financial services are very characteristic for the economic fraction (3.8 more likely to work in this industry than the average).

Recapitulation

The chosen approach to the Polish case has turned out to be the right one. The Polish social space has been found to be structured according to the same principles as it has been observed in France, Denmark, Norway, and the UK, that is, capital volume and capital composition. However, the capital composition dimension is visibly weaker than in these countries, something that has been predicted in the analysis of the economic and social changes after 1989 and the extent of post-industrialisation. Nevertheless, although this dimension is more muted, the overall structure of the space mirrors the one observed elsewhere. This is visible in the conical shape of the space which signals that the capital composition principle is stronger in the intermediate and dominant classes. Next, this is evident from the contributions of variables, cultural capital dominating over economic capital on the volume dimension, and the contributions being on par on the composition dimension. Moreover, the modalities are distributed in the space in the way predicted by the theory and similar to that found in other countries. The characteristics of the nine class fractions are also in line with the theoretical expectations and the patterns observed elsewhere. Finally, so is the relationship between the structure of the space and key external factors. First, age, the oldest groups being associated with the lowest levels of capital, the middle aged with the highest and the composition based on economic capital, whilst the youngest with the middle levels and the composition based on cultural capital. Second, industry, public services found on the cultural side of the composition dimension, whilst professional and financial services on the economic. Third, occupations have been distributed along the volume axis from the least to the most complex, and on the capital composition very clearly opposing teaching professionals to managers, professions found in the middle, the same pattern being further confirmed by the class fractions of the British Bourdieusian class schema. Interestingly, in Poland the link between sector of employment and gender and capital composition has been presented, but much less marked than in Scandinavia.

All this allows to for an interpretation of the Polish social space as largely comparable to those revealed in Western European countries.

Chapter 5: The Space of Lifestyles in Poland Part I

The Rise of the Omnivore Thesis

Although *Distinction* was translated into English quite soon after it had first been published in France, it took a considerable amount of time before its empirical findings concerning cultural consumption and lifestyles, as well as their ramifications for the understanding of the link between cultural and social hierarchies, were examined in empirical fashion, specifically with a view to testing or emulating it outside France.

One of the most important early studies exploring empirical aspects of *Distinction* is the work by Lamont (1992). Although generally sympathetic towards Bourdieu's ideas, she was not satisfied with his conception of symbolic boundaries because it focused primarily on the role of cultural capital, ignoring other potentially important factors such as economic capital or moral issues. The main conclusion was that cultural boundaries (that is, boundaries related to patterns of cultural consumption and knowledge of traditional highbrow culture) based on cultural capital were limited only to certain places (Paris in this case), whereas elsewhere (New York, Clermont-Ferrand and Indianapolis), different factors, like morals or economic capital, turned out to be of greater importance. Lamont's study, although by no means a complete and comprehensive test of Bourdieu's concept of symbolic space, was thus one of the first full-scale research projects starting from and developing important empirical aspects of *Distinction*.

A true breakthrough for the importance of Bourdieu's model in the empirical cultural sociology, however, and at the same its greatest challenge, came with the invention of the so-called *omnivore thesis*. The career of the concept, introduced by Richard A. Peterson (1992), started in the early 1990s and, although its importance has now begun to slowly wane, it is still an important theme orientating discussion in the field. It was developed as a critique of the *elite-to-mass* theory, which conceptualized cultural hierarchy as organized around the fundamental opposition between two ideal types of consumers of culture: on the one hand, elitist 'snobs', and, on the other, unrefined 'slobs'. The former were said to be keen on and engaged in fine arts practices and the lifestyle accompanying it, at the same time holding mass culture in contempt and actively rejecting it, whilst the latter were the consumers of mass culture, supposedly unrefined and un-differentiated, and as a result shunned by the snobs. Importantly, this cultural hierarchy was said to be rooted in the social structure: a snobbish taste characterized social elites, whereas a preference for popular culture was characteristic of

those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. However, when the theory was put to an empirical test, it seemed that a new pattern was emerging: the elites' cultural portfolio was becoming more eclectic, including lowbrow, mass culture traits alongside traditional 'highbrow' tastes, and this new trend was labelled as omnivorousness. On the other hand, amongst the population with lower capital stocks, instead of a differentiated taste in popular culture, one observed a pattern of a rather limited cultural activity, restricted to just a few popular culture preferences and activities. (Peterson, 1992, 1997; Peterson and Kern, 1996; Peterson and Simkus, 1992).

The idea was quickly picked up by other researchers, as on the one hand, it was without doubt an interesting development offering new insights for cultural sociology, but on the other, there was also a more practical reason behind its growing popularity – it was relatively easy to operationalize and study using secondary data sources. Such studies proliferated at an impressive pace, covering various domains. Some, similarly to Peterson, studied music (Eijck 2001; Chan and Goldthorpe 2007b; Purhonen, Gronow and Rahkonen 2010; Coulangeon and Lemel 2010; van Eijck and Lievens 2008), but others examined reading (Torche, 2007; Van Rees et al., 1999; Zavisca, 2005), visual arts (Berghman and van Eijck, 2009) dining out (Warde et al., 1999), or a few domains at once (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2010; Jaeger and Katz-Gerro, 2010; Katz-Gerro and Jæger, 2013; Lopez-Sintas and Katz-Gerro, 2005), with some exploring other countries than the US: Denmark (Jaeger and Katz-Gerro, 2010; Katz-Gerro and Jæger, 2013), France (Coulangeon and Lemel, 2010), the Netherlands (Berghman and van Eijck, 2009; Eijck, 2001; Van Eijck and Knulst, 2005), Russia (Zavisca, 2005), the UK (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, to name a few (for a more complete list of studies and an exhaustive discussion of the *omnivore thesis* see Gayo, 2016; Hazır and Warde, 2016; Peterson, 2005). Some largely universal correlates of omnivorousness have been reported, most importantly education (higher levels associated with higher activity and a higher probability of being an omnivore) but also social status (as defined by Chan and Goldthorpe 2007, the higher one's status, the greater their activity and chance of being an omnivore). Class and income have not usually been statistically significant when education and social status is controlled for. Regarding other socio-demographic characteristics, the relationship with gender seems to be the strongest (women being more active and more often omnivorous), whilst that with age is less clear. In some cases age has been found to be positively related to the probability of being a univore (the older one is, the more univorous) (e.g. Coulangeon and Lemel 2007, 2010; Tampubolon 2010), whilst in others age seemed to work in the opposite direction (e.g. Chan and Goldthorpe 2007c, 2007b). It is possible that the opposition between traditional vs. modern

is the key to unpacking this relationship (older people favouring the former: DiMaggio and Mukhtar 2004; Van Eijck and Knulst 2005), in which case the direction of the relationship with age would be dependent on a specific choice of the items analysed.

Interestingly, in the early stages of development of the *omnivore thesis* (Peterson, 1992), Bourdieu was not perceived to be the central figure of the antagonistic elite-to-mass theory, and more space was devoted to such theorists as Thorsten Veblen, William Lloyd Warner or Herbert Gans. However, he gradually began to be presented as the key theorist behind this old approach, though more fine-grained details of his argument were still mentioned, e.g. the role of distaste in Bryson (1996) or the importance of the mode of consumption in Peterson (1997), but he finally became the central figure when the elite-to-mass theory was renamed using a term taken directly from Bourdieu's inventory as the 'homology thesis' (Chan 2010; Chan and Goldthorpe 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Jæger and Katz-Gerro 2010; Sullivan and Katz-Gerro 2007). Translated into the language of hypotheses to be tested empirically, this entailed looking for a very close mapping of the social and cultural hierarchies, such that preference for highbrow culture was the exclusive attribute of elites, and at the same time the only element in their taste/participation portfolio, whilst the remainder of society consumed only mass culture and abstained from any highbrow activities altogether. The fact that such a pattern has not been found anywhere for any domain of culture has been read as a definitive refutation of the homology thesis in favour of omnivorousness, now supposedly the new norm.

The Failures of Omnivore Research

It would then seem that the sheer number of studies confirming the *omnivore thesis* and the great confidence with which some authors report it is enough to reject Bourdieu's idea of homology. However, when one examines the omnivorousness thesis in detail and the research which has developed around it, it becomes clear that there are a lot of problems with it, calling its value into doubt. Firstly, the most strident and decisive refutations of Bourdieu's model are built on an incorrect understanding of the core ideas of his model, specifically of the concept of homology. In effect, much of the argument made by these authors amounts to a building and destroying a straw man rather than meaningful engagement with Bourdieu's ideas. Secondly, there is a more general problem of the limited degree of comparability between these studies, resulting from a lack of universal conceptualization and operationalization of the *omnivore thesis*, leading to the conclusion that it does not represent a systematic and coherent

proposition. Thirdly, there are serious methodological issues with many of these studies. Below I present a summary of these counter-arguments.

Regarding the first point, it has often been assumed that Bourdieu posited the existence of a clear hierarchy where elite culture is understood to be superior to mass culture and such a hierarchy is a universally acknowledged fact by the elite and the masses alike. This also involves a specific vision of how social position is translated into culture and in effect sustained and reproduced by it – it is here taken to be an effect of a conscious and planned social action whereby cultural activities and goods serve as objective markers of distinction. However, such a position, characteristic of scholars like Lloyd Warner (Holt, 1997) and akin to the idea of conspicuous consumption developed by Veblen (1949), is very far away from what Bourdieu postulated. This misunderstanding was present in the early studies engaging with *Distinction* and it also found its way into the most influential of the more recent papers, where this theoretical confusion translated into empirical operationalization, namely, the insistence that it is cultural participation rather than taste that should be used when the link between social and cultural hierarchies is studied. (Chan 2010; Chan and Goldthorpe 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Jæger and Katz-er 2010; Sullivan and Katz-Gerro 2007). A related issue is the *substantialist* understanding of cultural capital as something that has an objective and fixed meaning pervading this research, which leads to overly focusing on the object through which distinction operates rather than on the underlying disposition inscribed in habitus (Holt 1997). This misreading underlies a common error of equating traditional highbrow culture/fine arts with cultural capital, and, in effect, considering Bourdieu as a proponent of elite-to-mass theory alongside such thinkers as Gans, something at odds with the ideas presented in *Distinction* (Hjellbrekke et al 2014; Flemmen et al, 2018). All of the above lead to a failed representation of the key idea of Bourdieu's model, namely, homology, which was misinterpreted as a strict isomorphism between high/low classes and highbrow/mass culture. As Emmison (2003) rightly observed, such a model amounts to such a degree of oversimplification that it is almost a caricature, based in turn on a caricature of Bourdieu's theory.

The first to address in detail these problems was Holt (1997). He stressed that habitus operates to a considerable degree on the practical rather than discursive level, which means that not only the reproduction of social structure is indeed happening even when individuals do not make distinctions consciously, but that these processes in any case could be even more effective, as they are often misrecognized as something neutral and not as a means of

maintaining or advancing one's social position. Moreover, he underlined the need to consider cultural objects and practices relationally for each given context, in order to avoid misrepresenting certain configurations characteristic only for a given place and time as universal. The emphasis on the key role played by habitus and dispositions, that is, the generative mechanisms, and specifically the aesthetic disposition, this time in direct relation to the status of the findings made by the more recent omnivorousness research, was further developed by Lizardo and Skiles (2012, 2016). The defining feature of the aesthetic disposition, most characteristic for those with the highest stock of cultural capital, is the ability to discern form from function, which allows for a specific *way* of consuming and appreciating a cultural item, focusing on its formal aspects, putting the specific content and the mode of presentation aside. It is also transposable, and not only is there nothing that limits this disposition to the evaluation of objects associated with fine arts or highbrow culture, but it is actually highly probable that it would lead to aestheticization of objects that are not (yet) part of the canon (e.g. genres like jazz, considered popular in the past and now highly consecrated) or objects commonly considered not to belong to a set of artistic objects of any kind (e.g. objects of everyday life). As some have rightly been keen to stress (e.g. Coulangeon and Duval, 2015; Berghman and van Eijk, 2009), Bourdieu (1984: 4, 30, 329) himself *recognised exactly this tendency*. When this is the case, as best revealed by qualitative research. (Atkinson, 2011; Bellavance, 2008; Jarness, 2015; Ollivier, 2008), the cultural elite consumes such items in a different way and for different reasons than people lacking cultural capital. The main reason behind the process of aestheticization of ever-newer things lies in the dynamics of the field of art, which is constantly changing as there are always newcomers looking for new signifiers of distinction and new ways to propel themselves upwards in the field. This is also related to the dynamics of the inter-fraction rivalry within the dominant class – the cultural elite looking for new ways to distinguish themselves from the economic elite. The second point is especially important in the discussion of the validity and merit of the *omnivore thesis*, as it is related to another example of erroneous reading of Bourdieu's ideas: the false assumption that the conflict in the space of cultural consumption is primarily between the elite and the masses. As Lizardo and Skiles point out, this is wrong, as the disproportion in possessed cultural capital between the cultural elite and the masses is such that the latter is absolutely not in position to endanger the former in any way, hence there are no grounds for any open conflict between the two, open shunning of the popular culture etc. In turn, the real opponent for the cultural elite is the bourgeoisie, and if the cultural elite really holds something in contempt, it is the bourgeoisie

lifestyle. This also points to a need for a more precise conceptualization of elites by taking into account the divisions resulting from capital composition (Atkinson, 2017b).

The main conclusion from the Lizardo and Skiles critique of the *omnivore thesis* is that its proponents are right about the fact that people high in cultural capital consume both highbrow and popular culture, but wrong in interpreting this finding as invalidating Bourdieu's model. However, as much as Lizardo and Skiles are certainly right about the second part of this conclusion, the first is more problematic, as the status of the *omnivore thesis* as a coherent research position has been questioned and serious methodological issues have been signalled (Gayo, 2016; Hazır and Warde, 2016; Robette and Roueff, 2014).

This problem is primarily related to the question of how the concept of omnivorousness should be conceptualized. This boils down to two questions - first, what is high and what is low in terms of brows, and second, what combination of high and low makes an omnivore? The first question could be answered by making a theoretical decision on what should be considered highbrow and what lowbrow. Unfortunately, this procedure risks taking as objective and reifying labels which in reality are to a large degree arbitrary and historically contingent (Flemmen et al, 2018). Besides, many studies do not really offer a clear rationale for taking particular decisions in this regard, which is rather unfortunate considering that these decisions are key for what one finds and what conclusions one draws. In order to overcome this difficulty some researchers proposed working out "brownness" empirically from data using some external criteria establishing the degree of legitimacy. This has usually been done by examining opinions on the items of interest held by people positioned highest in the relevant social hierarchies, whether occupational (e.g. Peterson 1992) or educational (Warde and Gayo-Cal, 2009). However, such a procedure has drawbacks. An exhaustive analysis by Robette and Roueff (2014) has clearly shown that the divergence in the employed statistical methods combined with the divergence in the adopted sources of legitimacy produces very different results, thus lowering the comparability across studies. Moreover, there are some items, especially certain types of activities, that are rather hard to assign to any of the brows. A good example is going to the cinema, as there are different kinds of cinemas (small art houses vs. multiplexes) and different kind of films could be screened in any type of a cinema.⁵⁹ Besides,

⁵⁹ Some have addressed this issue by arguing that the majority of films screened and watched in an average cinema would fall into the category of broadly understood mass culture anyway and thus classified this activity as representing mass culture. But, first, there is a possibility that there might be socially important variation even within the broad category of mass culture, and second, the highbrow remainder, even if it makes only a minority,

there are activities like dining out for which it is almost impossible to determine which brow they fall into.

As for the second question, the bottom line is that an omnivore is someone who in their preferences and/or activity mixes things from different brows, but the researcher can opt for a more liberal definition (say, just one item from each brow), which would inflate the size of omnivores, or they can choose a conservative definition (say, at least two or three), which would reduce the number of omnivores. As Robette and Roueff (2014) have shown, differences resulting from this choice could be huge, counting in dozens of percentage points in group size, thus giving a completely different picture of the patterns of cultural consumption and the place of omnivorousness in it. To make matters even worse, many researchers have not deployed any classification procedure involving a clear-cut definition of omnivorousness, instead working this out from an interpretation of the composition of latent classes/clusters, thus allowing for a good deal of arbitrariness. Finally, some researchers (notably, Peterson himself in 2005) proposed yet another understanding of omnivorousness, which further confused the matters and diluted the essence of the *omnivore thesis*.

Another important question is what unit of measurement should be deployed in a study. The most common practice has been to use categories representing genres in a domain of interest (like classical music, impressionist paintings or horror movies). However, this practice has been reported to be problematic (Atkinson, 2011; Bryson, 1996). Labels are often broad and imprecise, which risks lumping together sub-genres which could be very different in terms of their symbolic meaning and the link to social hierarchies. This could be illustrated, taking the field of music as an example, by the fact that for such genres as classical music or jazz, there are, on the one hand, more mainstream and easy-listening sub-genres and, on the other, more demanding and avant-garde ones (for instance, light classics vs. contemporary classics). Importantly, being able to distinguish between such variations of broad genres might turn out to be not a subtlety of secondary importance, but the crucial factor shaping the outcome of an analysis. Another problem with genres is that their meaning is not fixed, and different people may understand a given label differently, and thus attribute the same thing to different genres. Importantly, a great deal of the omnivorousness studies have used genres as their unit of measurement, but the potential issues arising from this choice and their implications for the

could be very important symbolically (in the sense of being part of some crucial symbolical oppositions in the hierarchies of taste) and strongly related to social hierarchies.

findings have been not been discussed in detail. As a potential solution to this problem, it has been proposed that it is more reasonable to ask about more concrete representations/features of a domain of interest, e.g. names of specific works or their characteristics, or specific artists. Such a strategy has been employed with success in some of the more recent studies exploring cultural activities and preferences (Roose et al, 2012).

Next, there is a question of what the chosen unit of measurement should represent: knowledge, taste or participation? Some researchers have spoken in favour of participation (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007a), whereas others have argued for taste (Peterson, 2007). Importantly, however, these measures are not identical and have been shown to lead to different results (Robette and Roueff, 2014; Warde and Gayo-Cal, 2009).

There is one more methodological aspect of the debate, rarely discussed in detail (Gayo 2016 and Wuggenig 2007 mentioned this as a potential issue but have not provided much detail), related to the choice of data analysis techniques. The majority of the most critical studies of Bourdieu's idea of homology are based on latent class analysis (LCA), and this seems to have a profound effect on their results. Although LCA is without doubt a widely recognized and powerful statistical tool, it has some characteristics which make it especially useful when one is seeking to find a simpler rather than more complex model of reality, as the parsimony principle plays an important role in the choice of the best solution, and as a result preferred models in LCA are the ones with a low number of groups (latent classes). On the one hand, reducing the complexity is a desired effect, as it helps to understand the most general patterns in the data, but on the other, it risks slipping into an over-simplification. Firstly, the low number of classes means that they mix a lot of items different in character. Secondly, especially problematic here is the influence of items which are characteristic for the majority of a population. In LCA they could easily get distributed quite evenly among all clusters, and as such items usually belong to what is classified as popular culture, when they are found together with highbrow items this leads to a confirmation of the *omnivore thesis*. In other analyses they could be easily identified as having low differentiating power (being located in the centre of the graph in MCA or having a low loading on all interpretable dimensions in PCA) and so being bracketed out as not defining the oppositions in the cultural hierarchies. Thirdly, but in connection to the previous point, although LCA could produce classes which could be interpreted according to the logic of opposition, it is not its aim, contrary to such techniques as PCA or MCA. Because of that, LCA could not present patterns in the data in terms of a set of more general principles. The practical result of this feature of LCA is an impression that the

only principle organising cultural hierarchies is engagement vs. disengagement (corresponding closely to the omnivore-univore division and hence interpreted as confirming its existence), whereas in reality, there are other principles of variation, but these are simply invisible in LCA models. This effect is heavily aggravated when the data deployed is of a questionable kind (e.g. the issue with broad genres) and quality. Very few commentators have been clear about this, but Gayo (2016: 112) assessed the data used *in many works favouring the idea of the omnivore as very poor*.

The rise of research projects inspired directly by *Distinction*

There have been many sociologists who recognized the above discussed problems and looked for new ways of exploring the link between cultural and social hierarchies. This has started a new strand of research exploring the contemporary forms of cultural capital, exemplified by the following projects: the ‘Australian Everyday Cultures Project’ (AECPP) (Bennett et al, 1999), the British ‘Cultural Capital and Social Exclusion’ survey (CCSE) (Bennett et al., 2009), the later Great British Class Survey (GBCS) (Savage et al., 2013), the Danish ‘Contemporary Patterns of Social Differentiation – The Case of Aalborg (COMPAS)’ study (Priour et al., 2008) and two Norwegian surveys – the ‘Cultural Heritage, Cultural Encounters and Cultural Change’ project (Rosenlund, 2009) and another survey undertaken as a part of the Norsk Monitor 2011 (Flemmen et al. 2018). In Germany, a different type of project was conducted, as the scope of topics covered in this case was much more limited, but followed very closely the original questionnaire from *Distinction*, still leading to meaningful results (Blasius and Friedrichs, 2008; Blasius and Muhlichen, 2010).

The researchers behind these projects have been much more sympathetic towards Bourdieu and based their empirical investigation on a much more careful and fuller understanding of his ideas, most importantly recognizing the fact that cultural hierarchies are not fixed, and that what Bourdieu found to represent legitimate culture in *Distinction* may no longer be the case because of the processes of historical change, or because it actually may have never played such a role at all outside France. The studies in question have had some important common characteristics distinguishing them from the omnivorousness research discussed above. First of all, the authors have defined differently their research goals: instead of testing a narrowly defined hypothesis (of the like of the *omnivore thesis*), they have taken a more inductive approach aimed at revealing and exploring the structure of cultural consumption and lifestyles and its relation to social characteristics. As such an approach

requires much richer data, capturing a lot of different aspects of cultural consumption and lifestyle differentiation, the majority of these studies have been based on original surveys designed with these requirements in mind. This has also resolved the issue of what an indicator should reflect – taste, participation or knowledge – as all of these have been considered important and thus have been included in the surveys. Moreover, in the case of at least some of these studies, the issue of the unit of measurement has been addressed as well and some alternatives to genres have been included (e.g. artists, works of art/culture or characteristics of works in certain domains). Another methodological improvement, directly stemming from Bourdieu's theory, has been related to the importance of distaste, resulting in implementation of questions explicitly asking about liking/disliking a given item, rather than simply about doing/not doing something. Moreover, MCA has been the principal statistical technique deployed, as it has been deemed ideal for the purposes of exploration of a large set of nominal and categorical variables, with the aim of uncovering its structure understood in terms of oppositions, thus having an additional benefit of being in line with the logic of Bourdieu's model.⁶⁰ Finally, progress has also been made in relation to the measures of social position deployed, or speaking more specifically, of class, better reflecting the Bourdieusian understanding of the concept, and most importantly, including the capital composition effects (however, Bennett et al. 2009 and Bennett et al 1999 are somewhat deficient in this regard, see Duval, 2010).

There are two primary strategies of constructing symbolic space discernible in the above-mentioned studies. The first group of researchers opted to include dozens of active variables, with the number of active modalities well exceeding one hundred, covering a wide variety of domains of culture, picked up without much pre-selection. Notably, these studies are somewhat skewed in the balance between the lifestyle questions and the questions concerning taste in arts and entertainment, favouring the former at the expense of the latter. Hence, the resulting spaces are maps of taste and participation in arts and entertainment rather than a more general map of lifestyles (Bennett et al 2013; Bennett et al. 2009; Roose et al 2014; Kahma and Toikka 2012; Hjellbrekke et al 2014; Börjesson, 2016). Other researchers took a different approach driven by the search for similar dispositions governing cultural consumption and lifestyles as these described by Bourdieu in *Distinction*: on the one hand, taste of necessity vs. taste of freedom, and, on the other, taste for exclusivity and luxury vs. aesthetic disposition. In

⁶⁰ The Australian AECP project initially did not use MCA, but it has been later re-analysed with the help of MCA (Bennett et al, 2013).

the latter case, the choice of variables was oriented towards the goal of illustrating how these dispositions operate. These researchers either aided the process of choosing variables by an extensive exploratory analyses (Prieur and Rosenlund, 2010; Atkinson 2017), or used a well-specified set of variables modelled on the *Distinction* questionnaire (Blasius and Friedrichs, 2008; Blasius and Muhlichen, 2010). This resulted in a significant reduction of the overall number of variables (Atkinson 2017 eight, Blasius and Friedrichs 2008 four), especially the number of the participation variables (Atkinson 2017), which were left out from the model altogether in Blasius (2008, 2010). In Prieur and Rosenlund's (2010) study, the number of the active variables remained high, but, as these were primarily binaries, the number of modalities dropped, as did the number of the participation variables. Also, the chosen areas were less prone to the problem of a high number of negative answers (especially in case of Blasius, 2008).

Of course, both approaches are justifiable and offer a potential for valuable findings. One has to be aware, however, that the choice of active input variables in MCA always sets the limits of what could be found. This kind of influence on the findings and, as a result, conclusions drawn, is clear in this case and for this reason I discuss these two groups separately.

Starting first with the dimensionality of the spaces in the first group of studies, the most common pattern is the first axis revealing a familiar pattern of engagement vs. disengagement. The negative, disengaged side of the map is characterized by non-participation in various types of activities and by dislikes/disinterest in a variety of genres/works/authors across all domains. The positive, engaged side, in contrast, gathers a variety of likes and participation answers. This opposition in all studies is usually very strongly related to, speaking in Bourdieusian terms, the principle of capital volume, (although in some of the studies this could be inferred only by proxy of variables such as income, education or social class, in some cases approached in a non-Bourdiesian way).

Although in most cases all types of items are represented on both sides (legitimate and popular), this dimension tends to be, to a varying degree across the studies, disproportionately defined by activities and tastes for items representing institutions traditionally regarded as highbrow and often state-funded, e.g. concert halls, operas or museums, and the likes, and taste for other items, primarily belonging to the realm of arts conventionally classified as highbrow. One must note that this is precisely the same pattern that has been found in so many studies on omnivorousness reported above, thus suggesting the very same principle shaping cultural

hierarchies – a division between those who actively pursue a variety of cultural activities and those who generally seem to be inactive with only few exceptions.

This picture though seems to be to a considerable degree dependent on the specific data choices. First of all, when all types of variables are included in one model, the participation ones tend to have the strongest differentiating power: the contribution of participation variables is higher than those related to taste, even though their overall number, as well as the number of their categories, is lower. Their high importance is also reflected by the fact that a great majority of them, and even their modalities considered individually, have above-average contributions to the inertia of this axis. The conclusion thus would be that the inclusion of many participation variables leads inevitably to a solution with a very strong primary axis reflecting the engagement vs. disengagement opposition. Technically speaking, this might be a result of the fact that such variables tend to have a rather skewed distribution in the direction of a lot of negative answers (usually non-activity or infrequent activity is the modal value in such cases). This holds true especially for activities in the domain of arts. Moreover, such variables are usually highly correlated with each other. When combined with the lack of a sufficient number of, broadly understood, taste variables and/or their low quality (in terms of differentiating power), this leads to a solution where the first axis is largely reduced to a rather crude opposition between engagement-only modalities opposed to disengagement-only modalities (Hjellbrekke et al, 2014; Börjesson 2016).

When the condition of a satisfactory number of taste and lifestyle variables is met, then the picture of inactive vs. active consumers is enriched with more fine-grained tones. On the one hand, it becomes clear that the former are not totally disengaged as they too have a more active and positive side and, on the other, that the latter are in no way all-encompassing in their taste and behaviour as there are certain limits to their tolerance and openness, disproving the omnivore argument.

Speaking of the positive accents on the disengagement side, some areas seem to have much greater differentiating power than others. It is certainly the case for food and drinks, where preference for traditional national cuisine registers, alongside food one is familiar with and served in plentiful amount; the ideal dinner for guests being something ‘usual’, i.e. a safe choice that guests would certainly enjoy (Bennett et al, 2013; Roose et al, 2014). Similarly, the choice of eating-out venues is limited to places serving simple meals like pizza or fish-and-chips (Bennett et al., 2009; Kahma and Toikka, 2012). This inclination for simplicity could be

summarized as what Bourdieu named the taste for necessity. Another domain which registers on the disengagement side is TV and film preferences. Here it means preference for relatively less demanding entertainment programmes like reality and quiz shows, sports, and films of a similar kind, e.g. Westerns or action movies (Bennett et al, 2013; Hjellbrekke et al, 2014; Kahma and Toikka 2012; Bennett et al. 2009). Whenever items/elements from other areas appear on this side of the map, whether it is music, art or reading (all of which occur here less frequently than food and TV), it usually reflect a similar logic: the least consecrated, like various kinds of folk and traditional music genres and artists (Harrits et al. 2010; Kahma and Toikka 2012; Flemmen et al, 2018); the least abstract, like figurative art (Prieur and Rosenlund, 2010); and those usually considered to represent entertainment rather than “true art”, like horror or romance books (Flemmen et al., 2018b). In sum, the least demanding in terms of symbolic mastery. One has also to note that the areas which are most frequently represented on the ‘negative’ side of the map are the ones where the level of disengagement is relatively low and most people seem to have an opinion on it (because, simply, all people eat, most of them can imagine having guests, and, regardless of their overall level of capital, most people watch TV).

Regarding the limits on the tolerance of those highly engaged, that is, the distribution of negative modalities on the engagement side, starting from food and dining out, the modalities appearing here represent the negation of the preferences seen on the opposite side. This is true for kinds of food served to guests (plentiful, familiar, traditional etc.) as well as types of dining out venues (e.g. fish and chips) (Prieur and Rosenlund 2010; Roose et al, 2014; Bennett et al. 2009). In music this means disliking only certain artists (e.g. representing specific types of dance music) (Prieur and Rosenlund, 2010). There are also certain kinds of entertainment TV which are disliked, e.g. reality TV and watching certain sports, e.g. motorsports and boxing (Kahma and Toikka, 2012) or family films (Flemmen et al., 2018b) It is then clear that there is no homogenous lowbrow/popular culture, and some genres, works and artists, often classified as belonging to a single category, may be in reality situated at the opposite ends of cultural hierarchies. This shows that a careful empirical test is needed to assess the level of legitimacy instead of theoretical judgments, the latter often being inaccurate and based on unclear premises.

On the second dimension of the lifestyle space, most models in the first group reveal the opposition between traditional and modern forms. On this dimension age usually comes out as the principal structuring factor. It opposes older people who favour cultural forms and activities which are traditional and long-established, and, on the high engagement side,

characterized by high levels of institutional legitimacy⁶¹, to young people who are more inclined to enjoy more contemporary, ‘emerging’ forms of culture. This pattern is observed along the entire first dimension, though usually there is slightly more variation on the high engagement side. This pattern registers strongly in many areas, but some are more characteristic than others. Modalities related to music are in most cases the greatest contributors. A combination of dislikes of such genres as heavy metal, rock or urban combined with liking classical music and various more traditional forms (like country/western or folk and various nation specific forms) is characteristic for older people. A reversed pattern characterizes younger age groups. TV preferences also play an important role, for which a preference for more factual types of programmes, e.g. news, documentary or nature programmes, on the ‘old’ side are opposed to entertainment, e.g. comedy shows and sport, on the ‘young’ side. In the related domain of film a somewhat similar opposition is observed: preference for drama or musicals combined with dislikes for horror is opposed to dislikes of the likes of the older generation and liking various newer and less-established forms like horror films, science fiction and action movies. This dimension is sometimes also related to art preferences, where it translates to the opposition between modern, more abstract art preferred by younger people and more figurative, less abstract art, e.g. depicting landscapes, preferred by older people. Finally, considering the strong relationship with age, it comes as no surprise that opposition between an outward, more active lifestyle vs. an inward, home-based, registers. A higher frequency of going out to various places (e.g. cinema, restaurant, pub) and doing sports is observed on the modern (and younger) side, whilst such activities are less frequent or do not appear at all on the traditional (and older) side.

Moving on to the second group of models, it is clear that the different strategies of variable choice resulted in a different shape of the space: the first dimension much more clearly opposes the dominated lifestyle of necessity to that of freedom stemming from symbolic mastery, and it closely corresponds to the logic of capital volume, whilst the second dimension is shaped by the principle of capital composition. In the British model (Atkinson, 2017a), the low volume side is still to a considerable degree defined by negativity, perhaps due to the inclusion of arts, as it is found that no specific art taste and very low levels of the knowledge on artists are characteristic for that side, but also, a somewhat less expected result, no sport activity. The positive modalities in this area are similar to the ones reported in the models from

⁶¹ That is, being certified by institutions like state ministries of culture and the network of related institutions like theatres, museum, concert halls etc.)

the first group: watching snooker and darts, reading tabloid newspapers and preferring home decorated in a “tidy and clean” way. The high capital volume side, in contrast, is characterized by a wide range of positive-only modalities: knowledge of many artists and, perhaps related to this, better defined art preferences, as well as being active in a variety of sports activities with an accompanying ability to provide a rationale for doing sports.

On the second axis of the model, reflecting the composition principle, the following opposition registers: a taste for the exclusive (financially-demanding sports as well as watching these on TV) but also potentially business-advantageous (doing sports for sociability thus potentially signalling the will to develop social networks) versus a taste for the abstract and intellectually demanding (modern and performance art) and sports favoured for their mental component rather than exclusivity. The picture is complemented by a projection of the supplementary points representing eating-out preferences which follow very similar patterns as in other countries – venues serving relatively simple fare (pizza, fish and chips, steak) which are characteristic for the low capital side, whereas more refined and not-local cuisine (French, Italian) is positioned on the high capital side. This is strengthened by the reversed pattern of the distribution of dislikes towards the same categories – what is liked on one side is disliked on the other. Although the composition principle here is visibly weaker, it is still possible to match certain preferences to class fractions in line with its logic.

Similar patterns are found in the model for Denmark (Prieur and Rosenlund, 2010). In this case, most probably because there are almost no participation variables, both ends of the first dimension are overly characterized by positive categories. Generally, the pattern is rather similar to those found in other models (especially to the one in Atkinson, 2017), and could be described in the following pairs of primary oppositions: abstract vs. specific, visible in the domains of arts (liking abstract painting and installation art combined with disliking figurative art vs. a reversed pattern); intellectually demanding forms vs. those offering entertainment and relaxation (e.g. “serious” press and ironic TV shows vs. tabloids and more straightforward TV programmes and series); rare and special vs. plain and common (e.g. choosing to serve guests exotic food vs. traditional food). However, even though the shape of the space is not defined by the positive vs. negative poles, this pattern is still visible when the position of participation variables (passive supplementary points in this model) is examined – the low capital nadir is still overly characterized by low knowledge and low participation (e.g. low attendance at museums, art galleries, concert halls).

Most importantly, the capital composition principle is again visible on the second dimension, though not so evident as in the British model because of the apparent lack of positive categories defining the cultural end. On the one hand, there is then a set of lifestyle preferences which require a considerable amount of money like decorating the home with antiquities and designer furniture, not surprisingly found close to a preference for an “exclusive” home decoration, combined with interest in money-related journalism in TV and press, and on the other, the opposite side of the space is characterised by negation of all of that.

The German models (Blasius and Friedrichs, 2008; Blasius and Muhlichen, 2010) prove that the same principles could be found deploying yet another combination of variables. In this case, the negative pole is defined by a stark example of the taste of necessity: clothes are simple (“correct”) and budget, furniture is bought in a department store rather than anywhere else, and no guests are reported (one can surmise that this is rather due to drastically low levels of economic capital than lack of a habit of organising dinners for friends somehow related to cultural capital). A rather different configuration emerges at the opposite pole associated with a high level of capital. Two combinations, depending on one’s capital composition, are visible. On the one hand, one finds a kind of quest for and openness to novelty manifesting in making bolder choices, e.g. thinking of serving original, exotic or improvised food, wearing “daring” clothes or having furniture “full of fantasy”, all of which is related to a capital composition where cultural capital dominates, pointing to a possibility that sufficient levels of symbolic mastery provide one with greater confidence. On the other hand, there is cluster of preferences characteristic of those who are endowed primarily with economic capital: taste for luxury and the rare prevails in the form of tastes for stylish furniture, perhaps sourced from an antique dealer, preference for chic and elegant or fashionable clothes, but also more practical and down-to-earth dispositions, somewhat in contrast to the cultural side, manifest in liking comfortable furniture or classical and good quality clothes.

Studies of cultural consumption and lifestyles in Poland

Overall, the debates discussed in the preceding section have only marginally registered in Polish sociology. Quite paradoxically, some of the best Polish studies of the patterns of cultural consumption and lifestyle, especially in terms of the quality of data, were conducted in the very early years of Polish quantitative sociology. In a study of literature preferences, newspapers and magazines readership and TV tastes, based on data gathered back in the 1960s, Wojciechowska (1977) found patterns of differentiation very similar to those registered much

later by many Western studies discussed above. First of all, in terms of overall level of participation as well as the number and variety of preferred types, there was already a clear link to the educational and occupational hierarchy – the higher one was positioned in these hierarchies, the greater was the engagement and variety. However, similarly to Western societies, there were certain limits to that apparent omnivorousness. This was evident in the patterns of taste in the studied domains. Hence, in literary taste, the intelligentsia⁶² preferred genres most demanding in terms of symbolic mastery (avant-garde and “ambitious” contemporary books), at the same time rarely reading popular genres (e.g. whodunits and romances) and almost never classics belonging to the compulsory school reading canon. The opposite pattern characterised the working class. Similarly, in newspaper and magazine readership, the intelligentsia much more often preferred socio-cultural magazines, almost absent in the reading portfolio of the working class, whilst the latter more frequently read sport weeklies, which, in turn, were not particularly popular within intelligentsia. Finally, a familiar opposition between fact-oriented content (news and current-affairs programmes) vs. sport and entertainment registered among TV tastes, the former characterizing the intelligentsia, the latter the working class.

Some aspects of cultural consumption and lifestyle differentiation in the 1990s were analysed by Henryk Domański. The greatest shortcoming of these analyses is that they were fragmentary, covering only a few elements, the choice of which gives an impression of being somewhat random and not driven by any well-specified understanding of the link between social and cultural hierarchies. This resulted in an ad-hoc style of data analysis which sometimes was not very helpful in uncovering the patterns of cultural consumption and lifestyles. For example, the factor analysis in Domański (2000a), based on a quite random set of variables, resulted in a model that was hard to interpret. The main conclusion is that the occupational and educational hierarchy continued to be strongly related to the overall level of activity, demonstrated by a positive relationship with a synthetic indicator of 'participation in culture' (including a few participation variables), which was also confirmed by an analysis of the distribution of the number of books possessed within the socio-occupational groups (Domański 2000b) and analysis of the patterns of newspaper and magazines readership and sport activity (Domański 2000a). On another occasion, Domański found that some activities and elements of lifestyle that cluster together were more characteristic for particular

⁶² A broad category covering professionals and managers.

occupations. On the one hand, a mindset oriented towards learning new things combined with activities requiring going out and elements of a business lifestyle was found to be characteristic of the parts of the service class, defined as higher professionals and managers, non-technical intelligentsia, technical intelligentsia (engineers) and company owners. On the other hand, a taste for arguably the least legitimate genre of music in Poland, ‘disco polo’, and a passive, home-based lifestyle, was characteristic of the working class and farmers. Some other tables presented by Domański in the same study, which for some reason he decided not to comment on in any detail, showed also a link between sports usually considered to be prestigious, like tennis or skiing, and occupations high in the occupational hierarchy (Domański 2000a: 145, table 34).

More recent studies show that the above patterns continued into the 2010s. Cebula (2013), using PCA, found a link between four types of music taste (versatile, elitist, popular and modern) and occupational groupings, as well some socio-demographic characteristics. The elite taste (liking soul, jazz, R&B combined with strong disliking of disco polo) turned out to be the most characteristic for the intelligentsia (operationalised as ‘professionals’), whilst popular taste (liking pop and latino, distaste for hard rock and heavy metal) and modern taste (various genres of electronic music, rock, reggae, R&B) was characteristic of office workers but not the intelligentsia. The versatile style (taste for most genres included) was most characteristic of managers and directors but much less so of the intelligentsia. This divergence in music taste between managers and directors on the one hand, and the intelligentsia on the other, points to a possibility of the capital composition principle at work. Such an interpretation, however, was not discussed. The analysis of TV taste by Cebula (2015) showed that it was to a high degree stratified by income and education, in a similar way as has been found elsewhere – sensationalist entertainment and TV series turned out to be chosen more often by people with low income and low education, whereas more “serious” infotainment and some specific entertainment programmes (e.g. the British programme *Top Gear*) were found to be associated with high levels of income and education. Notably, Cebula tried to interpret some of the findings in terms of capital composition here, though it was limited to a rather basic analysis of the differential association of certain items using income and education. Unfortunately, this was not pursued any further and assessing possible effects of the capital composition principle in a more systematic ways was not possible, because the author deployed a very crude, three-category measure of class, which in its design did not take into consideration this principle. (Błaszczyk and Cebula, 2016) also explored cultural participation in the city of Wrocław. The

theoretical frame of this study explicitly referenced Bourdieu (the city was considered to be a ‘field’ in a Bourdieusian sense) but, unfortunately, his ideas again were not really put to work for a more complete investigation of the issue of interest. The main finding was that income and education were positively related to the overall level of participation in all kinds of activities, whilst low levels were associated with the risk of being excluded from most of these activities with the exception of those based at home and in its close vicinity. Older age was also found to be a factor limiting the level of activity.

Another research project which missed the opportunity of deploying Bourdieu’s theory is the 2016 reports from a quantitative study of cultural participation *Kulturalna Hierarchia* (Bachórz et al., 2016), which, as discussed in Chapter 2, merged measures of economic and cultural capital into one synthetic measure, thus paying no heed to the concept of capital composition, fundamental to the capital theory. The notion of cultural capital itself was re-operationalised in order to reflect the emotional and moral motivators of participation in social life, namely positive attitudes towards public engagement, active social and public life, personality type (Ibidem: 21). The authors do not cite any particular theoretical inspiration for this indicator and there is no explanation of theoretical considerations when operationalising it. The data confirmed strong link between cultural participation and social status, especially with regards to what is traditionally considered high culture, or material aspects of it, like number of books owned. The new cultural capital was also a good predictor, especially for those who indicates high level of trust in other or public engagement. Perhaps the most interesting finding was that the most discriminative variable was not the type of cultural practices attended, by the frequency of it.

Recapitulation

Unfortunately, therefore, we are left with a rather patchy and crude understanding of the relationship between class and culture in Poland. Neither the conceptual principles nor the methodological lessons from Bourdieu or the train of research that followed in his path have been rigorously and comprehensively taken on board. Class is reduced to basic categories inspired by a post-socialist reading of the EGP scheme or the most rudimentary measures of capital, meaning the nuances that come from re-envisioning class as a multidimensional social space defined by diverse manifestations of capital – the capital composition principle, most importantly – have been lost. As we saw in the last chapter, the capital composition principle

is present in Poland is present, though weak. It becomes pressing, therefore, to test whether this statistical weakness translates into a weak relationship with lifestyle differences too – whether, that is, the basic and unidimensional measures employed by others are, in the end, sufficient proxies – or whether the statistical (lack of) prominence of capital composition in the model of the social space is a red herring when it comes to judging its *causal* prominence. At the same time, there is a need to bring together as wide a range of lifestyle indicators as possible, in full awareness of the effects each type of indicator can have on the resulting output, so as to provide a unified model of the symbolic space, examine its homology with class and provide a sounder answer to the question of how Bourdieu’s model applies to the Polish context. This is what the next chapter sets out to do.

Chapter 6: The Space of Lifestyles in Poland Part II: Construction and General Structure

The cultural participation module of the Household Budget Survey 2009 included questions about activities in a few domains: TV, film, radio, readership, music, entertainment, sightseeing, and hobbies. In comparison to some of the richest studies presented in the last chapter (in terms of the number of topics covered and the diversity of questions), there are domains missing, including some in which important distinctions have been found. The most important of these are food and drinks, sports, art, home decor and fashion/clothing. Moreover, the questionnaire is visibly skewed towards questions on participation at the expense of taste, whilst knowledge questions are missing altogether. The participation questions cover a wide range of activities which are reasonably diversified, thus giving a chance for a good representation of different levels of legitimacy and symbolic mastery typically required to take part in them. Unfortunately, questions asking about taste were limited only to three domains: TV, radio and music. In the case of all taste questions respondents were asked whether they watch or listen to listed genres, so the distaste component could not be explored. Although the data have their shortcomings and limitations, however, they are rich and diverse enough to allow for a construction of the space of cultural consumption similar to that in the studies from the first group discussed in the last chapter. This is important, as, to the best knowledge of the author, no better or more exhaustive dataset covering cultural consumption in Poland is currently openly accessible. Below, I discuss the choice of variables, highlight their most important features and categories, consider the predicted influence on the findings (in the sense of the issues identified in studies from other countries) and make clear their limitations, especially as they became clear in the process of model construction and the decisions taken to tackle them.

Starting with music, there nine binary variables relating to the following genres: classical music, opera/operetta, rock/pop, hard rock/heavy metal, world music, dance/house, techno, rap/hip hop and jazz/blues. Unfortunately, some of the genres have been grouped together and in this form these are obviously rather broad, thus suffering from the same limitations as the earlier referenced studies. Worse still, some of these merging decisions appear to be rather unfortunate insofar as they couple what could well be disparate genres and appear to be arbitrary since there is no technical documentation or commentary outlining their rationale provided by Statistics Poland. Nevertheless, even in such form, the genres are

certainly still useful so long as one carefully considers how they might have been interpreted by the respondents and what could be their relation to the hierarchy of legitimacy.

Classical music and *opera/operetta* are reasonably precise and should accurately capture traditional highbrow taste. However, the *operetta* component of the latter category introduces lighter tones and thus possibly serves as an indicator of the taste for more easily digestible ‘light’ classical music. The decision to combine *jazz* and *blues* is of less concern. Although in the USA these genres have been found to be divergent in their character (blues being less legitimate, see e.g. Peterson and Kern 1996), in Poland their reception has been different and the link between overlapping race divisions and social divisions present in the USA is absent in Poland. Jazz, from its inception in Poland in the 1940s/1950s, has been developed for and by segments of the cultural elite⁶³, and both genres have been found to be most characteristic for people highly endowed in cultural capital (Cebula, 2013). Thus, this category is also expected to measure legitimate taste. The most problematic case is that of rock/pop, as rock (at least typically, as it is itself internally diverse) and pop certainly have different connotations and occupy different positions in the hierarchy of legitimacy. As both genres are rather popular, the scale of the problem is significant in this case. This is somewhat offset by the fact that hard rock is distinguished as a separate genre, but then is combined with heavy metal, not exactly a match, which means that the likes of indie and alternative rock are still tied to its mainstream versions. The prediction is that the differentiating power of *rock/pop* is low and it could be a “catch-all” modality, whilst *hard rock/heavy metal* should be more specific, capturing less legitimate taste (especially considering the *metal* component, see e.g. Kahma and Toikka 2012). At the same time this could be a genre avoided by many, as has been reported elsewhere (e.g. Bryson 1996).

The remaining two categories combining two genres are somewhat less problematic. There is certainly a substantive difference between dance and house, though in this combination this could have been interpreted as generic dancing music played in clubs and discos. The connotation with dancing could lend this category a somewhat utilitarian character and thus generate some statistical ‘noise’ (as in such case choosing it would not represent one’s

⁶³ Many members of the 1950s cultural elite were fond of jazz. Popular writer Leopold Tyrmand, for example, was a populariser of jazz music. The genre was also closely tied to artistic cinema through the jazz movie scores of Krzysztof Komeda (perhaps the most renowned and revered Polish jazz musician in the history of Polish jazz) for such movies as “Nóż w wodzie” (dir. Roman Polański) or “Niewinni czarodzieje” (dir. Andrzej Wajda, where the main protagonist, a medical doctor in his thirties, an exemplary Polish representative of the Polish intelligentsia, was actually an amateur jazz musician).

taste). Nevertheless, it should work as an indicator of less legitimate taste, especially since the label could also hold associations with genres such as *euro dance* and especially *disco polo*, arguably some of the least demanding genres in terms of symbolic mastery. *Disco polo* is actually the great absent in the questionnaire – it has been consistently reported to be one of the most popular genres of music in Poland and at the same this popularity has been highly divided along educational lines, but for some reason it has not been included.⁶⁴ The inclusion of the category *techno* could have possibly limited the “catch-all” effect, as on the one hand, connoisseur listeners of this particular genre of electronic music might have picked it instead of the broader *dance/house*, and the same might have been the case for those who took *techno* to represent the wide array of somewhat “harder”, more aggressive genres of electronic music.⁶⁵ At the same time, however, this would mean that *techno* is itself not exactly a precise category, as it might be lumping together two types of understanding of this label. Notwithstanding these limitations, *techno* still has potential to capture less legitimate taste, especially in the younger age groups. Another more youthful genre, *rap/hip hop*, is expected to play a similar role. Finally, the category of *world music* is harder to pin down. Some suggest that this category might serve as a measure of “cosmopolitan” and “emerging” capital (Flemmen et al., 2018b), but the full form in which this category was presented to the respondent was *world music (traditional, folkloric)*, and the phrase in parentheses might have produced some confusion, as some might have interpreted this simply as Polish traditional/folkloric music rather the traditional/folkloric world music. The profile of this category is, therefore, hard to predict and it could be another example of a category picked by very different categories of people in terms of their social position and level and composition of capital.

The variables referring to listening of music genres are complemented by four variables related to attendance of live music events. The most general is the question whether the respondent attended any such events. The remaining variables are related to the kind of music played at

⁶⁴ The polling agency Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej conducted a short survey asking people about their opinion on *disco polo* twice, in 1996 and in 2018, and found that around two thirds of Polish society liked this genre, and that education was a strong predictor of this preference: in 2018, among those with primary education 79 percent declared liking *disco polo* (39 percent strongly) and only 20 percent disliking it (6 percent strongly), whilst among those having a degree the proportion was largely reversed, 59% disliking (and a rather telling 27 percent disliking strongly) and 37% liking (only 6 percent strongly). (Czarnowska, 2018; *Popularność muzyki disco polo. Komunikat z badań.*, 1996)

⁶⁵ Although *techno* is a broad term for a set of well-defined sub-genres, some of them rather consecrated in the modern music hierarchy (music which certainly qualifies as techno is often reviewed by such taste-setting portals as *pitchfork.com*), it is (at least in Poland) casually used to name almost any type of electronic music.

the events: rock/pop concerts are intended to capture less legitimate and more modern preferences, in contrast to *highbrow concerts*, constructed as a synthetic indicator of participation in any of the highly legitimate music events (philharmonic concerts, opera and ballet). Due to very low number of positive answers to all other types of concerts, it has been necessary to construct another synthetic indicator, *other concerts*, gathering the information from these variables.

Proceeding to the TV and radio taste questions, the questionnaire includes fourteen types of TV programmes and ten for radio, which to a considerable degree overlap. Some of these categories are very broad and do not reflect any specific taste in a straightforward way. Regrettably, this includes two potentially very important TV sub-domains, films and serials, which were included simply as *series* and *feature films*, thus understood as one of many types of TV programme devoid of any further details about what genres or types of series and movies this has involved. Nevertheless, when analysed along with many other practices and taste items these categories may still play a meaningful role. This is especially the case of TV series, as there is a chance that it catches primarily soap operas, arguably the most popular type of TV series in Poland (though there is also a chance that this could have been understood by some as referring to modern American series, e.g. *Dr House* or *Prison Break*).

The remaining categories are much more precise and relate to genres of TV and radio programmes resembling those deployed in studies from other countries. In this number are genres that have been found to be related to higher levels of cultural capital and symbolic mastery, at least for TV: *journalistic-cultural programmes* (asked for TV and radio separately; of course, the components are not exactly the same, but could be expected to have a largely similar social profile), a similar category of *other journalistic programmes* (TV and radio) and *TV documentary programmes*. The question is more open in relation to *TV plays*. On the one hand, this category was shown to be strongly related to education and occupation in the PPR (Wojciechowska, 1977) and suggested as a marker of sophisticated taste in the 1990s (Domański, 2000a), but on the other, its importance and popularity has been gradually waning. Thus this could be a cultural form also highly related to age. A category of a similar profile for radio is *radio dramas and novels*. The category *news programmes* (TV and radio) could possibly capture differentiation related to the level of symbolic mastery (people having more cultural capital being more prone to watch/listen to the news). *Talk shows* and *sport programmes* (the latter asked for radio and TV) are expected to measure less legitimate TV preferences. The category *entertainment programmes* could work in the same way, but it is

also possible that it could be too general to capture anything specific. The remaining categories have less straightforward interpretations. *Musical TV programmes* is rather broad. It could be strongly related to age but at the same time it might still identify people looking for musical content (understood as a part of arts and culture) in TV. The preference for *religious programmes* (radio and TV) most certainly would also be related to older age but it could also characterize people with lower levels of cultural capital for whom this could be one of their very few forms of positive activity. The category *educational and how-to programmes* (radio and TV, though for radio it is just *educational*) is again rather broad and ambiguous. It could be an indicator of cultural goodwill and a kind of *petit-bourgeois* taste (especially in the case of radio), but this could be complicated by the relationship with other factors, e.g. having children (for this reason the modality *children's TV programmes* has been excluded from the analysis). In case of TV its distinctiveness could have been lost altogether due to combining the *educational* element with the *how-to* one. The type of music listened to on the radio is differentiated on a very basic level, as there are only two types of music programmes: *classical music* and *entertainment music*. Most probably only the former category is specific enough to meaningfully capture variation in radio preferences. Some of the above variables were dropped from the final model, as they appeared to be redundant, introducing noise rather than meaningful information and skewing the model in a result. Finally, considering that the TV taste genres are far from ideal, frequency of watching a given type of a programme is also taken into account with the assumption that it could potentially shed additional light on TV watching behaviour. In addition to the TV and radio preferences questions, two variables registering the overall frequency of TV watching and radio listening have been included.

The questionnaire also includes a set of questions concerning books and magazines, covering frequency/volume and elements of taste. In the case of books, the respondents were asked about the number of books read in the previous twelve months, and there are also two questions on the frequency of reading daily newspapers and magazines. Regarding types of material read, for books this was a direct question about books read, while for magazines this could be only inferred from a question about the type of magazines bought in the household in the last three months. The questionnaire does not include a question about type of titles of newspapers read. Unfortunately, the reading taste questions were asked in a form that renders their sociological value to be very low. This is especially the case for books, where instead of genres, the respondents were asked about types of books categorized at a very rudimentary level as 'belles-lettres', 'scientific', 'professional' and 'popular science'. As such a

categorization has low differentiating power, they tend to overlap with the variable for reading/non-reading without contributing much additional information so it was excluded from the model. The situation is slightly better for magazines, as here the list includes much more useful types, two of which, *cultural* and *women's* magazines, have been left in the final model.

Cultural participation questions cover a considerable range of activities. They include forms with high institutional legitimacy belonging to the system of official, mostly state-funded, culture, such as theatres, museums and historical monuments, but also more local forms of cultural participation like using cultural community centres.⁶⁶ The question on visiting modern art galleries might perhaps indicate a taste for the more modern of the most legitimate forms. As the questions about museums, historical monuments and visual arts galleries were asked separately for Polish institutions and those located abroad, these probably also tap into elements of tourism preferences. The list of activities also includes more 'down-to-earth' entertainment related pastimes, like visiting game rooms/casinos, attending sports events and going to clubs/discos, circuses or zoos. Importantly, many of these activities have been found elsewhere to be among the few forms of activity popular among the less active parts of society, strengthening the case for considering them to represent less legitimate and more popular pastimes. In this sense, the question about attending parties and social gatherings could be especially valuable, as it is formulated in such a way that it includes parties/meetings organised by the respondent at home, allowing us to go beyond forms of activity requiring going out. The variable of going to the cinema, classified by many researchers as a popular cultural form, is less clear, and it is better to assume that there is no straightforward interpretation of its degree of legitimacy. Finally, the question on the frequency of using the internet is also included with the intention of capturing engagement with digital culture and is expected to be related to age. For all of the participation questions, the frequency of participation has also been taken into account as potentially introducing meaningful additional differentiation.

The questionnaire also includes a battery of questions related to preferred hobbies/spare time activities. Unfortunately, most of these turn out to be very unpopular – well below the threshold of five percent of the sample commonly suggested to include a modality in a MCA model. However, there are two exceptions, both offering potentially highly valuable contribution. Firstly, declaring photography as a hobby, which could capture the aesthetic

⁶⁶ Of course, these are still very broad labels and this is only an approximation of their possible meaning.

disposition, and, secondly, indicating DIY as a hobby, a form of activity which has been found to be characteristic for the working-class.

Table 1: Modalities contributing above average to dimensions (in bold)

Variables	Engagement - disengagement		Legitimate/Traditional – Less established/Modern	
	Coordinates	Contribution (% of total axis's variance)	Coordinates	Contribution (% of total axis's variance)
Reading				
0 books read	0.51	1.6	-0.20	0.5
>13 books read	-1.02	1.2	0.50	0.6
newspaper 0	0.42	0.6	-0.34	0.7
newspaper 5	-0.50	0.3	0.61	1.1
magazine_0	0.56	1.0	-0.32	0.7
magazine_6	-0.29	0.2	0.42	0.9
hobby photograp +	-1.27	1.6	-0.15	0.0
buy cultural mag +	-0.66	1.3	0.35	0.7
internet 0	0.62	2.3	0.27	0.9
internet 2	-0.98	3.0	-0.42	1.1

Variables	Engagement - disengagement		Legitimate/Traditional – Less established/Modern	
	Coordinates	Contribution	Coordinates	Contribution
Events/visiting				
amusement park +	-0.92	1.5	-0.29	0.3
cinema 0	0.54	2.1	0.10	0.1
cinema 1	-0.55	0.9	-0.03	0.0
cinema 2	-1.35	3.2	-0.35	0.5
movies 0	0.53	1.7	0.22	0.6
movies 2	-0.78	1.5	-0.46	1.1
theatre 1	-1.53	2.3	0.59	0.7
discotheque 0	0.34	1.0	0.18	0.6
discotheque 1	-0.78	0.9	-0.03	0.0
discotheque 2	-1.13	2.1	-0.93	2.9
parties 0	0.68	1.8	0.16	0.2
parties 3	-0.86	1.9	-0.33	0.6
sport events 1	-0.67	0.9	-0.40	0.6
hist monuments Poland 0	0.39	1.3	-0.09	0.2
hist monuments Poland 1	-0.95	3.2	0.23	0.4
museums Poland 0	0.28	0.8	-0.08	0.1
museums Poland 1	-1.20	3.3	0.36	0.6
cult. community center 1	-0.95	0.9	0.42	0.3
entert./comedy event 1	-1.02	2.1	0.13	0.1
zoo 1_2	-1.07	2.5	0.11	0.1
live music -	0.35	1.2	-0.08	0.1
live music +	-1.55	5.3	0.33	0.5
live music hbrow -	-1.53	2.7	-0.36	0.3
live music hbrow +	-1.58	2.6	1.11	2.7
concert rock/pop-	-1.42	2.5	0.90	2.1
concert rock/pop+	-1.75	2.9	-0.45	0.4
concerts other -	-1.52	3.3	0.46	0.6
concerts other +	-1.62	2.0	0.06	0.0

Variables	Engagement - disengagement		Legitimate/Traditional – Less established/Modern	
	Coordinates	Contribution	Coordinates	Contribution
TV Taste				
tv sport 1	-0.11	0.0	0.34	0.9
tv culture 0	0.32	0.3	-0.64	2.3
tv culture 2	-0.25	0.2	0.51	1.5
tv theatre 0	0.17	0.2	-0.60	3.8
tv theatre 1	-0.09	0.0	0.36	1.4
tv theatre 2	-0.21	0.1	0.95	2.4
tv religious 0	-0.15	0.1	-0.49	3.1
tv religious 1	0.10	0.0	0.51	2.2
tv religious 2	0.57	0.4	0.80	1.6
Music Taste				
music 0	1.04	2.2	-0.07	0.0
music 4	-0.62	0.9	-0.16	0.1
classic music -	-0.14	0.1	-0.27	1.1
classic music +	-0.57	0.8	0.89	3.9
opera +	-0.76	0.4	1.44	2.7
world music -	-0.34	0.7	-0.26	0.8
world music +	-0.07	0.0	0.47	1.7
jazz/blues music +	-1.16	1.7	0.07	0.0
hard rock/metal +	-1.09	0.9	-0.87	1.2
rock/pop music -	0.08	0.0	0.49	2.2
rock/pop music+	-0.52	1.4	-0.39	1.7
dance/house music -	-0.14	0.1	0.24	0.8
dance/house music +	-0.52	0.7	-0.61	1.9
techno music +	-0.82	0.7	-1.39	4.0
rap/hip hop music +	-0.82	0.9	-1.19	3.8
Radio Taste				
radio 0	0.68	0.9	-0.22	0.2
radio classical 0	0.04	0.0	-0.56	2.8
radio classical 1	-0.23	0.2	0.40	1.2
radio classical 2	-0.40	0.3	0.81	2.2
radio cultural 0	0.08	0.0	-0.61	2.6
radio cultural 2	-0.45	0.4	0.70	2.0
radio pop music 1	0.21	0.1	0.40	0.8
radio religious 0	-0.33	0.6	-0.45	2.5
radio religious 1	-0.03	0.0	0.76	3.2
radio religious 2	0.60	0.4	0.78	1.6
radio sport 1	-0.22	0.1	0.38	0.9

The space of lifestyles

The final model is based on 50 variables with 139 active modalities (Modalities with above average contribution in Table 1⁶⁷). Only the first two dimensions are interpreted, as on the third dimension, similarly to the social space, the Guttman effect appears and the further dimensions do not have a meaningful interpretation. The first dimension dominates, explaining 63 percent of the overall inertia. The second dimension adds a further 12 percent, meaning a considerably high 75 percent of the total variance is explained by the first two axes.


The first dimension

The logic underlying the first dimension is clear (Figure 1) – it opposes being engaged in various forms of cultural activity, both those typically considered popular *and* those considered highbrow (the left side of the figure), to inactivity in most included forms and domains of culture (the right side). It also reflects the level of commitment, as the higher frequency categories for a given activity are positioned farther to the left. Similarly, to other countries, this dimension is defined primarily by participation variables. These contribute 83 percent to the dimension's inertia, while taste variables play only a secondary role with a contribution of 17 percent.

The engagement apex is to a large degree defined, both in terms of the distance from the origin as well as the contribution to the inertia of the first dimension, by participating in live music events regardless of the kind of music, as well as by modalities representing attending/not attending specific type of live music events. Jointly these latter categories contribute 21 percent to the inertia. Most of the activities characterized by a higher degree of institutional legitimacy are positioned far to the left and have a high contribution: museums and historical monuments (the contribution over 3 percent situates these in the top five modalities), and theatres and cultural community centres. However, this is also the case of activities related more to entertainment than 'serious' culture and with less recognition, that is, visiting amusement parks, attending sport events, going to a disco, party and zoo, as well as forms which are too broad or awkward to allow for a precise classification. The latter may

⁶⁷ For the full list see Appendix

Figure 1. Space of Lifestyles, modalities with above average contribution



take highbrow or lowbrow forms (like cinema or movie watching), or are very hard to classify on a legitimacy continuum (like using the internet). The strongest contributors here are going to the cinema and discotheque (two positive categories for these being above the average, in total contributing, respectively, 4.1 percent and 3 percent), zoo (2.5 percent) and attending entertainment/comedy events (2.1 percent). The positive modalities of the passive variables follow the same pattern and are situated on the left side.

Being an avid music listener (that is, listening to music over two hours a day) and preferring certain genres and avoiding others is also positively related to the cultural engagement pole. Music genres that have the strongest relationship with this dimension are jazz/blues, hard rock/heavy metal and rap, followed by classics and rock/pop. Interestingly, the music-related categories are closer to the origin, and so are the activities which could be done at home, such as reading books, magazines and newspapers⁶⁸, meaning these play only a secondary role in defining this dimension (attested by their below average contribution). This observation sheds additional light on the nature of the first axis, suggesting that it could be interpreted as a scale of cultural engagement where the highest scores are related to being active in the most demanding forms, in terms of both symbolic mastery and effort (the very fact of going outside home, but potentially investing more money), whereas the more middling positions are more characteristics for those cultural forms which could be practices at home (like reading or listening to music).

The opposite end of the first dimension is defined by inactivity. Similar to the models from other countries which have revealed the same principle of engagement vs. disengagement on the first axis, there is much less variation in this area relative to its counterpart – fewer categories reach the threshold of an above average contribution, they are positioned closer to each other and the categories farthest from the origin are much closer to it than those at the opposite (engagement) side of the model. When one considers only the categories contributing above the average, only the negative ones register on the right side of the graph, almost all of which belong to variables whose positive categories appear on the engagement side of the map. It is again about music, but this time the most characteristic modality is not listening to music at all, though not attending live music events also registers. Other activities which have the greatest influence on defining this end of the axis (as measured by their contribution, in the

⁶⁸ The only exception is the highest level of reading as the category *>13 books read* is positioned quite far to the left and has an above average contribution.

decreasing order) are not using the internet, not going to the cinema or parties/social gatherings, not watching movies, and not reading books.

There is, however, one telling exception which does not follow the engagement vs. disengagement logic: TV watching. In this case the modalities are distributed in exactly the opposite way than observed for all other variables: the frequency of watching TV increases from left to right, which means that the category coding the lowest frequency, *TV 0-1*, is positioned on the left (close to the modalities *cinema 1* and *music 4*), and the category coding the highest frequency, *TV 4*, is positioned on the right. Although none of these modalities has an above average contribution, this is still a very important finding as it means that, firstly, watching TV is the only activity out of all included that the majority of people positioned on the right side engage in, and, secondly, that this the only activity in which engagement is more characteristic for the people who are overall disengaged than it is for those that are active, who, in turn, are characterized by a lower level of TV watching. The low contribution of this variable is most probably a result of its high overall popularity (most people do watch TV), but the fact that there is a group who does not watch TV or watch it infrequently, perhaps only a minority, is still of great sociological interest, as this could be the cultural elite. This point will be developed further in the detailed analysis of the structure of the space of lifestyles in the next chapter.

The second dimension

The second axis is based on different principles. In terms of the main contributors to the inertia, the taste variables outweigh participation variables (72 percent to 28 percent), a pattern observed in other countries, with music taste having a slightly greater role (35 percent) than the TV (24 percent) and radio (22 percent) preferences. Similarities with patterns observed elsewhere do not end here, as the most evident trait in the organization of the categories along this dimension reflects the logic of the opposition between more intellectually demanding forms, usually requiring more symbolic mastery, many of which are traditional highbrow forms, and a combination of the negation of the difficult and preference for more popular forms with less legitimacy.

This polarity is most clearly visible in the distribution of musical genres. Listening to opera and classical music (the latter having the second highest contribution, 3.9 percent), certainly traditional highbrow genres, but also world music, a less obviously highbrow genre, is combined with not listening to rock/pop and, to a slightly lesser degree, dance/house at the ‘legitimate’ pole at the top of the figure). This stands in opposition to listening to genres that are relatively recent developments in the history of music (the lower part of the figure): rap and techno (both having a very high contribution of 4 percent situating them in the top three contributors), which appeared in Poland probably only in the early nineties (and thus ‘emerging’ also in this very literal sense); hard rock/heavy metal, dating further back, positioned slightly closer to the origin; and finally, not listening to the genres characterising the opposite side (world and classical music), the closest to the origin, but still contributing above the average. This is further confirmed by participation in highbrow live music events, positioned high on the traditional highbrow side of the axis.

The same pattern is observed in the choice of radio and TV programmes. In the upper side of the graph there is a preference for forms requiring more symbolic mastery – cultural programmes in both media, TV plays and classical music in radio (the more frequently one watches/listens, the higher one is positioned) – and the negation of these forms on the other side. Together these four variables have a very substantial contribution of 23 percent to the dimension inertia. The related supplementary variables, that is, radio and TV *other cultural programmes*, radio dramas, TV documentaries, and radio and TV educational programmes follow the same pattern and are located roughly in the same areas of the map.

However, the overall picture for radio and TV taste is not straightforward. The preference for more demanding forms does not mean avoidance of entertainment, as non-classical music programmes in radio and sport programmes in both media register in the upper side of the map. There is a caveat here, however, as the frequency of watching/listening seems to be important in relation to these two types of programmes: in the highbrow zone these are listened to with only low to moderate frequency, whilst the categories coding the most avid listeners/viewers are found at the opposite side of the map, fitting the overall logic of the dimension well (though the fact that the latter do not contribute above the average suggests that this effect could be quite limited).


Further analysis of the position of other elements in the map suggests that the division is not exclusively between highbrow and popular, but also between traditional and modern, the

latter perhaps reminiscent of “emerging” forms of capital recently extensively discussed in the literature (Prieur and Savage, 2013, 2014) . This is visible in the inverse relationship between the level of newspaper/magazine reading and internet use, suggesting a division between different ways of accessing information. All this points to a strong relationship with age, which is further suggested by the positioning of the category representing the highest frequency of going to discos at the bottom of the model, an activity certainly more popular among younger people. This might also explain why religious programmes (both in radio and TV), a rather specific cultural form, have a high contribution (overall 14 percent, all categories of these variables contribute above the average) to the axis and are positioned far from the origin: older people usually happen to be more religious. The distribution of the categories of these two variables reveals another feature of the space. The frequency of watching and listening to religious programmes rises from the bottom-left quadrant to the top-right one, whilst the frequency of engagement in the more demanding forms related to culture rises from the bottom-right to the top-left. This shows that there is an internal differentiation of the second dimension along the first dimension, and to fully understand the score on the former, one should take into consideration the score on the latter. A very similar pattern of a rising frequency from the bottom-left to the top right quadrant is also observed for TV series, which, although it has a lower contribution (the bottom modality *tv series 0* and *tv series 3* are just below the 0.7 percent threshold), should still be considered important. Such a pattern also clarifies the issue of the meaning of the label – it appears that it may well be interpreted primarily as relating to soap-opera style TV-series rather than the more recent Netflix-style ones.

The next step in the initial examination of the space is looking for any clear-cut clusters of the category points. When their positions on both dimensions are considered together a quite clear picture of the organization of cultural practices and preferences emerges. The left side of the figure gathers those who are engaged above-average in a wide range of activities of all kinds and with higher intensity (with a notable exception of TV positioned on the opposite side, thus breaking the pattern), the upper-left quadrant being characterised by preference for highbrow and traditional forms, whilst the lower-left opt for popular and modern cultural goods and activities. The right side of the map is generally related to the lowest level of activity of any kind, although there is a difference between the composition of the upper and lower quadrants. The upper one is related foremost to not participating in the activities requiring going out, whilst the lowest level of reading and radio listening appear in the bottom quadrant. Moreover, the bottom quadrant is characterized by a complete inactivity, as not a single

positive category is located here, whereas there are some positive modalities in the upper one, namely, the modalities reflecting the highest frequency of engaging in rather specific forms: religious TV and radio programmes, and TV series. The conical shape of the cloud of individuals signals higher variation on the second dimension in the high activity area (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Space of lifestyles; Cloud of individuals



The social characteristics of the space of lifestyles – the analysis of the distribution of the supplementary variables (Figures 3-7)

In terms of important social characteristics corresponding with the structure of the lifestyle space, three emerge as particularly important. Firstly, there is a very strong link between the engagement/disengagement axis and overall volume of capital. Regarding economic capital, it can be observed that the level of income gradually rises from the right of the space to the left and is largely parallel to the x axis. However, the number of people in the household modifies this relationship, as on average it is much higher in the bottom part of the map. The money available for consumption per person is considerably higher in the upper section, as is observed in the distribution of the income per person modalities, those coding the lowest level being positioned in the bottom-right quadrant and those coding the highest level located in the upper-left quadrant. As for cultural capital, this – both in its inherited and educational form – also rises from the right to the left of the space, forming a line roughly parallel to the first axis. The modality coding the highest levels of educational capital, that is, people holding degrees, somewhat deviates from this general pattern – it is positioned in the left-upper quadrant, the score on the second dimension being quite substantial (0.27). A slight deviation is also observed for paternal capital, as its level rises from the top-right quadrant to the bottom-left, though only primary parent's education has a more noticeable score. This would then mean that the upper part of the graph is characterized by a slightly higher level of educational capital, and the lower part by slightly higher level of parental capital.

The pattern of distribution of objectified cultural capital is less straightforward. The number of records and movies possessed gradually rises from the right to the left and the line connecting the modalities is roughly parallel to the first axis, though the modalities coding 0 records and 0 books are positioned in the upper-right quadrant, and there is also a slight deviation of the modalities coding higher number of movies to the bottom, which is perhaps related to the greater popularity of watching movies and going to cinema in this sector, whilst the categories related to the number of records at home form an arch and the top one, *81+ records*, is located in the upper-left quadrant. When the number of books is considered, a different picture emerges – the size of the book collection rises diagonally from the bottom-right quadrant to the upper-left one and in this case the score of the top categories on the second axis is well marked, 0.1 for *51-100 books*, 0.26 for *101-500 books* and for *500+ books* almost 0.6. This means that the people located in the upper-left quadrant without any

Figure 3. Supplementary variables 1.




Figure 4. Supplementary variables 2.





Figure 5. Supplementary variables – occupation.



Space of lifestyles - passive variables 1 - Axes 1 & 2





Figure 7. Passive variables 2.



doubt have much larger book collections. Whether this should be taken as a sign of an overall higher level of cultural capital is debatable. On the one hand, it could be argued that books are a more general and thus a better overall measure of cultural capital than records or movies. Importantly, the case for this interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the higher number of books in the upper-left quadrant could not be explained simply as the effect of age (in the sense of older people having more books), one of the strongest structuring factor on the second dimension (whose role is discussed in detail below), as the number of books in this area is higher than in the lower-left quadrant across all age groups.⁶⁹ On the other, an alternative interpretation is that the number of books could also be reflecting a different mode of cultural participation, based on images rather than words, films rather than books, and a different age-related mode of accessing information, as was earlier suggested in the analysis of the space of lifestyles. There is yet one more possibility, namely that this difference could also be a trace of a capital composition principle: in the UK the economic fraction (business execs and LMPs) has been found to outweigh or possess at least similar number of DVDs than the cultural fraction, whilst the latter outweigh the former in terms of the number of books (Atkinson, 2017a). It has to be made clear, however, that the capital composition interpretation is in this case indirect and partial.

This leads us to consider more in detail the possible role played by capital composition in the general structuring of the space of lifestyles. So far, using basic capital indicators, the capital composition principle appears to be weak and muted. Some of the available measures are positioned in the area when one would expect them to be in case of the composition principle being present. This is the case of respondent's level of education and number of books rising in value diagonally from the lower-right to the upper-left quadrant. However, other indicators are not in line with the capital composition interpretation. Firstly, income instead of rising diagonally from the upper-right to the lower-left quadrant correlates closely with respondent's education and the points coding high values are positioned in the upper-left quadrant. Secondly, parental education categories are positioned in the bottom side of the map, rather than in the upper. Although this rather clearly signals weakness of the capital

⁶⁹ In the age group 18-39 62 percent in the upper-left quadrant have more than 50 books compared to 42 percent in the lower-left quadrant, in the age group 40-59 respectively 71 percent to 56 percent, the number of individuals in the lower-left quadrant older than 60 is too small for a meaningful comparison, all differences are statistically significant the level of 0.95.

composition, one needs to remember that this test of the capital composition hypotheses is far from perfect as, firstly, the set of capital indicators is incomplete and not exactly comparable to that used in the social space (due to the dataset limitations), and, secondly, because these variables are projected into the space of lifestyles as single indicators rather than a composite variable constructed on the basis of the scores on the capital volume and the capital composition dimensions coming from a separate (but calculated on the same dataset) model of social space (like this have been done in other studies, e.g. Flemmen et al., 2018b). This is important because these two methods may lead to a different picture.

Taking these problems into consideration, there is a need to dig further into the issue by examining the distribution of occupational groups in the space as a proxy for capital composition. Unfortunately, this is also no easy task, as the ISCO occupation variable is available only in the two-digit version and, contrary to the Polish General Social Survey, the information on occupation is available only for people in employment, which somewhat limits the possibility of generalization. The main issue with the ISCO schema in its two-digit form is that some of the groups lump together quite distinct occupations which have been shown to occupy different places in the Polish social space. This is especially important for the top two ISCO groups, ISCO 1 *legislators, senior officials and managers* and ISCO 2 *professionals*, which could be taken to approximate the dominant class and for which, as has been shown earlier, the differentiation along the capital composition lines in the social space is highest. The issues pertaining to these two major ISCO groups are briefly discussed below.

The most problematic category is the ISCO 24 *other professionals* code, which groups together three sub-categories having different capital composition profiles: on the one hand, social sciences and religious professionals and cultural producers, for whom one expects a domination of cultural over economic capital, and, on the other, business and legal professionals for whom the composition is expected to be balanced, or even tilted in the direction of economic capital. These two contrasting groups are mixed in roughly comparable proportions: the cultural fraction make up about 40 percent of the ISCO 24 category, whilst the economic 60 percent.⁷⁰ This unfortunately somewhat limits the extent to which it is useful for the task of unearthing capital composition and perhaps this category should be cautiously taken to have a balanced composition of capital. Another problematic category, though of lesser concern, is the ISCO 22 category *health professionals* which gathers three distinct groups:

⁷⁰ Source: the pooled data from the PGSS waves 1992-2010.

doctors, nurses, and biology and agronomy professionals. The first two groups could be distinguished from each other quite precisely on the basis of education, but the biology and agronomy related remainder (accounting for 10 percent of ISCO code 22) could not.⁷¹ It then seems that, similarly to the ISCO 24 category, the ISCO 22 category should be taken to represent a balanced composition. The remaining codes allow for a relatively precise dissection of the service class in to different fractions, however. Thus, corporate managers (ISCO 12) and general managers (ISCO 13) are taken to represent the economic fraction of the dominant class, teaching professionals (ISCO 23) to represent the cultural fraction, and physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals (ISCO 21) and life science and health professionals (ISCO 22) to represent the balanced fraction. As the analysis of the Polish social space have shown, the remaining occupational groups are not differentiated enough regarding capital composition, and for this reason their position in the space of lifestyles is not considered in terms of capital composition. The category legislators and senior officials (ISCO 11) is excluded from the analysis due to the extremely low size.

The first observation is that the dispersion of the points representing occupation modalities is the highest of all supplementary variables analysed. The occupational groups are distributed along the engagement/disengagement axis according to their capital profiles. Hence, farmers are the least active group and are located far to the right, almost on the x axis. Manual and skilled workers are much closer to the origin, but still on the low engagement side, and they are followed by two categories of low-skilled service workers (personal and protective services workers and models, salespersons and demonstrators) who are positioned close to the middle of the graph but on the positive side. These four categories are positioned to the bottom and relatively close to each other, which means that their level of cultural participation is average and that they prefer modern and less legitimate forms of culture rather than more traditional/highbrow ones. Clerks, customer service employees, and associate professionals are markedly more active and are thus located more to the left of the model. Finally, professionals and managers are the most active of all occupations, though it has to be noted that managers of small enterprises are an exception, as they are positioned much closer to the white-collar workers and associate professionals rather than to professionals and corporate managers.

⁷¹ Source: the pooled data from the PGSS waves 1992-2010.

Moving on to testing the capital composition hypothesis, one observes that the differentiation of the occupations that form the dominant class is high.⁷² A closer look on the pattern of their distribution does not provide straight answer on the role of capital composition. Again, some of the occupational categories are located where one would expect to find them to confirm capital composition being at play, while others are not. Starting with those categories whose position confirms the capital composition interpretation we see that teaching professionals, the sole representative of the cultural fraction are located high to the top (relative to other occupations), which very clearly indicates a taste for traditional highbrow legitimate forms. Teaching professionals stand in a clear opposition to managers of small enterprises, the latter located in the bottom part of the map, which signals the preference of the latter for modern/less established forms. Although the position of managers of small enterprises on the second dimension is less marked in comparison to teaching and health professionals, the distance between these two groups is still large (in the range of 0.75 to 0.98) and, as shown by the ANOVA post-hoc tests, these differences are statistically significant.⁷³ Finally, other professionals (for whom, to reiterate, the capital composition profile is harder to pin down) are also positioned in the middle of the graph, which, assuming that this category mixes the economic fraction with the cultural fraction, would be in line with the expectation.

Proceeding to the categories whose position do not confirm the capital composition interpretation, one observes that health professionals taken to be representing the balanced composition of capital, are also located in the upper-left quadrant, only slightly lower than teaching professionals, rather than in the middle. When one uses education to divide this group into doctors and nurses, it is observed that these sub-groups are positioned close to each other, have almost identical scores on the second dimension and only differ in the level of activity, doctors being more active. Next, the position of corporate managers, representing the economic fraction, in the middle rather than in the bottom of the map, does not fit the pattern expected for a clear and well developed capital composition effect and suggests that, as a group, they do not have any specific stance regarding the legitimate/traditional vs. less established/modern opposition. The position of natural and engineering science professionals also diverges of the

⁷² Importantly, what strengthens the case that an independent effect of occupation is indeed at work, is the fact that the same relationships are observable when the space of lifestyles is computed only for people in employment, in two versions, separately for males and females, thus controlling for the possible effect of gender, considering the gendered structure of occupations.

⁷³ See Appendix for details.

one observed in the social space, instead of being located in the middle, what would be in line with the balanced composition of capital, this group is found in the lower part of the map.

To summarize, the findings regarding the capital composition hypothesis on the legitimate/traditional vs. less established/modern dimension of the lifestyle space offer a mixed picture as only three out of six categories are positioned where one would expect to find them to confirm the hypothesis. Some additional support is offered by the contrast and large distance between teaching professionals and managers of small enterprises fully meets the expected pattern and is the strongest argument for the capital composition interpretation. Moreover, corporate managers are not positioned in a way that would fully contradict the capital composition interpretation, that is in the middle rather than at the top, thus still in considerable distances from teaching professionals. Nevertheless, this still allows only for a very cautious interpretation that a trace of a weak capital composition effect could be indeed being observed, but this certainly needs more exploration using data offering a wider choice of lifestyles variables. However, one more interpretation is possible – the opposition between natural and engineering science professionals and teaching professionals could be reflecting a more peculiar differentiation related to the type of education. Technical education, certainly dominant in the former group, would be then linked to taste for less established and more modern forms, whilst more general education, often in arts and humanities, prevailing within teaching professionals⁷⁴, would be connected to a preference for traditional and legitimate forms of culture. This would be in line with the differentiation between technical and non-technical intelligentsia⁷⁵, two fractions of the Polish intelligentsia distinguished on the basis of the type of education, the former preferring less established activities like DIY and the latter more established and highbrow like opera, reported by Domański (2008). This differentiation could possibly be resulting from occupational field effects – teachers are closer to the centre of the system of production and distribution of the most legitimate visions of the society and culture, whilst natural sciences professionals and engineers are more at the periphery of this system. The position of health professionals, clearly on the traditional/legitimate side, is somewhat harder to explain and needs to be explored further using richer data.

⁷⁴ According to the data in the report by Ośrodek Rozwoju Edukacji, in the school year 2014/2015 (the only year for which the report is available), 60 percent teachers in Poland taught humanistic and preliminary learning subjects, 30 percent natural science subjects, 10 percent physical education (academic teachers were not included).

⁷⁵ Understood as managers and professionals, so being comparable with the approximation of the dominant class deployed in this thesis.

The second key factor associated with the structure of the space, as suspected from the positioning of active modalities, is age. Age increases diagonally from the bottom-left quadrant to the upper-right and this relationship is very strong (the distance between the outermost modalities, *age 18-24* and *age 65+* equals 2.2, interestingly the youngest group is the one which is the least spread across the space, with majority in the lower half of the graph, mainly on the ‘engaged’, left side⁷⁶). This means that age is shaping the differentiation on both dimensions, however from concentration ellipses analysis it is evident that younger age groups are more internally polarised on the first axis. On the first axis, being older is related to being less active, while on the second being older corresponds with a preference for traditional and highbrow culture. Being younger, by contrast, is associated with preferring more modern forms of culture with less formal legitimacy. Age, in turn, could be related to education in the following way. On the one hand, as the younger dominate the bottom sector, most of the students are located there (as attested by the position of the modality *student* far down the map), who are yet to attain their highest level of education, whilst the bulk of those in the upper region of the map have already finished their education. On the other, the younger age cohorts have, on average, better educated parents, hence the slight difference in the pattering of inherited capital. All in all, the conclusion should perhaps be that the bottom and the top sectors are roughly comparable in terms of educational and parental capital.

The third key social characteristic corresponding with the space of lifestyles, and particularly with the opposition of traditional/highbrow and modern/lowbrow forms, is gender. Women tend to prefer the former, whilst men typically prefer the latter. This is well visible on concentration ellipses which show that majority of female respondents are located in the ‘traditional’, upper half of the graph, while opposite is true for men. The gender differentiation is exclusively a matter of the second dimension of the space, as on the engagement/disengagement axis these modalities have a score close to zero and are thus positioned almost exactly and identically on the y axis. The distance between the points representing genders (roughly 0.6) is notable (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 59) and attests to the importance of gender as a factor structuring cultural consumption and taste.

Recapitulation

⁷⁶ See Appendix

So far, then, we have determined that the space of lifestyles in Poland follows a familiar structure. As other studies have found, the primary axis of differentiation is one of engagement versus disengagement from culture. Just as in those studies, this could well be an effect of the variables and modalities available, especially in their skew toward indicators of high culture and the broad genre categories. Nevertheless, the opposition is clear and suggestive of a broad homology between the space of lifestyles in Poland, a few decades after the fall of socialism, and the spaces of lifestyles in other longstanding capitalist countries. The second axis, moreover, opposes highbrow and lowbrow tastes *and* traditional and modern tastes, indicating the interaction of class habitus with the specific effects of trajectory and the possibility of ‘emerging’ symbols of cultural capital. Analyses of supplementary variables approximating capital possession and demographic features add to this picture. While the engagement/disengagement clearly corresponds with volume of capital, the second dimension correspond with age, gender and occupations. Legitimate and traditional forms of culture appear to be associated with occupational groups richer in educational capital, with older age and with women, while lowbrow or ‘emerging’ forms of culture are associated with lower educational capital, with youth and with women. The opposition between highbrow and lowbrow, traditional and modern, therefore, seems to be homologous with the binaries of cultural/economic capital, old/young and female/male, which might not be surprising given the gender and age structure of occupational groups and educational attainment.

Chapter 7: The Space of Lifestyles in Poland Part III: Cluster Analysis

In order to examine the space of lifestyles more closely we can look for internally homogenous clusters of taste and cultural consumption using cluster analysis. Due to the large sample size a mixed method of classification, combining hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) with the k-means method, has been deployed. However, statistical indicators did not offer a clear solution for the number of clusters to be retained (Table 1). The intra-cluster inertia linearly decreases from the three-cluster solution to the nine-cluster solution, whilst the inter-cluster inertia linearly increases, and there is no “break” point suggesting the best number of clusters. The statistical fit criteria available in the SPAD package, Calinski-Harabasz and Davies-Bouldin indexes, suggest choosing solutions with very different numbers of cluster (Calinski-Harabasz suggests nine clusters, Davies-Bouldin suggests five clusters), none of which have a satisfactory interpretation. For that reason, the criteria of meaningful interpretation and external validity (using supplementary variables) of the clusters have guided the selected cut point of the dendrogram. The distribution of the relevant active and passive variables among the clusters is presented in Table 2⁷⁷. The position of the clusters in the space of lifestyles is presented in Figure 1 and the cluster membership of individuals in Figure 2. The following discussion of the clusters is structured according to their order in the MCA solution rather than their statistically assigned number.

Table 1. Statistical fit criteria for clusters

Criteria	3 clusters	4 clusters	5 clusters	6 clusters	7 clusters	8 clusters	9 clusters
Intra-cluster inertia	0.104	0.079	0.065	0.054	0.047	0.041	0.036
Inter-cluster inertia	0.143	0.168	0.182	0.193	0.200	0.206	0.211
Explained inertia (%)	57.828	68.066	73.684	78.003	81.106	83.210	85.297
Calinski-Harabasz (pseudo F) criterion	3006.510	3114.741	3068.063	3107.761	3134.318	3101.021	3175.539
Davies-Bouldin's index	0.851	0.985	0.998	0.951	0.873	0.892	0.949

⁷⁷ See Appendix

Figure 1. Clusters in the space of lifestyles.





Figure 2. Cluster membership of the individuals.



Cluster 3 - disengaged (20 percent)

The first cluster to be considered is positioned on the far-right of the space of lifestyles and is characterized by almost complete disengagement from all kinds of activities. It is thus labelled disengaged. There are some areas for which this tendency is particularly strong, most importantly for listening to music: non-listeners make up 67 percent of the cluster and 76 percent of all non-listeners are found here. This makes for a very high level of overrepresentation in comparison to the population average (almost four times, 18 percent in the population) and other clusters (over seven times to the next cluster in the order of the size of the non-listeners). The relationship is absolute for participation in music events as not even one person declared going to any such event. All other activities requiring leaving the house, regardless of their location in the hierarchy of legitimacy and how symbolically demanding they are, are very heavily underrepresented (the frequency of participation for the majority being close to zero).

The picture is slightly more positive for activities which could be done at home, though here as well there are some practices for which activity is very low. This is the case for reading, especially books (88 percent do not read relative to 51 percent in the population, this the highest non-readership rate of all clusters), but the proportion of non-readers in the cluster for magazines (54 percent) and newspapers (48 percent) is also very high, twice that of the whole sample. It could be argued that reading, regardless of the content read, is a rather demanding activity (in terms of symbolic mastery), but the picture is still largely negative even for “easier” practices such as listening to the radio (48 percent abstain, 3 times more than the average). The only activity which is really popular in this cluster is watching TV – people who watch it at least once a week make up 84 percent of the cluster and the group of the most avid TV-viewers is slightly higher than the average (27 percent to 20 percent). The only cluster with overall slightly higher frequency of TV watching is Cluster 1, whilst some clusters are markedly less engaged (5 and 6). The only other activity for which the level of engagement is at an average level (20 percent) is having DIY as a hobby.

This does not mean, however, that their TV-taste is broad. Quite the contrary, its breadth is also rather limited. It is based on the most popular types of programmes (at the same time the least specific ones) which are watched by a marked majority: TV news (99 percent), movies (95 percent) and TV series (91 percent). Religious programmes are the only characteristic type of TV content for this cluster, which at 54 percent is slightly overrepresented

and is also watched with slightly higher than average frequency.⁷⁸ For all other TV genres the share of non-viewers is overrepresented and there is no apparent pattern to it, as the list includes both programmes which are related to culture/education and thus could be said to be more demanding (educational programmes, documentaries, TV plays, cultural programmes, other cultural programmes) and those which do not have an obvious intellectual profile (music programmes), and even programmes clearly related to entertainment (talk shows, entertainment programmes, sport programmes).⁷⁹ The situation is similar for radio tastes, as only info programmes are listened to by an overwhelming majority (97 percent) and the only positive overrepresented category is *religious programmes* (57 percent to 40 percent). For the remainder, only the negative categories are overrepresented and most of them by a large margin (around 20 percentage points or more).⁸⁰

Music taste is equally undifferentiated, the only overrepresented categories being *world music* (54 percent to 37 percent) and *other music* (36 percent to 23 percent). Quite interestingly, the *other* category is also the only overrepresented category for literary preferences (41 percent to 29 percent). This is a rather interesting finding for a cluster with the lowest overall number of chosen genres of music (1.3) and literature (1.2) and points to a possibility of an agreement bias or a lack of competence to name a specific genre.⁸¹ The former effect could have been perhaps stronger in case of book reading – the respondents might have felt pressed to give a positive answer (e.g. to avoid being perceived as “uncultured”) and then they struggled to provide the details. The latter effect seems to be more probable in the case of music – assuming their positive answer reflected the reality, they simply do not think of music or reading in terms of genres (or they did not fully understand the list in this case), they just casually listen to generalized *music* played on the radio or elsewhere, without paying much attention to genre classifications. In the case of music, however, there is yet another possibility: the popularity of the *other* category might be the result of the omission of the *disco polo* genre in the questionnaire.

⁷⁸ The top frequency category *tv religious 2* is overrepresented, 18 percent to 11 percent.

⁷⁹ Educational programmes (45 percent to 25 percent), documentaries (29 percent to 16 percent), TV plays (58 percent to 43 percent), cultural programmes (37 percent to 23 percent), other cultural programmes (40 percent to 27 percent), music programmes (41 percent to 20 percent), talk shows (47 percent to 34 percent), entertainment programmes (21 percent to 14 percent), sport programmes (44 percent to 29 percent).

⁸⁰ The shares of the non-listeners: classical music programmes (71 percent to 45 percent), educational programmes (68 percent to 48 percent), radio plays (63 percent to 52 percent), sport programmes (62 percent to 44 percent), cultural programmes (59 percent to 35 percent), other cultural programmes (57 percent to 37 percent), entertainment programmes (51 percent to 26 percent), music programmes (31 percent to 7 percent).

⁸¹ The figures are for, respectively, listeners and readers only.

In terms of social characteristics, the cluster is characterized by the lowest level of both cultural and economic capital. Only 22 percent of the people in the cluster have education higher than a vocational school diploma and the share of those with only primary education is the highest of all clusters (44 percent). The level of parental capital is equally low: 80 percent of the cluster's members have parents with only primary education, which is again the highest proportion by a large margin (14 percentage points over the average, and 19 over the cluster 1, second in this regard). This is further confirmed by the lowest levels of objectified cultural capital as the proportions of people who do not possess any books (35 percent to 13 percent), records (73 percent to 40 percent) or movies (81 percent to 54 percent) at home are also the highest of all clusters.

There are two other important factors possibly explaining the inactivity, both of which, to a degree, may also be behind the very low observed level of capital, but each also has an independent contribution driving cultural participation down. Firstly, this is one of the oldest clusters. Hence it reflects the educational structure of the past, which might also partially explain the low income of the cluster (retirees make up 56 percent of the cluster), but aging itself also influences the patterns of consumption by gradually limiting physical ability to actively participate, especially in activities involving going out. Secondly, the majority of the people in the cluster live in rural areas, which, through association with low-education and low-income occupational groups (and low pensions resulting from it), again may partially explain the low level of capital: farmers make up 34 percent of the employed members of the cluster, over twice the average, and together with workers they account for 86 percent of the cluster, compared to 52 percent in the whole population of people in employment. However, living in a rural area certainly has a significant independent effect: rural areas simply lack the cultural facilities of any kind and this lack of opportunity amplifies the overall effect (Bourdieu, 1984: 105). Taking all these factors into account, the pattern of cultural participation and taste is without doubt a very clear example of the *taste of necessity*.

Clusters 1 and 4

The next two clusters 1 and 4, as expected from their similar position on the first dimension, are characterised by a similar level of disengagement from most of the cultural activities requiring going out. Not participating in most of these activities is overrepresented in comparison to the population average. This includes highly institutionally legitimate practices, such as visiting museums, monuments, galleries, going to theatre and attending highbrow

concerts, but also most of the other, arguably less/not necessarily legitimate activities, like going to music concerts of any kind, entertainment and comedy events, and zoos to name a few – for all these forms the inactivity is almost total. Not going to the cinema, disco and to amusement parks is also overrepresented in both clusters, though the degree is significantly higher for Cluster 1.⁸² In relation to other forms of culture, however, these clusters differ markedly.

Cluster 1 – *traditional homebodies* (20 percent)

Cluster 1 reflects a specific mode of consumption and a rather sedentary lifestyle – the inactivity in forms requiring going out is counter-balanced by a medium to high activity rate (over 90 percent participates) in the areas of music (low to moderate overall frequency⁸³), radio (high overall frequency⁸⁴) and especially TV (highest overall frequency⁸⁵). Moreover, people in this cluster present average (in relation to books) or above average (regarding newspapers and especially magazines) levels of reading.⁸⁶

There is a clear patterning of taste in these domains: a preference for traditional highbrow genres and avoidance of the most popular ones. In music, this translates to an overrepresentation of listening to world music (59 percent to 37 percent), opera (10 percent to 7 percent) and classical music (35 percent to 25 percent), but also an overrepresentation of not listening to the popular genres (both in terms of how legitimate and how common they are) like rock/pop and dance/house music, for which the proportion of non-listeners is the highest of all clusters (respectively, 79 percent to 46 percent and 91 percent to 74 percent). Yet more characteristic is the virtual absence of the listeners of the most youthful genres such as rap, techno and hard rock/heavy metal (the proportion being lower than 1 percent). Interestingly,

⁸² Respectively, 89 percent to 75 percent (62 percent in the population), 96 percent to 85 percent (74 percent in the population) 97 percent to 89 percent (85 percent in the population).

⁸³ Slightly overrepresented are the two bottom music listening frequency categories, *music 1* (18 percent to 11 percent), *music 2* (35 percent to 28 percent).

⁸⁴ The top frequency category *radio 4* is overrepresented (36 percent to 26 percent).

⁸⁵ The two top categories are overrepresented relative to the average, *TV 3* (39 percent to 32 percent, higher than all other clusters except the 2/7 and 4/7) and *TV 4* (28 percent to 20 percent, higher than all other clusters except the *disengaged*), this makes it the most active cluster TV-wise. The difference is especially high in comparison to the clusters 5/7 and 6/7 – the most avid TV-watchers (*TV3* and *TV4* taken together) are more numerous by, respectively, 35 and 29 percentage points.

⁸⁶ For book reading none of the frequency categories is overrepresented, for newspapers the number of non-readers is lower than the average (17 percent to 26 percent) and the category *newspaper 3-4*, representing medium-to-high frequency, is overrepresented (32 percent to 26 percent), for magazines the number of non-readers is also lower than the average and the top two categories are slightly overrepresented (respectively, 40 percent to 37 percent and 26 percent to 21 percent).

jazz, which in the space of lifestyles is positioned in the area of high symbolic mastery and thus highly legitimate, is also avoided (97 percent to 87 percent).

Regarding TV and radio, the highbrow vs. popular division is less clear, as there is an overall overrepresentation of all kind of programmes including entertainment (especially TV series watched by almost everyone), perhaps to a degree a function of having the overall highest TV watching frequency and another sign of a specific sedentary mode of cultural consumption. Nevertheless, the degree of overrepresentation for cultural programmes, radio plays and TV theatre is higher than for other genres, pointing to a marked highbrow trait.⁸⁷ However, the most characteristic TV and radio form are religious programmes, a rather specific trait already observable in case of the *disengaged*. A marked majority declares watching/listening to this category of programmes (82 percent in TV, 81 percent in radio), which is roughly double the average, and with an above average frequency.⁸⁸ Such high popularity of religious content could be explained by high overrepresentation of older age groups, who are the primary consumer of this kind of media content.⁸⁹ The cluster can thus be labelled *traditional highbrow homebodies*.

The sedentary lifestyle could be to a large degree explained by life cycle effects: in terms of the age and employment status structure this cluster is very similar to the *disengaged*: the average age is 59, retirees make up over half of the cluster (56 percent) and people with other employment status falling into this cluster (employed or homemakers) are also older than average. Among those who are in employment, farmers are also overrepresented (perhaps related to the fact that 45 percent of the cluster live in rural areas) and professionals and managers are again almost absent.

⁸⁷ For the more demanding TV forms (TV plays, cultural programmes, other cultural programmes, documentaries) the range of overrepresentation equals 10-28 percentage points (17 on average), whilst for the entertainment related ones (TV series, talks shows, entertainment programmes) 5-11 percentage points (8 on average). For radio it is, respectively, 21-28 percentage points (24 on average, radio plays, classical music, cultural programmes and other cultural programmes) and 8-14 percentage points (11 on average, entertainment and sport programmes).

⁸⁸ For TV religious programmes 82 percent to 46 percent in the population and 61 percent in the 6/7 cluster, next in the order of popularity, for radio religious programmes 81 percent to 40 percent and 57 percent in the 3/7 cluster. The top frequency categories are also overrepresented *tv religious 2* (25 percent to 11 percent) and *radio religious 2* (29 percent to 13 percent),

⁸⁹ There is a high probability that there are two particular media entities broadcasting much, if not most, of the programmes covered by this variable: Radio Maryja and Telewizja Trwam. This is important insofar as both represent a very peculiar media phenomenon: popular religious radio stations with an ultra-conservative, nationalist profile, owned by a famous Catholic priest and Redemptorist, Tadeusz Rydzyk, a powerful media tycoon who has many times proved himself to be a skilful political player able to exert (direct and indirect) influence on country's politics.

The stark difference between this cluster and the *disengaged* is in turn explained by higher overall levels of capital. For cultural capital, this manifests in a higher level of education, as the share of people with degrees and secondary school diplomas is higher, taken together by 20 percentage points (42 percent), and the share of those with primary education only is in turn lower by 19 percentage points (25 percent). The difference in the level of parental capital is of a similar magnitude: those whose parents have education higher than primary are more numerous by 15 percentage points (35 percent to 20 percent). The same pattern is also confirmed by the level of objectified capital, though the overall level is at best only average. The effect is the strongest for the number of book, as the share of people who do not possess any books is lower by 22 percentage points (13 percent to 35 percent), and somewhat weaker for records (58 percent to 73 percent) and movies (71 percent to 81 percent). Of course, overall, the level of objectified capital is low here. Finally, an average person in the cluster has more money to spend on cultural consumption, as the household income per person (1213 PLN) is higher by 21 percent than in the inactive cluster, though overall it is still low (11 percent lower than the average).

Overall then, this cluster is still one of the least endowed with capital and in this context (especially the low level of cultural capital), it is somewhat surprising to find such a clear highbrow profile of the cluster. Perhaps this might be a still visible effect of the specific kind of a cultural goodwill rooted in the cultural policies of state-socialist Poland promoting forms highbrow culture through mass media. Another potential factor is the gender composition: the cluster is to a considerable degree dominated by women (66 percent).

Cluster 4 – *commoners* (19 percent)

As the next cluster is also positioned on the disengagement side, it comes as no surprise that most of the participation variables primarily reflect disengagement, though the picture is not as one-sided as it is in case of the *disengaged*. The key difference is that there are some activities in which the overwhelming majority of this cluster engage – this is the case of listening to music (92 percent) and radio (87 percent) and watching TV (86 percent). The only other activity in which the majority of the cluster participates is going to parties and social events (68 percent). The other two forms of activity worth mentioning fit the picture of a popular, to a considerable degree working-class, lifestyle found in other countries. Firstly, declaring DIY as a hobby is overrepresented (37 percent to 21 percent) and the highest of most

clusters by a significant margin (on average almost 20 percentage points).⁹⁰ Secondly, attending sport events at 20 percent is by no means undertaken by the whole cluster, but is still one of the most popular activities, though engaged in at only an average level.

Watching TV, similarly to the disengaged, is among the most important activities in which the members of this cluster engage. Although the participation and frequency rates are close to the average, this still means a lot of TV in comparison to other clusters and the number of people who avoid TV is lower than in the most active clusters (notably, Clusters 4, 5 and 6). This cluster is beaten in their love for TV only by the *traditional homebodies*. TV taste is defined primarily by the highest levels of avoidance of programmes which are potentially the most intellectually demanding – this the case of TV plays (68 percent to 43 percent) and TV cultural programmes (38 percent to 23 percent for *cultural programmes*, 39 percent to 27 percent for *other cultural programmes*). This situates the cluster in the group of clusters (along with Cluster 4 and Cluster 7) for which the level of avoidance of these programmes is the strongest. This is also the case of programmes which serve the purpose of teaching and spreading knowledge like educational programmes (33 percent to 25 percent) and documentaries (24 percent to 16 percent), this feature also being shared with the *disengaged* and Cluster 7. Another TV genre which is staunchly avoided is religious TV programmes (80 percent to 54 percent), the strength of this effect being comparable only in Cluster 7. Speaking of the positive side of their taste, sport programmes are the only ones watched with a higher than average frequency, which fits the pattern of participation discussed above.⁹¹ The remaining TV programmes are watched with a frequency similar to the population average or the effects of overrepresentation are very weak.

On average, the cluster has low to moderate frequency of radio listening and the taste is characterized by a very similar pattern. Again, religious programmes are characterized by the highest avoidance ratio (88 percent to 60 percent) and more demanding content is avoided more often than in the population: radio plays (77 percent do not listen compared to the average of 53 percent non-listeners), cultural (56 percent to 35 percent) and classical music programmes (69 percent to 45 percent). In the case of radio taste, however, there is no positive trait, as the

⁹⁰ The only cluster for which the difference is statistically not significant is Cluster 7.

⁹¹ The two top-frequency categories are overrepresented, *tv sport 2* (30 percent to 24 percent) and *tv sport 3* (19 percent to 14 percent), the percentages are also higher than in other clusters, *tv sport 2* than the clusters 1,2,3,6 and *tv sport 3* than the clusters 1,2,6.

figures for sport programmes point in different directions. Both the lowest and the highest frequency categories are slightly overrepresented.

The members of this cluster listen to music with moderate frequency (the only overrepresented category is the middle *music* 2, 37 percent to 27 percent). Their musical taste is based on uncontroversial choices and overall it is a sort of “common” taste as the only overrepresented genres in the cluster are at the same time the two most popular ones: rock/pop (65 percent to 54 percent) and dance/house (32 percent to 26 percent), which are in the top three of the most popular genres in the population. At the same time, the listening figures for genres which are more niche and characteristic only for particular segments are at best also around the average (rap at 11 percent, at techno 8 percent), or have less than average number of listeners, like hard rock/heavy metal (5 percent to 8 percent). Finally, the most legitimate genres are strongly avoided. This is the case of jazz/blues (94 percent non-listeners to 87 percent) and especially the traditional highbrow genres, classic and opera, for which the effect of overrepresentation of non-listening is among the strongest of all clusters (92 percent to 75 percent for classical and virtual absence of opera).

The non-participation in activities more demanding in terms of symbolic mastery also manifests in a high frequency of non-readers in the cluster. This is most evident for books, as this is the only other cluster apart from the *disengaged* where this category is overrepresented by a significant margin (67 percent to 51 percent), though the effect is weaker for magazines and newspapers where the readership level is roughly average.

The socio-demographic profile of this cluster explains well its overall low activity and the avoidance of more demanding cultural forms, and at the same time it may well account for the difference between this cluster and the cluster of *disengaged*. Age seems to be an important factor responsible for raising the level of activity as the average age in the cluster reaches 41, which is 18 years lower than in the *disengaged* cluster. The younger average age also translates into a very different employment profile, as people in employment make up almost 70 percent and retirees in this cluster are a minority (13 percent). Importantly, the class profile of the cluster fits the cultural consumption profile well, as this is the most working-class cluster: the overrepresentation of manual and skilled workers is the highest (35 percent to 20 percent), and so is the overrepresentation of people with vocational certificates (40 to 27 percent), combined with the underrepresentation of degree holders (10 percent to 19 percent). This also means a very high underrepresentation of professionals (though, interestingly, not managers of small

enterprises). The level of objectified cultural capital is low to middle (the low and middle categories coding the number of books, records and movies are overrepresented).⁹²

However, even though the overall level of cultural capital is still low, in comparison to the *disengaged* it is high enough to change the overall trend of absolute disengagement into a pattern of low activity – the proportion of people having only primary education (14 percent) is lower by 20 percentage points and the share of persons whose parents have only primary education is only half of that in the *disengaged* cluster (40 percent). Importantly, it seems that cultural capital plays a more important role than economic capital, as the level of income per person in these clusters is fairly comparable. Certain “manly” characteristics (most importantly, preference for sports and DIY) are also explained by a male preponderance, which at 60 percent is not very high, but the proportion of males is still one of the highest (second only to Cluster 7). Finally, the opportunity to be culturally active, especially in the activities related to highly legitimate cultural institutions, is limited by the fact that a considerable part of the cluster live in rural areas (48 percent).

Cluster 2 – *highbrow entertainment dabblers* (13 percent)

People in this cluster are engaged in some outside home practices, though in most cases the overall share of engagement is smaller than half of the cluster, with only two exceptions. The most widespread practice is going to the cinema (61 percent engaged), which is undertaken with a moderate frequency.⁹³ The level of participation in other forms characteristic for the cluster is much lower (with the exception of visiting museums) but these have a peculiar profile – they all represent institutions closest to the legitimate culture. This is the case of visiting historical monuments in Poland and abroad (respectively, 52 percent to 29 percent and 18 percent to 11 percent) and museums (31 percent to 19 percent). Such practices as going to the theatre, a cultural community centre and museums abroad are also overrepresented, but the effect is quite weak.⁹⁴

There are a few other quite popular cultural forms related to entertainment (slightly less than one third of the cluster participate in them). These include going to discos/clubs (29

⁹² 6-25 books (27 percent to 21 percent), 26-50 books (29 percent to 25 percent), 1-20 records home (23 percent to 17 percent), 21-40 records home (19 percent to 14 percent), movies 6-25 home (29 percent to 23 percent).

⁹³ The middle frequency category, *cinema 1* is overrepresented, 46 percent to 24 percent in the population.

⁹⁴ Theatre (12 percent to 8 percent), cultural community centre (11 percent to 8 percent) and museums abroad (8 percent to 6 percent).

percent) and attending sport events (23 percent), for which the level of participation is average, and visiting zoo (28 percent to 18 percent), which is overrepresented. The moderate to low level of engagement in practices listed above should not be read as a sign of overall disengagement, as these are offset by home-based activities, some of which are both higher than the average and are engaged in by a marked majority. The most important is reading, the number of readers of all kinds of material being markedly higher than the average: for newspapers 91 percent versus 74 percent; for magazines 90 percent versus 74 percent; and for books 77 percent versus 49 percent. Moreover, for newspapers and magazines the frequency of readership is higher, attested by the overrepresentation of the top frequency categories.⁹⁵ Another example is watching movies at home (69 percent to 49 percent). The members of the clusters are also socially active, as 82 percent of them reported going to parties/social events (and this is actually the most popular of all practices).

The musical taste of the *highbrow entertainment* dabblers is, similarly to the *homebodies*, to a considerable degree characterized by a traditional and highbrow trait, as the most characteristic genres are again world music (43 percent compared to 37 percent) and classical music (34 percent to 25 percent), though it must be noted that the degree of overrepresentation in this case is not very high. However, people in this cluster are certainly not ‘snobs’, as the most listened to genre is rock/pop (57 percent), i.e. the most “average” of all genres, and dance/house is, although slightly underrepresented (21 percent to 26 percent), still quite popular, which signals that the highbrow character is not pure. Another feature, also somewhat attesting to the relatively weaker position of the highbrow component is the fact that fans of world music outnumber fans of classical music. Moreover, there is no overrepresentation of opera (8 percent listens to it).⁹⁶ Overall, the taste here is quite diverse and not fully coherent, as only rock/pop is listened to by the majority of the cluster.

The frequency of watching TV is moderate and close to the population average. There are no TV genres which are avoided (all are popular at least at an average level), but some genres are overrepresented and these have a highbrow/intellectual profile. This is mostly the case of TV plays (77 percent to 57 percent in the population), cultural and *other cultural* programmes (respectively, 90 percent to 77 percent and 85 percent to 73 percent), documentaries (94 percent to 84 percent) and educational programmes (87 percent to 75

⁹⁵ *Newspaper 3_4* 35 percent to 26 percent, *newspaper 5* 19 percent to 11 percent, *magazine 4_5* 49 percent to 37 percent, *magazine 6* 28 percent to 21 percent.

⁹⁶ Opera then appears to be the most “elite” genre characteristic primarily for the cluster 5/7.

percent). The share of people watching these genres at a comparable level with the *homebodies* and Cluster 6, and higher than in the clusters that are inactive/less active, and/or generally avoid forms demanding in terms of symbolic mastery: *the disengaged*, the *commoners* and Cluster 7. However, some entertainment genres, namely talk shows (74 percent to 66 percent) and entertainment programmes (91 percent to 86 percent), are also overrepresented, though the strength of this effect is much weaker.

Listening to radio a lot is itself a distinctive feature of this cluster (shared with all clusters characterized by older age): the two top frequency modalities are overrepresented, the topmost by a high 10 percentage points.⁹⁷ In terms of taste, the profile is similar to that of TV: there is a marked overrepresentation of listening to classical music programmes (78 percent to 55 percent) and cultural programmes (82 percent to 65 percent, *other cultural programmes* 79 percent to 63 percent), educational programmes (65 percent to 52 percent), but, again, also entertainment programmes (86 percent to 74 percent).

Overall, the cluster is characterized by middle to high overall level of capital. The level of cultural capital is relatively high, people with primary education are underrepresented (4 percent to 20 percent), and those with degrees are overrepresented (30 percent to 19 percent), whilst the share of other qualifications is at an average level. The level of parental capital is medium to high, as shown by a slight overrepresentation of the middling categories, vocational (30 percent to 25 percent), and secondary education (29 percent to 22 percent), at the same time parents with only primary education are underrepresented (29 percent to 43 percent).

The picture is complemented by the high level of objectified capital – the number of books, records and movies in the household is well above the average and slightly lower only in comparison to Cluster 6.⁹⁸ There is no specific employment and occupational profile, except for a slight overrepresentation of professionals (13 percent to 8 percent) and associate professionals (11 percent to 5 percent). The proportion of other occupations is close to the average. Importantly, as 71 percent of the cluster members live in urban areas, they have much easier access to culture and arts, especially important in relation to the forms of high institutional legitimacy. However, it seems that the clear highbrow/legitimate profile,

⁹⁷ *Radio 3* 29 percent to 24 percent, *radio 4* 34 percent to 26 percent.

⁹⁸ The categories coding high number of items possessed are overrepresented, books: *51-100 books* (27 percent to 19 percent), *101-500 books* (22 percent to 14 percent), *500+ books* (7 percent to 4 percent), records: *41-80 records home* (21 percent to 15 percent), *81+ records home* (21 percent to 13 percent), movies, *movies 26-50 home* (15 percent to 11 percent), *movies 51+ home* (9 percent to 6 percent).

contrasting with that observed in Cluster 7 (discussed below), which has a similar cultural capital profile, could be attributed to a significant degree to its different gender composition (females make up 63 percent) and age composition (with an average age is 46 this cluster is older by 18 years).

Cluster 7 – *entertainment seekers* (12 percent)

The next cluster is also much more active when it comes to forms of cultural participation outside the home, but the pattern is reversed relative to Cluster 2, as here the activities are mostly related to partying and entertainment. The most characteristic ones, which more people engage in and which are done with higher frequency than in the population and in other clusters (with the exception of Cluster 5), are parties/social events (94 percent to 68 percent, the top frequency category is overrepresented by 2.2 times) and going to discos (71 percent to 26 percent, the top frequency category is overrepresented by 3.7 times).⁹⁹ These are complemented by an above average interest in film (76 percent to 38 percent, the top frequency category is overrepresented at a 2.2 rate), represented by both going to the cinema as well as watching films at home (85 percent to 49 percent, the top frequency category is overrepresented by 2.3 times).¹⁰⁰ Other reasonably popular and characteristic practices are attending sports events (51 percent to 21 percent, the top frequency category is overrepresented at a 3 rate) and amusement parks (30 percent to 15 percent, two times more than in the population).¹⁰¹ Finally, there are activities in which only a fraction of the cluster is engaged, but as these are overall not very popular, they are still overrepresented. In this number are visits to casinos (9 percent to 4 percent) and circuses (8 percent to 5 percent), of which casinos are especially interesting as this cultural practice is characteristic only for this cluster and Cluster 5, which is somewhat in contrast with the much more working-class background of this activity found elsewhere. (e.g. Flemmen et al,2018)

When it comes to practices having significant institutional legitimacy, the members of this cluster mostly avoid them. This effect is strongest for modern art galleries (abroad and in Poland alike), theatre and museums abroad - even though these practices are overall very rare

⁹⁹ *Parties* 3 48 percent to 21 percent, *discotheque* 2 50 percent to 14 percent.

¹⁰⁰ *Movies* 2 47 percent to 21 percent, *cinema* 2 34 percent to 15 percent.

¹⁰¹ *Amusement park* 30 percent to 15 percent in the population, *sport events* 2 15 percent to 5 percent.

(which limits the possible effect of underrepresentation), they are still underrepresented relative to the (low) average.¹⁰² Participation in other similar practices is at an average (low) level.

The avoidance of traditional highbrow content extends to musical taste as non-listeners of classical music (97 percent) and opera (100 percent) are the absolute majority of this cluster. World music, the second genre in the order of popularity in the population, is also heavily underrepresented (13 percent to 37 percent). Regarding the positive side of musical taste, it combines two components: taste for some of the most specific forms with elements of the “common” taste. First, the most niche and youthful genres are heavily overrepresented relative to the population average and their popularity is by far the highest of all clusters: techno (44 percent to 13 percent, 3.3 times more than the average), rap/hip hop (38 percent to 10 percent, 3.7 times) and hard rock/heavy metal (19 percent to 8 percent, 2.5 times). Second, genres which are the most popular in the population are also overrepresented, rock/pop (82 percent to 54 percent, 1.5 times more) and dance/house (1.9 times more, 49 percent to 26 percent).¹⁰³

The avoidance of traditional and more demanding forms is also visible in the cluster’s TV preferences. In this regard cluster is very similar to the *commoners*, since both are characterized by the highest share of non-watchers of programmes for which there is the highest probability that these would contain traditional highbrow content. This effect is strongest for the TV plays (70 percent to 43 percent), and weaker, but still well-marked, for cultural programmes (*cultural programmes*, 34 percent to 23 percent, *other cultural programmes*, 40 percent to 27 percent). This cluster is also characterized by very strong avoidance of religious programmes (86 percent to 54 percent), a feature shared with the *commoners*, and, weaker but still notable, of TV series (18 percent to 10 percent). A very similar pattern of avoidance is visible also in radio taste: radio plays (74 percent to 52 percent), cultural (55 percent to 35 percent, *other cultural programmes* 59 percent to 37 percent), classical (70 percent to 45 percent) and educational programmes (68 percent to 48 percent), are all much more often avoided than in the population and in most clusters (the degree of avoidance is comparable only Clusters 3 and 4), and so are religious programmes (94 percent to 60 percent).

¹⁰² *Modart galleries abroad* 0 99.4 percent to 98.5 percent in the population, *modart galleries Poland* 0 98 percent to 95 percent in the population, *museums abroad* 0 96 percent to 94 percent in the population, *theatre* 0 96 percent to 92 percent in the population.

¹⁰³ The ratios are, of course, lower in this case, as the average is higher, the strength of this effect is still high: rock/pop is overrepresented by 23 percentage points and dance/house by 28 percentage points, what is the highest level of all clusters, with the only exception of the 5/7 cluster which is characterized by a comparable level.

Overall, the cluster, which might be dubbed the *entertainment seekers*, represents a medium to high level of cultural capital. The educational structure largely reflect that of the population, save for the slight overrepresentation of those with general secondary education (19 percent to 11 percent) and underrepresentation (20 percent to 27 percent) of people with vocational qualifications, which is perhaps related to the high share of students, who constitute 25 percent of the cluster.¹⁰⁴ One has to note, however, that 57 percent of these students study at a university, hence the proportion of degree holders is expected to rise by another 10 percentage points, raising the overall level of capital. The level of parental capital is markedly high, substantiated by overrepresentation of the highest qualifications (secondary education, 39 percent to 22 percent, and university degrees, 19 percent to 10 percent) and underrepresentation of the lowest (primary education, 10 percent to 43 percent). However, this pattern is not so straightforward, as the percentage of parents with vocational education is also overrepresented (33 percent to 25 percent), and for fathers with vocational certificates it is actually the highest of all clusters (45 percent), which points to a working-class background of a large part of the cluster (especially given that the cluster is the youngest, meaning parental education represents the most recent state of the development of the educational structure). In this light, it is perhaps easier to explain the only average level of objectified capital, especially for the number of books, and slightly higher than average number of records and movies (all positive categories are very slightly overrepresented).

The most important characteristic, perhaps the defining feature of the *entertainment seekers*, is their young age – the average of 28 years makes it the youngest cluster, and explains the large share of students, and both features surely contribute to the apparent party lifestyle. However, the cluster also shares some important features with the *commoners*: it has got a working-class profile (but workers here have higher level of parental capital) and it is overly male dominated (69 percent, the highest share of males), which could explain the proclivity for sports and DIY. Interestingly, the relatively high activity rate in this cluster is not limited by having only an average household income (1407 PLN per person, closest to the average of all clusters). At the same time, these factors are most probably behind the contrast in taste observed between this cluster and Cluster 2, that is, masculinisation instead of feminisation, much younger age and a noticeably more working-class profile. Finally, similarly to all other culturally engaged clusters, the *entertainment seekers* are predominantly urban (65 percent).

¹⁰⁴ A secondary school diploma is an entry requirement for applying for a place at a university level.

Cluster 5 (9 percent) and 6 (7 percent)– *versatiles and highbrow snobs*

The final two clusters have much in common. Perhaps the most characteristic practice is attending live music events, as it characterizes the overwhelming majority of Clusters 5 and 6 (respectively, 88 percent and 92 percent to 19 percent, almost five times more than the average level), and at the same time is mostly exclusive for these clusters, as 78 percent of all people attending live music events are located in these clusters. Moreover, both clusters are characterized by the largest share of visitors to various institutions providing access to the most legitimate forms of art and culture, higher than the average and higher than in all other clusters by a large margin. For some of these the number of people participating make up a substantial majority of the clusters, as is the case with visiting historical monuments in Poland (respectively, 77 percent and 85 percent to 29 percent, almost 3 times higher) and museums in Poland (63 percent and 71 percent to 19 percent, more than 3 times higher).

There are also a few practices which are highly overrepresented but overall are only moderately popular in Clusters 5 and 6 (which is, of course, a function of their overall infrequency). These include visiting historical monuments abroad (respectively, 38 percent and 36 percent to 11 percent, more than 3 times the average), going to the theatre (29 percent and 45 percent to 8 percent), 3.5 and 5.5 times the average), visiting modern art galleries in Poland (21 percent and 28 percent to 5 percent, 4.3 and 5.6 time the average) or museums abroad (20 percent and 26 percent to 6 percent, 3.5 and 4.5 times the average) and using cultural community centres (18 percent and 29 percent to 8 percent, 2.2 and 3.7 times the average). The slight differences between the clusters in regard to these practices are in most cases small enough to not be statistically significant. The exceptions are going to the theatre and using cultural community centres, for which Cluster 6 is characterized by greater activity. This means that the generational cleavage does not take a straightforward form of highbrow/legitimate vs. popular, at least not at the level of differentiation offered by the available variables. However, Cluster 5 outweighs Cluster 6 by a significant margin when it comes to nightlife and is the most active cluster in this regard: 82 percent of the former declare going to disco/club compared to only 41 percent of the latter (26 percent in the population). A similar relationship, but much weaker one, is observed for parties/social events (99 percent to 91 percent, 68 percent in the population).

Secondly, Clusters 5 and 6 are characterized by a comparable and much higher than average level of reading. This is true for all kinds of reading: magazines (92 percent and 96

percent to 74 percent), newspapers (84 percent and 91 percent to 74 percent) and books (89 percent and 91 percent to 49 percent). The frequency of reading is also much higher than in the sample as a whole. This means reading more books than average and reading magazines and newspapers more frequently, though the effect is much stronger for Cluster 6 and in case of newspapers it is observed only for it.¹⁰⁵ What also differentiates these clusters is the perceived general importance of books as a medium: Cluster 6 manifests more reverence towards it in the proportion of people saying that books could not be replaced by either TV or the Internet being higher (and the highest of all clusters). Moreover, these clusters consist of readers of slightly different ilk: in both of them reading of popular science books is overrepresented and the highest of all clusters (both slightly above 30 percent compared to 19 percent in the population), but Cluster 6 is the only one for which the proportion of people reading belles-lettres books is overrepresented (72 percent to 61 percent).¹⁰⁶ This is important as reading belles-lettres and popular science books could be interpreted (though cautiously) as a sign of reading for pleasure (at least the closest one gets to measuring it in the data available).

In comparison to other clusters, both groups are characterized by the highest or almost the highest overall level and frequency of film watching, both at home and in the cinema (only the *entertainment seekers* are comparable in this regard), but the clusters are by no means identical and the difference has an interesting pattern. On the one hand, Cluster 5 gathers more avid film enthusiasts: the share of viewers is higher, especially at home (90 percent to 67 percent, 49 percent in the population) but also somewhat for cinema (93 percent to 83 percent, 38 percent in the population), as well the frequency with which they watch.¹⁰⁷ On the other, the way of watching is different: in Cluster 6 there is a considerable share of people who watch movies only in the cinema and it is much higher than in Cluster 5 (25 percent to 10 percent). As going to cinema instead of watching a movie at home requires much more effort, the

¹⁰⁵ The number of books read: the top two categories are overrepresented by a significant margin, *8-12 books read*, 19 percent and 15 percent to 8 percent, *>13 books read* (28 percent and 35 percent to 10 percent). The frequency of newspapers reading: the top two categories are overrepresented for the cluster 6/7 *newspaper 3_4*, 33 percent to 26 percent and *newspaper 5*, 31 percent to 11 percent. The frequency of magazines reading: the top two categories are overrepresented, *magazine_4_5*, 46 percent and 42 percent to 37 percent) and *magazine_6*, 26 percent and 43 percent to 21 percent.

¹⁰⁶ The proportions for popular science books are the highest of all clusters, the proportion of belles-lettres readers in the cluster 6/7 is statistically significantly higher than in the clusters 3/7, 4/7 and 7/7 by roughly 20 percentage points.

¹⁰⁷ The degree of overrepresentation for the 5/7 cluster is very high: 64 percent go to cinema with the highest frequency, 49 percentage points higher than the average, and 56 percent watch movies at home with the highest frequency (35 percentage points). For the 6/7 cluster the strength of the effect is more modest: high for cinema (34 percent, an overrepresentation of 19 percentage points) and small for watching movies at home (26 percent, an overrepresentation of 5 percentage points).

preference for such a mode of watching may be a sign of a different attitude towards movies in general, which in Cluster 6 may be perceived as a work of art requiring the right context and circumstances to be properly consumed and fully appreciated. What is more, this could also indirectly signal the attitude of the amateur movie expert who closely follows the most important film releases, a feature offered only by cinemas.

Clusters 5 and 6 are characterized by a low overall level and low frequency of TV watching – respectively, 40 percent and 26 percent watch it rarely or do not watch it all. Importantly, this is not due to lack of a TV set, as an overwhelming majority of people in these clusters have one in their households, so not watching TV is a choice rather than necessity.¹⁰⁸ Interestingly, in the case of TV tastes the gap in relation to items considered to have high legitimacy is wider than in the activities related to cultural institutions. Cluster 6 has a very clear intellectual profile, as watching of all of the most demanding TV genres is overrepresented by a large margin and, what is more, these are viewed by an overwhelming majority of the cluster: documentaries (97 percent to 84 percent in the population), cultural programmes (96 percent to 77 percent), educational programmes (93 percent to 75 percent), TV plays (92 percent to 57 percent) and other cultural programmes (92 percent to 73 percent). In this regard, this cluster is similar to the *traditional homebodies* and *highbrow entertainment dabblers* (though for some of these genres the effect of overrepresentation is here even stronger). These genres are also watched with markedly higher than average frequency.¹⁰⁹ However, again similarly to these two clusters, TV taste is not limited to these more intellectual type of programmes, as there are other TV genres which are popular enough to be overrepresented (though the effect in this case is much weaker) and this means that a decided majority of the cluster watches them. This is the case for music programmes (90 percent to 80 percent) and sport programmes (77 percent to 71 percent). Another overrepresented genre is religious programmes, less popular than for the *traditional homebodies*, but at 61 percent still above the average. This makes for a rather peculiar feature of the TV taste of this cluster as the preference for this kind of programme, contrary to the pattern observed in the population, is not related to age, in other words, the relative popularity of this genre stems from other factors

¹⁰⁸ In this case the way of using TV is perhaps different: it could serve primarily the purpose of watching VHS/DVD movies), it could be used primarily for someone else living in the household (children, parents, grandparents etc.) or finally it could be a disused artefact, something kept 'just in case', but not really in use.

¹⁰⁹ The top frequency categories are overrepresented by 18 percentage points on average: *tv culture* 2 (49 percent to 25 percent, highest of all clusters), *tv oth cultural* 2 (37 percent to 21 percent, the level comparable only in the cluster 1/7), *tv theatre* 2 (29 percent to 11 percent, comparable only in the cluster 1/7), *tv documentaries* 2 (47 percent to 32 percent, comparable in the clusters 2/7 and 5/7), *tv educational* 3 (45 percent to 28 percent, comparable in the clusters 2/7 and 5/7).

than the age composition of the cluster. Assuming that watching such programmes is correlated with the level of religiousness this points to a possible link between it and the traditional, especially highbrow, cultural interest.

The TV taste of Cluster 5 is not entirely different, but there are a few important divergences. On the one hand, the overall intellectual character is to a large extent retained as genres like cultural programmes, educational programmes and documentaries are still very popular (respectively, 85 percent, 82 percent, 89 percent,) and even slightly overrepresented, but at the same time significantly less popular than they are in Cluster 6. The most evident difference is the popularity of TV plays: the proportion of people watching them is overall average (60 percent) and lower by a large margin than in Cluster 6 (32 percentage points), and so is the number of its frequent watchers (by 17 percentage points).

The difference between clusters is more evident in radio programmes preferences. The majority of people in both clusters listens to radio (92 percent in Cluster 5, 98 percent Cluster 6) and at an above average frequency. The taste, however, differs. The radio taste of Cluster 6 mirrors that in TV, that is, all of the more demanding types of programmes are very popular and overrepresented relative to other clusters (except the *traditional homebodies*) and the population level (in most cases by well over 20 percentage points): classical music programmes (92 percent to 55 percent), cultural programmes (92 percent to 65 percent), educational programmes (79 percent to 52 percent), other cultural programmes (87 percent to 63 percent) and radio plays (67 percent to 48 percent). Similarly to TV, also the frequency is higher.¹¹⁰ In Cluster 5 the same genres are still quite popular, but only at an average level, which is much lower than in Cluster 6: classical music programmes (55 percent, 37 percentage points less), cultural programmes (70 percent, 22 percentage points less), educational programmes (53 percent, 26 percentage points less), other cultural programmes (65 percent, 22 percentage points less), radio plays (45 percent, 23 percentage points less). It then seems that the radio taste of Cluster 5 is less differentiated and is primarily about listening to music programmes other than classical (98 percent to 93 percent) and entertainment programmes (81 percent to 74 percent). Again, the greatest contrast between the clusters and the most characteristic feature of Cluster 5 is related to religious programmes: Cluster 5 is characterized by their avoidance

¹¹⁰ The top frequency categories are overrepresented by a large margin, the range is 10 to 28 percentage points, 20 percentage points on average: *radio classical music* 2 (45 percent to 17 percent), *radio cultural* 2 (46 percent to 20 percent), *radio educational* 2 (30 percent to 13 percent), *radio oth cultural* 2 (35 percent to 18 percent), *radio dramas* 2 (22 percent to 12 percent).

as only a minority listens to them (12 percent), whilst in Cluster 6 the listeners make up a majority (55 percent), and the difference of 43 percentage points is very high.

Proceeding to music, attending live music events is on the same level in both groups, but the composition is very different: Cluster 5 is dominated by pop/rock concerts (70 percent, only 17 percent in the 6) and Cluster 6 by highbrow concerts (77 percent, only 23 percent in the 5). Interestingly jazz/blues events in both cases are at a similarly low level (roughly 10 percent). These differences extend to musical taste and reflect a similar pattern: the most characteristic for Cluster 5 are those categories which, in most cases, are the least characteristic for Cluster 6, and vice versa. The only exception is again jazz: in both clusters slightly more than one third listen to it, which represents a high level of overrepresentation (almost three times the overall sample level). Importantly, these are the only clusters for which jazz is characteristic. Jazz then appears to be not only elitist, but as it bridges the generational gap, it is also characterized by a more widespread consensus regarding its distinguished status.

However, in relation to other genres the two clusters differ markedly. The most popular and at the same time characteristic genre in Cluster 5 is rock/pop, which is listened to by 89 percent and it is almost the backbone of their taste and common ground for all people situated in this cluster. The youthful genres, such as techno, rap and hard rock/heavy metal and dance/house, are also popular and their fans are found here in not insignificant numbers (respectively, 22 percent, 31 percent and 26 percent) and are overrepresented by a considerable margin in comparison to the sample average (respectively, 2.1, 2.3 and 3.4 times). However, as is evident from the percentages, these genres are not listened to by everyone in the cluster, though if one assumes that together they represent a more general category of youthful genres and analyse them jointly, the share of people who declared listening to at least one of these is markedly higher than average (52 percent). The traditional highbrow genres, classical music and opera, are not avoided but their popularity is only average (respectively, 26 percent and 5 percent). The composition of Cluster 5 is thus characterized by the highest degree of openness for all sorts of genres, regardless of their symbolic affiliation. This cluster is the closest, therefore, to the image of the musical omnivore, though it could hardly be said that it combines avid fans of both traditional highbrow and less established youthful genres as only the latter are overrepresented. Considering this feature as the most important for its overall character of cultural consumption and taste, this cluster is labelled the *versatiles*.

The music taste in Cluster 6 presents an almost entirely reversed image. This is the only cluster for which not only the legitimate traditional highbrow genres are overrepresented and are more popular by a large margin than in other clusters, like opera (29 percent to 7 percent, 4 times), but, as in case of classical music, are listened to by a majority of the cluster (70 percent to 25 percent, almost 3 times more). Similarly to all older clusters, world/traditional music is also overrepresented, but in this case only by 9 percentage points (46 percent to 37 percent). This is, however, high enough to make this genre an important element of their music taste, but considering the overall elitist profile of the cluster, both in terms of the cultural consumption and taste, as well as the capital profile, there is a chance that in this case this is world rather than traditional music. The category ‘other music’ is also slightly overrepresented (28 percent to 23 percent), but, again, there is a high chance that this has a rather different meaning than an overrepresentation of the same category in the *disengaged* cluster – in this case it most probably signals high level of musical competence, manifesting in the ability to precisely name the genres one listens to, which were, however, absent in the questionnaire. The taste of this cluster is defined by the pattern of preference as much as it is defined by the pattern of avoidance. The genres preferred in Cluster 6 are here staunchly avoided, especially the youthful ones – only 2 percent listens to rap/hip hop, 1 percent to techno and 3 percent to hard rock/heavy metal, dance/house is also largely (13 percent). Rock/pop, the most popular genre in the population, is also underrepresented, though to a lesser extent and overall it is still quite popular (42 percent to 54 percent). As the cultural consumption and taste in this cluster is very selective and defined primarily by traditional highbrow forms, the cluster is labelled *highbrow snobs*.

Both clusters are the most highly educated and have the highest level of parental capital, and by a large margin: the proportions of people with only primary education and parents with such qualification is the lowest and underrepresented (respectively, seven percent and five percent in Cluster 5, two percent, and 20 percent in Cluster 6), whilst the share of degree holders and parents with degrees is the highest and overrepresented (respectively, 43 percent and 60 percent, 33 percent and 25 percent).¹¹¹ The status of the cultural elite is further confirmed by the highest level of objectified capital: the clusters are the most endowed with all kinds, but Cluster 6 outweighs Cluster 5 in the size of book collection (52 percent owns over 100 books compared to 34 percent, 18 percent in the population) whilst the clusters are on par in regard

¹¹¹ These differences are statistically significant (except for the respondent’s primary education) but they are small and most probably reflect the age composition of the clusters, so this does not importantly change the main conclusion on the clusters similarity in terms of cultural capital.

to the number of records (respectively, 51 percent and 57 percent owns over 40 records, 28 percent in the population) and movies (respectively, 40 percent and 33 percent owns over 26 movies, 18 percent in the population). The clusters stand out also in terms of the level of household income per person (respectively, 2152 and 2066 PLN). The amount for these clusters is higher also because of their household composition – single person households make up around 30 percent of these clusters (compared with roughly 15 percent in the sample). Both clusters also show how important the urban-rural divide is as a factor shaping cultural participation in Poland – roughly 80 percent of people located in them live in a city, and only a few percentage points shy of half of the clusters in the biggest cities (i.e. with over 200 hundred thousand inhabitants, respectively, 47 percent and 42 percent) – though of course this is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. As the clusters are largely similar in the level of cultural capital and economic resources at their disposal, age is a key differentiating factor in this case: Cluster 5 is on average younger by 18 years (48 compared 30 years). Gender is also important, as Cluster 6 has the largest overrepresentation of women (70 percent), whilst Cluster 5 is balanced in this regard.

However, the differences do not end with age and gender composition, as the clusters also differ in their occupational profile. In order to better capture this differentiation the differences are reported only for respondents in employment. First of all, in both clusters working-class groups are markedly (at least over two times) underrepresented: farmers make up only four percent of Cluster 5 and three percent of Cluster 6 (compared to 14 percent in the working population), and the figures are similar for manual workers (respectively, 8 percent and 6 percent to 21 percent) and skilled workers (7 percent and 5 percent to 17 percent). Secondly, most of the overrepresented occupations represent the dominant class. Some of those are overrepresented in both clusters (as could it be expected considering their position in the space of lifestyles), that is, corporate managers (respectively, 8 percent and 7 percent compared to 3 percent) and other professionals (14 percent and 12 percent to 4 percent). Interestingly, managers of small enterprises are not overrepresented in neither of the clusters, which confirms that their cultural consumption and taste profile is more akin to the intermediate class rather than the dominant class. For other overrepresented occupational groups the following pattern is observed: those requiring more technical education are related to modern tastes, whilst occupations requiring more general humanistic educations are related to more traditional highbrow forms of culture. Hence, physical and engineering science professionals are overrepresented in Cluster 5 (11 percent to 3 percent in the population), and whilst teaching

professionals are overrepresented in both clusters, the degree of overrepresentation still fit this pattern as it is much higher in Cluster 6 than in Cluster 5 (18 percent compared to 8 percent, 4 percent in the population). This is in line with the findings from the previous chapter.

The final step of the analysis of the overall effect of class on cluster membership is to observe if some occupational groupings have a higher chance of being found in one cluster or set of clusters than in others. Considering that the analysis so far has shown that the differentiation related to occupations is related primarily to the traditional-legitimate vs. modern-less legitimate division, the clusters that differ in their level of activity, but have a similar profile in relation to this opposition, are analysed jointly, i.e. Cluster 2 with Cluster 6, and Cluster 5 with Cluster 7. This should facilitate the interpretation and to some extent alleviate the issue of the small sizes of some of the clusters and occupational categories. The majority of teaching and health professionals (roughly 60 percent of each category) are located in the traditional highbrow clusters, which means that they are three times more likely to be members of this cluster than the general population. The proportion of the members of these occupational groupings who belong to the modern clusters is much lower, almost 4 times in the case of health professionals (17 percent) and 2 times in the case of teaching professionals (29 percent). A reversed pattern of comparable strength is observed for natural and engineering science professionals, 63 percent of whom are found in the modern clusters, roughly twice the share of those in the traditional highbrow clusters (33 percent), and for managers of small enterprises, 47 percent being located in the modern clusters, 1.7 times the proportion found in the traditional ones (29 percent). Finally, the remaining two occupational groups are roughly equally likely to be found in either the modern or the traditional highbrow clusters, 39 percent of corporate managers and 41 percent of other professionals in the former, and, respectively, 45 percent and 51 percent.

Recapitulation

Cluster analysis has brought out the structure of the Polish space of lifestyles in greater detail. Rather than confining ourselves to analysis of polarities or quadrants we have detected the existence of seven more or less internally homogenous and more or less mutually heterogenous clusters of cultural taste and participation indicative of differences of habitus. These were the *disengaged*, the *traditional homebodies*, the *commoners*, the *highbrow*

entertainment dabblers, the *entertainment seekers*, the *cultural snobs* and the *versatiles*. Analysis of socio-demographic profiles revealed that the *disengaged*, the *traditional homebodies* and the *commoners* might reflect variants of the dominated class habitus; that the *highbrow entertainment dabblers* and the *entertainment seekers* might constitute variants of petit-bourgeois taste and the intermediate class habitus; and that cultural snobbery and cultural versatility might be variants of the dominant class aesthetic. Everything would seem to indicate that intra-class variation is structured according to age, gender and occupation. The *homebodies*, the *highbrow dabblers* and the *cultural snobs* are older and to a varied degree dominated by women, whereas the *commoners*, the *entertainment seekers* and the *versatiles* are younger and more often men. The findings also confirm that the effect of occupational differentiation, that is, the overrepresentation of teaching professionals in the traditional clusters and that related to the type of education (the technical vs. non-technical), on the traditional-legitimate vs. modern-less legitimate division is strong. However, the question on their interpretation remains – this could be a trace of a relatively weak capital composition or a sign of more distinctively Polish division of the dominant class along the educational lines (it is also possible that these effects in some way interact with each other).

Chapter 8: The Polish Case in Context

Poland as a case in Bourdieusian class research

The first key question asked in the thesis was about the right strategy for studying Poland. Is it a case so different from Denmark, Norway and the UK that new forms of capital need to be introduced into the model, as has been done for Serbia, or is it similar enough to proceed in the same way as in the three former countries, that is, by constructing the social space largely on the basis of two forms of capital, economic and cultural, and using similar indicators? To answer this question, the Polish case and its local specificity were carefully investigated. The key premise for considering the possibility that Poland diverges substantially from Western capitalism was its history. Four questions needed to be answered: (1) how much did state-socialist societies diverge from the Western capitalist societies in terms of class and stratification structures? (2) What was the degree to which systemic transition changed these structures; or in other words, how much of the old system survived? (3) If some elements of the old system survived, are they important enough to be treated as local forms of capital when conceptualizing the Polish space? (4) And to what degree has Poland become a post-industrial society and what are the ramifications of this for the shape of the Polish social space?

In the last few hundred years, Polish history has led to important differences in the economic, occupational and class structures in comparison to the typical Western European capitalist countries which together constituted it as rather distinctive case. Before the Second World War, Poland was among the latecomers to industrialization which manifested in a very large peasant class and the underdevelopment of a propertied bourgeoisie, combined with the much stronger position of the gentry and aristocracy than typically observed in Western Europe in the same period. This was then subjected to another force that led to yet further divergence: the state-socialist experiment. Its ramifications for the shape of social spaces were very briefly considered by Bourdieu (1998) himself and later studied in more detail by other scholars (Eyal et al., 1998). From this perspective, the primary difference between state-socialist and capitalist social spaces pertained to the different role and importance of capitals – their hierarchy was reversed, with economic capital, the most important asset in the capitalist context, becoming subordinate to a form of social capital specific to state-socialist reality; that is, it became subordinate to *political* capital acquired through one's position in the system of power controlled by the communist party. Cultural capital was positioned in the middle, similarly to

a capitalist setting. Although so far this model has not been properly examined using quantitative data and analyses, non-Bourdieuian class analysis has confirmed the leading role of political capital in a typical state-socialist social space. The situation in Poland, however, was more complex.

Although the class system was underpinned by different principles than those present in capitalist societies – arguably a higher degree of state control over the basic economic mechanisms – the shape of the class system and the relationship between the basic measures of stratification were still largely similar to those observed in Western capitalist societies. It seems that what was more important here was its industrial character rather than a specific way of organising the economy. On the one hand, the system of rewards, in comparison to that of capitalist societies, was indeed designed in a way that tilted the system in favour of the working class, and the pattern of social mobility to some extent reflected the positive effect of the state's pro-equality policies. On the other, the overall distribution of wealth as well as cultural capital was still skewed towards the upper segments of the class structure, and this translated into generous advantages (e.g. better access to education) leading to a considerable degree of class reproduction. Looking at this state-socialist social space through Bourdieusian lenses, one can conclude that its first dimension probably reflected capital volume, with political capital probably of equal importance to economic and cultural capital. Establishing the shape of subsequent dimensions requires further research. In any event, the answer to the first part of the question is clear: the conclusion here is that the degree to which state-socialist societies represented a different case regarding class and stratification structures seems to be exaggerated, and salient differences notwithstanding, the foundation for the development of a capitalist social space was in fact quite solid, and in the case of the dissolution of the state-socialist system, one could expect a relatively quick transition to the capitalist system.

The state-socialist system managed to survive only slightly more than forty years before another social upheaval took place. The most important aspect of the transition was the political decision to take the path of a quick and decisive transition to capitalism. The dissolution of the communist party and other satellite organisations meant that the institutional basis of the system of power disappeared. These developments called into question the importance of political capital. The transition to capitalism and democracy was not smooth, nor quick, as the old system was characterized by a considerable degree of inertia what resulted in a good deal of elite reproduction. Political capital alone, however, was not enough to be successful in the

new circumstances. Those *nomenklatura* members who succeeded made use of a combination of political capital and cultural capital (for instance, state-socialist managers, high in managerial expertise and cultural capital in general). In turn, the largest share of the old elite who were downwardly mobile was constituted by those who derived their pre-1989 position primarily from political capital and whose lack of cultural capital limited the prospects to converse this old political capital into resources useful in the post-communist setting. Cultural capital, in the form of educational credentials, became the most important asset in the first 15 years of transition. Its exchange rate to economic capital was found to be rising consistently up until the late 2000s, when it slowed down, probably due to the saturation of the labour market with graduates.

This leads to the answer to the second part of the question. Political capital lost its role as a key resource in social space because the system of power organized around the structure of the communist party, that was the source of political capital and that guaranteed its value, decomposed. This, one has to note, does not exclude the possibility that it might still have a discernible effect in some particular fields, for instance the field of economy or the field of power, but only assumes that at the most general level of the social spaces the possible effect of political capital is of lesser importance. In this sense, Poland is a very different case from Serbia as analysed by Cvetičanin and Popescu (2011). Moreover, the idea of inclusion of other specific local forms of capital into the construction of the social space (for instance, those proposed by Tomasz Zarycki) has also been found to be unconvincing. Besides, from the practical point of view, the currently existing and available data sources do not allow us to test these concepts empirically and address the issues they generate.

However, the demise of the state-socialist system did not mean that Poland became a capitalist society overnight, characterized by the same principles of stratification and class divisions as Western European countries. After 1989, Poland underwent a set of economic and social processes which could be divided into processes resulting from the systemic transition itself and more general processes best characterized as post-industrialization. The role of these process as factors reshaping Polish social space was carefully considered in order to formulate initial hypotheses on its possible contemporary shape, especially the relative strength of capital volume and capital composition.

There were two main ways in which the systemic transformation changed the class structure (as conceptualized by the Polish sociology of class and stratification for the most part

working with non-Bourdieusian concepts). Firstly, the existing state socialist classes underwent a transformation. On the one hand, new classes appeared, the most important of which was a class of fully independent business owners operating freely on the market, which marked the re-birth of the Polish *bourgeoisie*, one of the defining classes of capitalism. On the other, some classes disappeared or changed their character, like the *nomenklatura* whose members either retired or joined the ranks of business owners, managers and professionals or farmers, who also became independent actors operating in the market. Secondly, the relations between the classes changed. The chosen model of transition, based on *shock therapy*, underpinned by strong (neo)liberal sentiments, quickly resulted in developing divisions between the winners and the losers of the systemic transformation.

The immediate victim was the working class, whose overall position quickly deteriorated due to rapidly rising unemployment and the worsening material situation. At the same time, the transition offered the possibility of a quick upward surge for those already relatively high in capital, especially cultural capital. These two changes, the increase in the strength of the education-income relationship and the rising polarization between winners and losers, suggests that the transition to a capitalist type of a social space started soon after state-socialism fell. They most probably worked as factors that significantly strengthened the capital volume principle. More generally, new channels for accumulating wealth further amplified this division and translated into an increase in income inequality. In terms of the influence on the shape and principles of the Polish social space these changes may have worked in two ways. On the one hand, in combination with the high rate of overall economic growth, they could have led to a rise in the overall differentiation pertaining to economic capital, therefore raising the possibility of the emergence of segments of social space where economic capital was the primary source of recognition. On the other, it seems that exceeding certain levels of income inequality suppressed the capital composition axis (Atkinson forthcoming), which may have been especially acute in case of Poland, a country still in the process of transition into a post-industrial model. In fact, the level of income inequality Poland achieved was quite high by European standards, though still below that observed in the USA or China for example. However, more recently the Gini coefficient in Poland has dropped significantly to average European levels, suggesting that when income inequality is considered, Poland is on course to strengthen the capital composition principle in the future.

The beginning of the systemic transformation also meant a rapid increase in the pace of transition to a post-industrial model. A profound change in the Polish educational structure was visible, making it more similar to the highest educated post-industrial Western societies. First, the number of highly educated people rose significantly after 1989, thus potentially increasing the size of the high capital area of social space and possibly increasing differentiation along the capital composition principle. Second, the percentage of degree holders among women became higher than among men. However, the last of these effects may have been suppressed by relatively low female employment and significantly increased the probability of observing capital composition at work in Poland. The increase in the share of professionals in the occupational structure worked in the same direction as the overall changes in the educational structure. However, the effect in this case was probably weaker because the proportion of farmers and working class, occupational groups which are located primarily in the lower echelons of social space, remained high. Moreover, relative to the post-industrial Western European countries, Poland still has a large industrial sector, at the expense of services. Assuming that the public sector in Poland has similar characteristics to that of the Scandinavian countries - that is, that it gathers employees who are on average better educated and worse paid than those working in the private sector (specifically women) – that also could play some role in strengthening the capital composition principle as the public sector in Poland is relatively large. Overall then, the extent of post-industrialization was moderate.

This discussion allows me to answer the third and fourth questions. It is then assumed that Poland as a case for Bourdieusian class analysis remains largely within the limits of a ‘typical’ capitalist society in the process of post-industrialization, and as such could be analysed using the same model and methods as were deployed for the analysis of the Western European societies. In terms of the extent of post-industrialization as a factor shaping the Polish social space, the theoretical expectation was that the capital composition principle should be already detectable, but might still be quite weak at the expense of the domination of the capital volume principle.

The structure of the Polish social space

The main conclusion of the empirical analysis of the structure of the Polish social space is that the initial hypotheses regarding its shape and the relative strength of the dimensions were confirmed. The social space constructed was similar to those of the Western

societies studied using the Scandinavian approach so far – two dimensions with a clear and largely similar interpretation have been observed. The first dimension without any doubt reflects the capital volume principle and opposes people with high levels of economic and cultural capital to those characterized by low levels. The second dimension reveals an opposition between, on the one hand, people whose portfolio of capital is tilted towards economic capital at the expense of cultural capital (or, if they graduated from universities, people with business and technical degrees), and on the other, people whose stock of capital is based primarily on cultural capital rather than economic, and in terms of educational credentials, on humanistic and general degrees.

However, what certainly differentiates Poland from the Scandinavian countries and the UK is the strength of these dimensions relative to each other – the capital volume axis dominated the model and capital composition is relatively weak. This was clear from the amount of inertia explained by each axis: very high for the capital volume axis and rather low for the capital composition axis. Moreover, the latter appears only as the third dimension, whilst on the second dimension the horseshoe/Guttman effect is observed, which further confirms the strength of capital volume. Although some recommend interpreting the Guttman effect as a sign of uni-dimensionality, I decided to proceed with a full interpretation because, (i) the third dimension has a very clear and, most importantly, sociologically relevant interpretation, which (ii) fit the patterns found elsewhere very well. Such a step is not unusual in the literature, and here I follow Rosenlund (2009) and Atkinson (forthcoming). This, however, meant that special care was necessary in the interpretation of the space, and of this dimension in particular, to make entirely clear that it was not a kind of residual and somewhat ‘accidental’ dimension.

This was achieved by assessing the structure of the dimensions against findings from other studies. There are a few characteristics of the space which closely resembled the patterns found elsewhere in terms of both the character and strength of the relationship between capital volume and capital composition. This was true for (i) the shape of the cloud of individuals, (ii) the internal structure of the dimensions (which variables and in what strength they contributed to the dimensions), (iii) the positioning and contribution of particular modalities relative to each other, (iv) the sectors representing different combinations of capital volume and composition, taken to represent different class fractions, and (v) the position of relevant supplementary variables (or structuring factors).

First, it was established that the shape of the cloud of individuals was conical, characterized by the increasing variation, and therefore importance, of capital composition with an increasing overall level of capital; in other words, capital composition differentiation was found to be much greater in the high capital area of the space. Such a pattern has been found in the majority of countries studied so far (Atkinson and Rosenlund, 2014; Flemmen et al., 2018a, 2018b; Prieur et al., 2008).

Regarding the second point, it was observed that the structure of the volume dimension, with a predominance of cultural over economic capital and work-related variables coming third, mirrors that found in Norway (Rosenlund, 2014) and Denmark (Skjøtt-Larsen, 2012). Also similarly to other countries, the contribution of economic and cultural capitals to the composition dimensions turned out to be much more balanced, and work-related variables much more important contributors (Prieur et al., 2008; Rosenlund, 2014).

In relation to the third point, it was observed that the opposition on the capital volume dimension was defined by the modalities related to the highest and lowest levels of economic and cultural capitals and the distance between these was roughly comparable to that observed in other countries. A high degree of comparability was also found for the capital composition dimension. Here, most of the oppositions observed are the same as in Norway, Denmark and the UK. On the one hand, all categories coding high economic capital (household income, home value, savings) are found on one side of the map, whilst all categories denoting high volume of cultural capital are on the opposite side. The distance of both groups of points from the origin as well as from each other should be considered substantial, being, again, of a similar order of magnitude as that found in other countries. Moreover, the position of work-related variables – in case of the Polish social space, employment status and industry – reflected a pattern analogous to that identified elsewhere. Therefore, being in a position of control over the work of others (supervisor), or of influence over strategic decisions of the company (manager), or being self-employed, was found to be associated with a capital composition dominated by economic capital, and so was being employed in professional and financial services, whilst working in the public services sector was found to be associated with a reversed composition of capital, with cultural capital in a dominating role.

With respect to the fourth point, a detailed analysis of the nine sectors of the space, the *analytical classes*, reflecting three levels of capital (dominated, intermediate and dominant classes) and internally divided into economic, balanced and cultural fractions, showed, firstly,

that the three classes are well separated from each other, and secondly, that there is substantial differentiation within the dominant and intermediate classes. That is, class fractions differ from each other in respect of the composition of capitals and associated work-related characteristics. These differences were found to be of substantial size, and, in the overwhelming majority of cases, statistically significant. The degree of differentiation is of similar magnitude to that observed elsewhere (though one should be cautious as detailed information is available for just one study, Harrits et al. 2010: 17). However, the exception in this regard is the dominated class, where differences were found to be smaller and of a different character – internal differentiation for the most part reflected the urban-rural divide rather than capital composition proper. This finding attested to the still observable (and predicted in the preliminary analysis) distinctiveness of Polish farmers as a still somewhat separate stratum.

Finally, the relationship between social space and the key supplementary variables was also found to a large degree to resemble that observed in other countries. Most importantly, the position of occupational groups and class fractions based on the UK recoding of ISCO codes were found to be closely related to both dimensions. On the capital volume axis, these groupings were distributed according to the degree of job complexity (occupational groupings) or volume of capital (as predicted by the UK schema). On the capital composition axis, a clear and marked differentiation was observed, though visible primarily in the high and middle capital volume areas. The polarity in the dominant class was found to be related primarily to the opposition between, on the one hand, teaching professionals, cultural producers, and social science and religious professionals and, on the other, corporate managers and managers of small enterprises. This pattern was further confirmed by the distribution of the categories of the UK class schema which served as an external validation of the model and a more robust measure due to the larger size of the categories (because it groups occupational categories into a smaller number of class fractions). Therefore, the cultural dominants were observed to be opposed to business executives and lower managers/proprietors, the distance between these groups being very large. Overall, this pattern of distribution mirrored that reported by Atkinson and Rosenlund (2014) for the UK. Moreover, the oppositions observed corresponded closely to those found in Norway (Flemmen et al., 2018a) and especially Denmark (Prieur, Rosenlund, and Skjøtt-Larsen 2008; Skjøtt-Larsen 2012). Taken together these findings provide the strongest argument for the interpretation of the third axis in the model as the capital composition dimension.

However, with regard to relationships between two of the other structuring factors of space, sector of employment and gender, it was observed that whilst it had the same direction – the public sector and women being associated with the cultural side, the private sector and men with the economic side – its strength was limited in comparison to Denmark, Norway and the UK. One reason for this could be the relatively low rate of female employment in Poland potentially suppressing the effect of gender and, as these two factors are inter-related, of the employment sector too.

The final conclusion regarding the social space is, then, that the chosen strategy of construction, based on similar measures of capitals as deployed elsewhere, proved to be the right one, revealing that the structure of space was largely similar to that observed in Denmark, Norway and the UK. The strength of the capital composition principle in Poland, however, remains weaker, but one can predict that it will get stronger with the progress of post-industrialisation. Here it seems that the most important factors will be de-industrialisation, primarily through the falling numbers of traditional working-class jobs (roughly ISCO major groups 7 and 8), and the further reduction in the number of farmers, as this will mean limiting the size of the low capital volume area, where capital composition is weaker, thus most probably strengthening the latter dimension.

The structure of the Polish space of lifestyles

Regarding the Polish space of lifestyles, the overall conclusion is that its shape is largely similar to the spaces in other countries reported in the literature discussed. This means that, firstly, it is structured according to the same principles. The first dimension reveals a familiar pattern, that is, a very strong opposition between, on the one hand, people engaged in a wide variety of forms of cultural activity, and, on the other, people disengaged from most forms. The second dimension, also similar to findings from other countries, reveals an opposition between modern/less established practices on the one side, and traditional/legitimate tastes on the other side. A detailed analysis of the dimensions revealed further similarities.

On the first dimension, music was found to be a very strong factor shaping the space; in the Polish case it is the most important single aspect defining the opposition. Moreover, this dimension is also defined by an opposition between legitimacy and the lack of it, as the position of highly legitimate institutions is both marked on the engagement side and so is their contribution to the axis. The data turned out to be rich enough to reveal some signs of activity

on the disengagement side, similarly to all other countries where signs of activity registered in this area, including TV – people watching a lot of TV are more often found in this area. Even though the TV taste categories are rather broad and of a somewhat ambiguous character, it was still possible to find some TV genres in the low engagement area, namely, religious programmes and TV series. This then means that these two forms are the furthest from the legitimate area of the space. At the same time, not watching TV is one of the few negative accents on the engagement side, which clearly confirms that TV is also an area of distinction in Poland. To summarise, this dimension could be then understood as a scale of engagement with a variety of forms of cultural activity, but with music in the leading role and various participation modalities.

The character of the differentiation along the second dimension differs somewhat between high engagement and low engagement areas. In the case of the former, it translates into an opposition between classical and opera music vs. techno and rap, but also rock. The distance between these two groups of points is very large, attesting to the high importance of this opposition. The differentiation in TV and radio taste registers primarily in the middle level of engagement. It opposes listening/watching to more demanding and legitimate content like cultural, educational and classical music programmes to not listening and watching these. However, this does not mean that entertainment is not present on the traditional/legitimate side. It is but the frequency is lower. On the low engagement side there is a strong opposition between, on the traditional side, intense engagement with religious radio and TV programmes (a rather distinctive feature of the Polish space of lifestyles in comparison to other countries studied so far), and, to a lesser extent, also with TV series, and, on the modern side, avoidance of these combined with complete disengagement from all forms of activity, especially those having a more “intellectual” component like reading. Finally, another important opposition observed on this dimension is about different ways of accessing information: reading newspapers and watching TV, on the traditional side, opposed to using the Internet on the modern side. There also seems to be a polarity between a culture of words and a culture of pictures: on the traditional side reading books is more popular than on the modern side, and the reverse pattern is true for watching movies, at home and in the cinema.

A cautious conclusion from these findings is that the overall structure of the Polish space of lifestyles is similar to those uncovered elsewhere, which also means that some other aspects of the differentiation, which were not possible to explore due to data limitations, could also register in Poland, assuming that better data was available. This could be observable, for

instance, in art preferences, knowledge of cultural forms and artists, but also certain aspects of a more broadly understood lifestyle like clothing, food preferences and home decoration style.

The answer to the key question of the thesis concerning the homology between social space and the space of lifestyles is less clear. The spaces are largely structured according to the same principles on the first dimension. The first dimension of the space of lifestyles, opposing engagement to disengagement, is structured according to capital volume, which is clear from the distribution of the indicators of capitals, all of which – educational capital, inherited cultural capital, and economic capital in the form of household income per person, as well as measures of objectified cultural capital such as the number of books in the home or the number of movies and records – are distributed along this dimension, their level rising in linear fashion from the disengagement end to the engagement end. The same is true for the distribution of occupations, which mirrors that seen in the social space, that is, farmers and manual workers being positioned on the disengagement side, managers and professionals on the opposite side, with white collar occupations in the middle. The picture is less clear on the second dimension of the space of lifestyles, as in this case the limitation imposed by the data are again significant, and it was impossible to construct the social space using the same dataset. Educational capital and inherited capital have rather low scores on this dimension, meaning people situated on opposite sides have similar levels of these capitals. Some (though rather weak) support for the capital composition being present on the second dimension comes from the distribution of objectified. A higher number of records and movies in the home is situated on the modern/less established side, whilst number of books is quite strongly associated with the traditional/legitimate side. Such a pattern has been found to be related to a differentiation of capital composition, therefore this finding could be taken as pointing to the possibility that we observed a capital composition effect. Additional support for the capital composition interpretation comes from the distribution of occupations in the space of lifestyles. In this case the primary opposition in the social space between teaching professionals and managers registers also in the space of lifestyles – the former are located on the traditional/legitimate side, whilst the latter on the modern/less established. However, this effect is only partial, as, first, corporate managers are not positioned at the bottom but in the middle (though the distance between them and teaching professionals is still substantial), and, second, physical, mathematical, and engineering science professionals are found in the bottom part of the map rather than in the middle. However, such position of the latter, in the opposition to teaching professionals is a sign of a division related to the field of study, that is, between non-technical/humanistic and technical subtypes of educational

capital. It is unclear how exactly the lack of a clear capital composition principle in the space of lifestyles should be interpreted. There is a chance that this results from the characteristics of data used – one cannot rule out such a possibility as data choices play an important role in determining the shape of spaces of lifestyles as has been discussed in the Chapter 5. First, this pertains to the data used for the construction of the space, the lack of indicators tapping into more mundane aspects of everyday life being particularly important. Second, the data used for testing the capital composition hypothesis is also far from perfect, as it does not allow for the construction of the spaces simultaneously using the same dataset, an indirect test through projecting indicators of capital is incomplete as some important measures are not available (most importantly indicators of wealth), and in result one needs to rely on occupations as a proxy for capitals and their configuration. If the data limitation is indeed at play then there is chance that had different data been used, the outcome might have been different and the capital composition stronger. Another possibility, however, is that this finding reflects a distinctively Polish feature of the cultural consumption and lifestyle patterning: the capital composition is indeed weak and instead a more particular differentiation between technical and non-technical intelligentsia is more important. What it is then clear is that the issue needs to be explored further using data offering a wider choice of lifestyle indicators, especially those related to everyday aspects of lifestyles, and allowing for a more direct and complete investigation of the relationship between the social space and the space of lifestyles.

In the next step, cluster analysis was used to aid the detailed analysis of the sectors of the space. The main conclusion from the cluster analysis is that it was possible to identify reasonably homogenous groups of consumers of culture, well differentiated from each other, characterized by unique cultural consumption characteristics and distinct in terms of social characteristics. These findings show very clearly that there is a strong differentiation of cultural consumption in Polish society strongly associated with various social characteristics, most importantly class. This undermines some of the recent Polish studies claiming that researching cultural consumption through measuring lifestyle practices and taste is outdated and problematic in the face of profound changes of culture in the post-modern era (Drozdowski et al., 2014) – contrary to this diagnosis, the analysis of the space of lifestyles proves that a meticulous and methodical analysis of even suboptimal data lead to fruitful and valuable outcomes.

In total, seven clusters were distinguished. Except for one cluster positioned the farthest to the disengagement side and roughly in the middle of the second dimension, the clusters

formed pairs characterized by a similar overall level of engagement but of contrasting characteristics on the traditional/legitimate vs. modern/less established dimension.

First of all, a large group (a staggering one fifth of the population) of almost completely disengaged consumers was found and the difference between the cluster and the population was highest in relation to listening to music. The only activity in which a majority of members of this cluster participates at an average level was watching TV. A set of social characteristics associated with this cluster reflected the pattern observed elsewhere – the lowest levels of all kinds of capital, older age, living in rural areas and being employed as a farmer. This was then an exemplary case of the taste of necessity.

Next, two groups of people characterised by lack of participation in activities requiring going out were identified, but very distinct with regards to other forms of consumption. The first, labelled *traditional homebodies*, displayed a sedentary lifestyle combined with listening to legitimate genres of music and not listening to modern genres. They also watch TV theatre dramas. The most characteristic tastes of all for this cluster, though, were for religious TV and radio programmes. In terms of social characteristics, this cluster was also much older than other clusters and composed of retirees and people living in rural areas, so largely similar to the *disengaged*. However, the people located in this cluster had substantially higher levels of economic and cultural capital. The second cluster in this pair, dubbed the *commoners*, was found to represent features of cultural consumption which were elsewhere linked to the working-class and this was observed to be the case in Poland as well, as in terms of social characteristics this was the most working-class cluster. The cluster was characterised by a very high level of avoidance of ‘ambitious’ TV and radio programmes, and a preference for sports in TV as well as live events, but also keenness DIY, a distinctively working-class trait.

The next pair of clusters, the *highbrow entertainment dabblers* and the *entertainment seekers*, were characterized by a similar level of overall engagement, the difference being that the former preferred more home-based activities, whilst the latter chose activities related to going out. A stark difference between the clusters was observed in their taste: the *highbrow entertainment dabblers* favouring traditional and highbrow forms, though not to the extent leading to avoidance of more entertainment-related ones, whilst the *entertainment seekers* were found to be the least interested in legitimate forms, preferring modern and less established ones. This opposition registered in music and TV preferences alike. Both clusters were characterized by a relatively high level of all capitals and represented the intermediate class, though the *entertainment seekers* had a discernible working-class trait. The most important difference between the cluster was related to age (the *entertainment seekers* being much younger) and

gender (women being overrepresented in the *highbrow entertainment dabblers* cluster, men in the *entertainment seekers* cluster).

The other two clusters, *versatiles* and *highbrow snobs*, represented the highest levels of cultural participation, especially in the forms having the highest institutional legitimacy. What differentiated the groups was their taste: *highbrow snobs* were found to be focused primarily on the highbrow and legitimate content, whilst the taste of the *versatiles* was much more inclusive. The clusters without doubt represented the cultural elite of the Polish society, and at the same time the social elite, as there were characterized by the highest levels of cultural and economic capital. Similarly to other pairs, the clusters differed in their age profiles. The structure of the cultural elite, composed of a well-marked and homogenous highbrow segment and a not exactly omnivorous section of *versatiles*, largely disproved the omnivorousness thesis in the Polish context.

Final remarks and opportunities for future research

The thesis aims to fill the gap in research on class divisions in Poland as approached from a Bourdieusian perspective. The main conclusion is that, in regard to the shape of its social space and its relation to space of lifestyles, Poland appears to be a case already largely comparable to Western capitalist societies even though the transition to post-industrialism is still in progress. What bolsters this argument even further is the fact that the construction of the spaces was possible even though the data used are far from ideal, which is usually the case with secondary data as it never exactly fits the research needs. In any case, this does not mean that the presented findings should be taken only as an initial exploration of the issue, as the thesis could certainly be treated as a standalone piece of detailed analysis.

This, however, does not mean that Poland is identical with these countries, but rather that despite all historical differences a common denominator in the form of certain regularities in the shape of social and lifestyles spaces can be found. In this sense, the thesis is in line with the reasoning of non-Bourdieusian class research which sees industrialism and later post-industrialism as the key features defining class and stratification systems. However, even at the very general level of just over ten variables used in the construction of the Polish social spaces, some distinctive features are well visible, namely, the weakness of the capital composition principle and a very well-defined rural component of the space with its unique characteristics. Polish distinctiveness is also observed in the structure of the Polish space of lifestyles. Firstly,

there is a relatively large and homogeneous cluster of traditional highbrow snobs. Secondly, religious items tend to play a much bigger role than elsewhere. The relation of the capital indicators and occupations to the second traditional/established vs. modern/emerging dimension also points to a possible divergence from the patterns observed elsewhere, as it seems that the capital composition principle could be much weaker and/or of somewhat different character through its relations to the technical – non-technical education opposition.

In this light, it is certain that more research is needed to investigate all the intricacies of the Polish class system.

Most importantly, there is a need for an entirely new study of Polish spaces similar to the projects undertaken in Scandinavia and the ongoing CASSPIN project which explores Germany, Sweden and the USA. Such a study would be able to go beyond the limitations of the analysis presented here. Firstly, the investigation of various spaces – social, symbolic, political, and possibly more, for instance geographical – ought to be done in one single survey translating into one dataset, thus allowing one to explore the link between spaces directly by projecting positions from one space in to another as opposed to relying on proxy measures like occupation. Secondly, a new study is necessary to generate more complete and comprehensive data on each type of space. For each of the spaces there is a set of issues to be addressed and aspects to be further explored.

Regarding the social space, there is a need to more carefully consider what indicators of capitals should be used to capture all the specificity of the Polish case. For economic capital the most pressing question is about the nature of wealth in Poland – a careful exploration should produce fuller understanding and thus generate ideas on the best ways of measuring wealth. In relation to cultural capital, two needs can be identified. Firstly, there is a need to work on establishing more robust and detailed measures of inherited cultural capital, delving into various aspects of the family milieu shaping habitus. Secondly, there should be more focus on how to measure educational capital. Along with some basic aspects adding to education level like field of study, more fine-grained measures, such as the type of institution attended, should be explored. All of the above would result in establishing a list of indicators of capitals more suitable for the Polish context and improve the validity of the models built thereupon.

Future research on the space of lifestyles, secondly, has to build on the analyses available – in this regard the thesis could provide much needed material for generating further hypotheses and formulating new research questions. It is clear there are some gaps which need to be filled. Most importantly, more research is needed on more everyday aspects of lifestyles, like clothing, food and eating preferences, interior design and attitudes, preferences and

practices related to the body. Next, it is necessary to take a more comprehensive approach by including different components of cultural consumption – instead of focusing primarily on participation, more focus should be put on taste and knowledge. Some key methodological issues in survey research on cultural consumption and lifestyles must be addressed, e.g. the issue of the right unit of measurement through inclusion of indicators based on different units. Moreover, greater reflection is needed on the effect of different ways of asking taste questions, especially in relation to the role of distaste.

An exploration of the space of political position-takings, finally, is a necessary next step. This would shed more light on the cross-space nature of homology in Poland. It could well be that the patterns of differentiation of political views and attitudes in Poland have some unique characteristics, and this area could be much more affected by the state-socialist history (i.e. the lack of democratic politics for almost 50 years) than the space of lifestyles. Moreover, class has recently been found to be largely irrelevant for voting behaviour, the cultural cleavage being the most important factor explaining it (Domański, 2015). However, class in these studies has been conceptualised in either Neo-Weberian or Neo-Marxist terms, and it would be extremely interesting to see what the issue looks like through Bourdieusian lenses.

Finally, a future study should – like the Scandinavian studies, the CASSPIN project and *Distinction* before them – include a qualitative component. Only then can we explore the ways in which the objective structures of the spaces are perceived by people and whether they are important bases for the construction and defence of symbolic boundaries.

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Appendix

Table 1. Social space summary of active variables modalities.

Table 1	Frequency	% of total	Capital Volume		Capital Composition	
			Coordinates	Contribution (% of total axis's variance)	Coordinates	Contribution (% of total axis's variance)
Economic capital						
Household Income						
0-1350 PLN	227	18.0	0.81	3.53	-0.25	0.76
1351-2100 PLN	236	18.7	0.55	1.74	-0.12	0.17
2101 - 3000 PLN	276	21.9	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
3001-4000 PLN	170	13.5	-0.15	0.09	0.03	0.01
4000+ PLN	224	17.7	-1.02	5.74	0.61	4.39
Missing	130	10.3	passive	passive	passive	passive
			Total	11.11		5.33
Summerhouse ownership						
Owens a summerhouse	80	6.33	-1.08	2.13	1.05	4.41
Does not own a summerhouse	1164	92.16	0.07	0.13	-0.07	0.29
Missing	19	1.50	passive	passive	passive	passive
			Total	2.26		4.70
Home ownership and value						
Respondent does not own a house	336	26.60	0.33	0.89	-0.58	6.07
1-99k PLN	136	10.77	0.55	1.03	-0.15	0.16
100-199k PLN	143	11.32	-0.07	0.02	0.84	5.32
200k+ PLN	265	20.98	-0.72	3.38	0.49	3.39
Missing	383	30.32	passive	passive	passive	passive
			Total	5.31		14.95

Table 1	Frequency	% of total	Capital Volume		Capital Composition	
				Contribution (% of total axis's variance)		Contribution (% of total axis's variance)
			Coordinates		Coordinates	
Economic capital						
Savings						
No savings	947	74.98	0.25	1.43	-0.17	1.39
Up to 15k PLN	73	5.78	-0.40	0.28	0.93	3.39
Over 15k PLN	110	8.71	-1.35	4.90	0.91	4.86
<i>Missing</i>	10	0.79	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>
			<u>Total</u>	<u>6.60</u>		<u>9.63</u>
Economic capital			Overall total	25.28		34.61
Cultural capital						
Respondent's education						
Primary	202	15.99	0.9	3.87	-0.19	0.40
Vocational	284	22.49	0.7	3.16	0.05	0.03
Secondary vocational	288	22.80	0.0	0.01	0.48	3.49
Secondary general	166	13.14	-0.4	0.71	-0.21	0.39
University degree business/technical/medical	71	5.62	-1.7	4.74	1.31	6.43
University degree arts and humanities	186	14.73	-1.0	4.88	-0.84	6.76
Phd degree	9	0.71	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>
<i>Missing</i>	57	4.51	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>
			<u>Total</u>	<u>17.36</u>		<u>17.50</u>

Table 1	Frequency	% of total	Capital Volume		Capital Composition	
				Contribution (% of total axis's variance)		Contribution (% of total axis's variance)
			Coordinates		Coordinates	
<u>Cultural capital</u>						
Father's education						
Primary	491	39	0.65	4.90	0.23	1.27
Vocational	324	26	0.13	0.13	0.31	1.68
Secondary	216	17	-0.72	2.73	-0.68	5.25
Degree	112	9	-1.90	9.92	-0.38	0.87
<i>Missing</i>	120	10	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>
			<u>Total</u>	<u>17.68</u>		<u>9.07</u>
Father's occupation						
Official/manager	100	8	-1.18	3.40	-0.44	1.02
Professional	61	5	-2.09	6.54	-0.59	1.15
Technician	65	5	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>
Clerk/service worker	70	6	-0.19	0.06	-0.83	2.48
Peasant	275	22	0.66	2.96	0.48	3.31
Skilled worker	306	24	0.19	0.26	0.21	0.70
Unskilled worker	221	17	0.26	0.37	-0.01	0.00
<i>Missing</i>	165	13	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>	<i>passive</i>
			<u>Total</u>	<u>13.59</u>		<u>8.67</u>

Table 1	Frequency	% of total	Capital Volume		Capital Composition	
				Contribution (% of total axis's variance)		Contribution (% of total axis's variance)
			Coordinates		Coordinates	
<u>Cultural capital</u>						
Number of books in home when 14-16 y.o.						
Around 10 books	251	19.87	0.85	4.31	0.06	0.04
Around 20 books	231	18.29	0.49	1.35	0.16	0.30
Around 50 books	295	23.36	0.04	0.01	0.41	2.63
Around 100 books	175	13.86	-0.39	0.68	-0.08	0.06
More than 200 books	235	18.61	-1.25	8.83	-0.69	5.78
<i>Missing</i>	76	6.02	passive	passive	passive	passive
			<i>Total</i>	<i>15.18</i>		<i>8.81</i>
<i>Cultural Capital</i>			<i>Overall total</i>	63.82		44.05

Table 1	Frequency	% of total	Capital Volume		Capital Composition	
			Coordinates	Contribution (% of total axis's variance)	Coordinates	Contribution (% of total axis's variance)
Work related variables						
Respondent's Employment status						
Self-employed farmer	80	6	passive	passive	passive	passive
Self-employed	80	6	-0.45	0.41	0.94	3.80
Manager	67	5	-1.12	2.01	0.92	2.96
Owner	29	2	passive	passive	passive	passive
Employee	676	54	0.19	0.56	-0.31	3.47
Supervisor	159	13	-0.42	0.68	-0.31	2.69
Never worked	154	12	passive	passive	passive	passive
Missing	18	1	passive	passive	passive	passive
			Total	3.66		12.91
Respondent's Industry	-	-				
Primary and secondary industries	358	28	0.51	2.23	0.32	1.95
Construction	76	6	0.31	0.19	0.26	0.30
Trade and transport	213	17	0.14	0.11	0.12	0.17
Private services	88	7	-0.01	0.00	-0.10	0.05
Professional and financial services	74	6	-1.17	2.42	0.62	1.51
Public services	273	22	-0.60	2.29	-0.57	4.46
Missing	181	14	passive	passive	passive	passive
			Total	7.24		8.42
Work related variables			Overall total	10.90		21.33

Table 2. Class Fractions – Two-sided test Results – Social space modalities

Respondent's education	Table 2 Class Fraction – Two-sided Test – Social space modalities								
	Dominated			Intermediate			Dominating		
	"cultural"	"balanced"	"economic"	cultural	balanced	economic	cultural	balanced	economic
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)	(I)
Primary education	44%	45%	33%	10%	12%	1%	1%	3%	1%
Vocational education	44%	42%	45%	21%	28%	25%	4%	2%	1%
Secondary education	12%	11%	22%	48%	56%	71%	27%	46%	45%
Secondary vocational	7%	8%	20%	27%	37%	58%	10%	17%	30%
Secondary general	5%	3%	1%	21%	19%	13%	18%	30%	14%
University degree	0%	1%	0%	21%	4%	2%	67%	49%	53%
Degree tech/buss/med	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	1%	9%	39%
Degree arts/humanities	0%	1%	0%	21%	3%	0%	65%	36%	13%
PhD	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	4%	1%
Primary education	DEFGH I	DEFGH I	DEFGH I		FGI				
Vocational education	DFGHI	DGHI	DFGHI	GHI	GHI	GHI			
Secondary education				ABC G	ABCG	ABCD GHI	B	ABC	ABC
Secondary vocational			A	ABG	ABGH	ABCD EGHI			ABG
Secondary general				ABC	ABC	C	ABC	ABCF	BC
University degree				BEF			DEF	DEF	DEF
Degree tech/buss/med								EG	EGH
Degree arts/humanities				BE			DEH I	BEI	B
PhD									

Table 2 Class Fraction – Two-sided Test – Social space modalities									
	Dominated			Intermediate			Dominating		
	"cultural"	"balanced"	"economic"	cultural	balanced	economic	cultural	balanced	economic
Father's education	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)	(I)
Primary education	83%	77%	80%	26%	38%	52%	5%	6%	23%
Vocational education	14%	23%	20%	36%	56%	47%	6%	17%	36%
Secondary education	4%	0%	0%	37%	6%	1%	61%	44%	18%
University degree	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	29%	33%	23%
Primary education	DEFG HI	DEFGH I	DEFGH I	GH	GH ABCG HI	DGHI ABCG H			GH
Vocational education		G	G	AGH					AGH
Secondary education				AEFI			ADE FI	AEFI	AF
University degree							DF	DF	DF

Table 2 Class Fraction – Two-sided Test – Social space modalities									
	Dominated			Intermediate			Dominating		
	"cultural"	"balanced"	"economic"	cultural	balanced	economic	cultural	balanced	economic
Number of books when respondent was 14yo	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)	(I)
0-10 books	48%	52%	48%	10%	16%	16%	1%	1%	4%
20 books	29%	29%	28%	20%	20%	30%	6%	5%	11%
50 books	12%	18%	21%	23%	43%	44%	9%	17%	35%
100 books	7%	0%	2%	29%	16%	10%	15%	28%	23%
200 books	3%	1%	0%	14%	1%	0%	34%	25%	12%
500+ books	0%	0%	0%	3%	4%	0%	36%	26%	15%
0-10 books	DEFG HI	DEFGH I	DEFGH I	GH	GHI	GHI			
20 books	GHI	GHI	GHI	GH	GH	GHI			
50 books				G	ABCDG H	ABCDG H			AGH
100 books				ACF	C		C ABD	ACF	AC
200 books				ABE			EI	ABE	BE
500+ books							DEI	DE	DE

Table 2 Class Fraction – Two-sided Test – Social space modalities									
Father's occupation	Dominated			Intermediate			Dominating		
	"cultural"	"balanced"	"economic"	cultural	balanced	economic	cultural	balanced	economic
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)	(I)
Legislator/official	1%	0%	0%	7%	6%	2%	30%	25%	12%
Professional	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	18%	18%	13%
Technician	2%	1%	0%	12%	6%	0%	15%	11%	9%
Clerk/service worker	8%	1%	0%	16%	5%	2%	17%	9%	2%
Peasant	21%	42%	76%	11%	13%	32%	2%	3%	17%
Skilled worker	29%	33%	19%	31%	39%	44%	10%	20%	27%
Unskilled worker	16%	15%	3%	13%	20%	13%	6%	14%	15%
Elementary	23%	9%	1%	10%	11%	7%	2%	1%	6%
Legislator/official							A D E F I	A D E F	A
Professional							D	D	D
Technician				B			A B	B	
Clerk/service worker				B F I			B F I		
Peasant	G H	A D E G H I	A B D E F G H I			D E G H			G H
Skilled worker	G	G		G	C G H	C G H			G
Unskilled worker	C	C			C G			C	C
Elementary	C F G H I				C H				

Table 2 Class Fraction – Two-sided Test – Social space modalities									
	Dominated			Intermediate			Dominating		
	"cultural"	"balanced"	"economic"	cultural	balanced	economic	cultural	balanced	economic
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)	(I)
Summerhouse ownership									
Owens	0%	0%	1%	0%	3%	10%	2%	14%	28%
Does not own	100%	100%	99%	100%	97%	90%	98%	86%	72%
Owens						C		C E G	C E F G
Does not own			F H I		H I	I	H I		
House ownership and value									
No house	76%	28%	5%	63%	26%	8%	29%	12%	4%
1-99k PLN	24%	61%	29%	19%	13%	8%	19%	7%	2%
100-199k PLN	0%	5%	37%	7%	24%	40%	8%	20%	25%
200k+ PLN	0%	5%	29%	11%	37%	45%	44%	61%	69%
No house	B C E F G H I	C F I A C D E F G H I		B C E F G H I	C F I		C F I		
1-99k PLN	H I		F H I	I			I		
100-199k PLN			B D G			B D G			B D B C D E F G
200k+ PLN			B		B D	B D	B D	B C D	

Table 2 Class Fraction – Two-sided Test – Social space modalities									
	Dominated			Intermediate			Dominating		
	"cultural"	"balanced"	"economic"	cultural	balanced	economic	cultural	balanced	economic
Savings	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)	(I)
No savings	100%	98%	93%	99%	93%	75%	88%	66%	38%
Up to 15k PLN	0%	2%	7%	0%	3%	17%	4%	10%	16%
Over 15k+ PLN	0%	0%	0%	1%	3%	9%	9%	23%	46%
No savings		F G H I	F H I	F G H I	F H I	I	H I	I	
Up to 15k PLN						B E G			B E G
Over 15k+ PLN						D	D	D E F G	D E F G H
Income									
0-1350 PLN	58%	36%	26%	23%	15%	8%	5%	3%	2%
1351-2100 PLN	28%	32%	39%	30%	19%	12%	10%	8%	5%
2101-3000 PLN	9%	25%	24%	30%	32%	32%	32%	22%	15%
3001-4000 PLN	5%	6%	8%	15%	23%	27%	21%	25%	8%
4000+ PLN	0%	1%	3%	2%	11%	20%	31%	43%	70%
0-1350 PLN	B C D E F G H I	E F G H I	F G H I	G H I F G H	H I				
1351-2100 PLN	F G H I	F G H I	E F G H I	I	I				
2101-3000 PLN		A	A	A	A I	A I	A		
3001-4000 PLN					A B C	A B C I	A B	A B C I	
4000+ PLN					B	B C D	B C D E	B C D E F	B C D E F G H

Table 2 Class Fraction – Two-sided Test – Social space modalities									
	Dominated			Intermediate			Dominating		
	"cultural"	"balanced"	"economic"	cultural	balanced	economic	cultural	balanced	economic
Employment status	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)	(I)
Self-employed farmer	4%	12%	31%	0%	1%	5%	1%	1%	1%
Self-employed	0%	0%	8%	0%	5%	15%	2%	7%	20%
Manager	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	8%	3%	14%	23%
Owner	0%	1%	3%	1%	3%	1%	4%	4%	2%
Employee	86%	69%	36%	76%	62%	36%	67%	32%	25%
Supervisor	1%	4%	14%	6%	8%	26%	11%	21%	25%
Never worked	9%	14%	8%	17%	21%	9%	12%	20%	4%
Self-employed farmer		E G H I	A B E F G H I						
Self-employed						G			C E G H
Manager						C		C G	C F G
Owner									
Employee	B C E F G H I	C F H I		C F H I	C F H I		C F H I		
Supervisor			A			A B D E G	A	A B D	A B D E
Never worked				I	I			I	

	Table 2 Class Fraction – Two-sided Test – Social space modalities								
	Dominated			Intermediate			Dominating		
	"cultural"	"balanced"	"economic"	cultural	balanced	economic	cultural	balanced	economic
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)	(I)
Industry									
Primary and secondary	39%	64%	72%	9%	21%	36%	6%	21%	25%
Construction	14%	5%	5%	5%	8%	14%	1%	4%	7%
Trade and transport	17%	24%	15%	27%	31%	29%	8%	15%	13%
Other private services	12%	6%	8%	8%	8%	7%	10%	12%	3%
Professional and financial services	0%	0%	1%	1%	5%	5%	6%	19%	25%
Public services	19%	2%	0%	50%	27%	9%	69%	29%	27%
Primary and secondary	D G	A D E F G H I	A D E F G H I		G	D G		G	G
Construction	G					G			
Trade and transport		G		G	G I	G			
Other private services									
Professional and financial services								C D E F G	C D E F G
Public services	B			A B E F H I	B F		A B E F H I	B F	B F

For all class fractions Table 2 tables results are based on two-sided tests. For each significant pair, the key of the category with the smaller column proportion appears in the category with the larger column proportion. Significance level for upper case letters (A, B, C): .05"

Only significant differences shown. If cell empty the difference either nonsignificant or category is not used in comparisons because its column proportion is equal to zero or one.

Figure 1. Concentration ellipses; Social space modalities; Household Income
Household income - Axes 1 & 3




Figure 2. Concentration ellipses; Social space modalities; Savings
Savings - Axes 1 & 3




Figure 3. Concentration ellipses; Social space modalities; Summerhouse ownership




Figure 4. Concentration ellipses; Social space modalities; Home ownership and value




Figure 5. Concentration ellipses; Social space modalities; Father's occupation




Figure 6. Concentration ellipses; Social space modalities; Father's education




Figure 7. Concentration ellipses; Social space modalities; Number of books when respondent 14-16 years old




Figure 8. Concentration ellipses; Social space modalities; Industry
Industry - Axes 1 & 3




Figure 9. Concentration ellipses; Social space modalities; Respondent's occupation




Figure 10. Concentration ellipses; Social space modalities; Respondent's education




Figure 11. Concentration ellipses, Social space, Approximated class fractions p1




Figure 12. Concentration ellipses, Social space, Approximated class fractions p2




Figure 13. Concentration ellipses, Social space; Approximated class fractions p3




Figure 14. Space of lifestyles. Female respondents in employment. MCA




Figure 15. Space of lifestyles. Male respondents in employment. MCA




Table 3. Space of lifestyles. Active variables.

Variables	Engagement/disengagement		Traditional/Modern	
	Coordinates	Contribution	Coordinates	Contribution
0 books read	0.51	1.58	-0.20	0.51
1-3 books read	-0.20	0.10	0.07	0.03
4-7 books read	-0.59	0.50	0.23	0.15
8-12 books read	-0.67	0.41	0.18	0.06
>13 books read	-1.02	1.20	0.50	0.59
newspaper 0	0.42	0.55	-0.34	0.74
newspaper 1_2	-0.02	0.00	-0.10	0.09
newspaper 3_4	-0.17	0.09	0.21	0.29
newspaper 5	-0.50	0.34	0.61	1.07
magazine_0	0.56	0.99	-0.32	0.67
magazine_2_3	-0.06	0.01	-0.13	0.07
magazine_4_5	-0.21	0.20	0.05	0.02
magazine_6	-0.29	0.21	0.42	0.93
hobby				
photography -	0.11	0.14	0.01	0.00
hobby				
photography +	-1.27	1.58	-0.15	0.05
hobby DIY -	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.02
hobby DIY +	-0.47	0.18	-0.35	0.21
hobby other -	0.07	0.05	-0.02	0.01
hobby other +	-0.40	0.30	0.09	0.03
buy cultural mag +	-0.66	1.29	0.35	0.74
buy cultural mag -	0.21	0.41	-0.11	0.24
buy women mag +	-0.15	0.17	0.05	0.04
buy women mag -	0.29	0.34	-0.09	0.08
internet 0	0.62	2.31	0.27	0.87
internet 1	-0.24	0.16	-0.10	0.06
internet 2	-0.98	2.98	-0.42	1.11
amusement park -	0.16	0.28	0.05	0.06
amusement park +	-0.92	1.53	-0.29	0.31
cinema 0	0.54	2.12	0.10	0.14
cinema 1	-0.55	0.87	-0.03	0.00
cinema 2	-1.35	3.21	-0.35	0.46
movies 0	0.53	1.71	0.22	0.62
movies 1	-0.39	0.50	-0.06	0.02
movies 2	-0.78	1.51	-0.46	1.10
theatre 0	0.14	0.21	-0.05	0.06
theatre 1	-1.53	2.32	0.59	0.71

Variables	Engagement/disengagement		Traditional/Modern	
	Coordinates	Contribution	Coordinates	Contribution
discotheque 0	0.34	1.04	0.18	0.57
discotheque 1	-0.78	0.91	-0.03	0.00
discotheque 2	-1.13	2.10	-0.93	2.90
parties 0	0.68	1.76	0.16	0.20
parties 1	0.07	0.02	0.12	0.10
parties 2	-0.26	0.16	-0.06	0.02
parties 3	-0.86	1.88	-0.33	0.58
sport events 0	0.19	0.36	0.13	0.31
sport events 1	-0.67	0.87	-0.40	0.64
sport events 2	-0.85	0.45	-0.65	0.55
hist monuments Poland 0	0.39	1.29	-0.09	0.16
hist monuments Poland 1	-0.95	3.16	0.23	0.38
museums Poland 0	0.28	0.77	-0.08	0.14
museums Poland 1	-1.20	3.29	0.36	0.59
cultural community center 0	0.08	0.07	-0.04	0.03
cultural community center 1	-0.95	0.85	0.42	0.35
entertainment/comedy event 0	0.21	0.44	-0.03	0.02
entertainment/comedy event 1	-1.02	2.12	0.13	0.07
zoo 0	0.24	0.55	-0.03	0.01
zoo 1_2	-1.07	2.50	0.11	0.06
live music -	0.35	1.22	-0.08	0.11
live music +	-1.55	5.35	0.33	0.50
live music hbrow -	-1.53	2.71	-0.36	0.31
live music hbrow +	-1.58	2.60	1.11	2.67
concert rock/pop-	-1.42	2.48	0.90	2.06
concert rock/pop+	-1.75	2.87	-0.45	0.39
concerts other -	-1.52	3.27	0.46	0.61
concerts other +	-1.62	2.03	0.06	0.01
TV 0-1	-0.43	0.39	-0.15	0.10
TV 2	-0.10	0.04	-0.07	0.03
TV 3	0.11	0.05	0.07	0.04
TV 4	0.36	0.31	0.13	0.08
tv music 0	0.42	0.40	-0.32	0.48
tv music 1	0.08	0.03	0.20	0.43
tv music 2	-0.28	0.26	-0.04	0.01
tv music 3	-0.61	0.22	-0.30	0.11

Variables	Engagement/disengagement		Traditional/Modern	
	Coordinates	Contribution	Coordinates	Contribution
tv sport 0	0.25	0.21	0.01	0.00
tv sport 1	-0.11	0.05	0.34	0.95
tv sport 2	-0.07	0.01	-0.26	0.38
tv sport 3	-0.08	0.01	-0.40	0.53
tv talkshow 0	0.05	0.01	-0.16	0.20
tv talkshow 1	-0.04	0.01	0.08	0.07
tv talkshow 2	0.03	0.00	0.05	0.01
tv series 0	-0.29	0.10	-0.53	0.69
tv series 1	-0.17	0.13	-0.19	0.31
tv series 2	0.13	0.07	0.17	0.26
tv series 3	0.31	0.20	0.37	0.59
tv culture 0	0.32	0.28	-0.64	2.32
tv culture 1	-0.02	0.00	0.06	0.04
tv culture 2	-0.25	0.18	0.51	1.55
tv theatre 0	0.17	0.15	-0.60	3.78
tv theatre 1	-0.09	0.04	0.36	1.40
tv theatre 2	-0.21	0.06	0.95	2.39
tv religious 0	-0.15	0.14	-0.49	3.08
tv religious 1	0.10	0.04	0.51	2.20
tv religious 2	0.57	0.41	0.80	1.63
music 0	1.04	2.24	-0.07	0.02
music 1	0.30	0.12	0.22	0.14
music 2	-0.06	0.01	0.12	0.10
music 3	-0.34	0.32	-0.06	0.02
music 4	-0.62	0.91	-0.16	0.13
classic music -	-0.14	0.13	-0.27	1.12
classic music +	-0.57	0.77	0.89	3.89
opera -	-0.21	0.38	-0.09	0.14
opera +	-0.76	0.37	1.44	2.74
world music -	-0.34	0.72	-0.26	0.83
world music +	-0.07	0.02	0.47	1.66
jazz/blues music -	-0.10	0.09	0.00	0.00
jazz/blues music +	-1.16	1.72	0.07	0.01
hard rock/metal music -	-0.17	0.26	0.09	0.14
hard rock/metal music +	-1.09	0.88	-0.87	1.17
rock/pop music -	0.08	0.03	0.49	2.20
rock/pop music+	-0.52	1.40	-0.39	1.65
dance/house music -	-0.14	0.14	0.24	0.82
dance/house music +	-0.52	0.69	-0.61	1.94

Variables	Engagement/disengagement		Traditional/Modern	
	Coordinates	Contribution	Coordinates	Contribution
techno music -	-0.18	0.27	0.17	0.54
techno music +	-0.82	0.66	-1.39	3.97
rap/hip hop music -	-0.15	0.20	0.20	0.69
rap/hip hop music +	-0.82	0.86	-1.19	3.79
music other -	-0.28	0.58	-0.05	0.04
music other +	-0.12	0.03	0.23	0.24
radio 0	0.68	0.93	-0.22	0.20
radio 1	0.01	0.00	-0.12	0.03
radio 2	-0.02	0.00	-0.09	0.05
radio 3	-0.20	0.12	0.05	0.01
radio 4	-0.24	0.18	0.22	0.33
radio classical music 0	0.04	0.01	-0.56	2.80
radio classical music 1	-0.23	0.19	0.40	1.24
radio classical music 2	-0.40	0.26	0.81	2.23
radio cultural 0	0.08	0.02	-0.61	2.57
radio cultural 1	-0.17	0.13	0.24	0.53
radio cultural 2	-0.45	0.41	0.70	2.02
radio pop music 0	0.65	0.30	-0.33	0.16
radio pop music 1	0.21	0.10	0.40	0.81
radio pop music 2	-0.27	0.35	0.05	0.03
radio pop music 3	-0.55	0.57	-0.31	0.36
radio religious 0	-0.33	0.65	-0.45	2.45
radio religious 1	-0.03	0.00	0.76	3.21
radio religious 2	0.60	0.45	0.78	1.60
radio sport 0	-0.05	0.01	-0.08	0.05
radio sport 1	-0.22	0.15	0.38	0.94
radio sport 2	-0.18	0.05	-0.21	0.15
radio sport 3	-0.24	0.04	-0.21	0.06

Above average contribution in bold.

Figure 16. Concentration ellipses; Space od lifestyles, Supplementary variables; Age - Axes 1 & 2




Figure 17. Concentration ellipses; Space od lifestyles, Supplementary variables; Gender - Axes 1 & 2




Figure 18. Concentration ellipses; Space of lifestyles; Supp. variables; Household Income
Household Income - Axes 1 & 2




Figure 19. Concentration ellipses; Space of lifestyles; Suppl. variables Personal Income
Personal Income - Axes 1 & 2




Figure 20. Concentration ellipses; Space of lifestyles; Supplementary variables, Respondent's Education




Figure 21. Concentration ellipses; Space of lifestyles; Suppl. variables, Parental Education




Figure 22. Concentration ellipses; Space of lifestyles; Suppl. variables; Number of books




Figure 23. Concentration ellipses; Space of lifestyles; Suppl. variables, Number of records





Figure 24. Concentration ellipses; Space of lifestyles; Suppl. Variables; Number of movies



The distribution of active and passive modalities in the clusters								
Cluster:								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Population
0 books read	53	23	88	67	11	9	46	51
1-3 books read	23	31	7	20	20	18	24	20
4-7 books read	10	20	3	6	22	23	17	12
8-12 books read	7	10	1	5	19	15	9	8
>13 books read	7	16	1	2	28	35	4	10
<i>belles-lettres books</i> -	35	36	47	46	38	28	49	39
<i>belles-lettres books</i> +	65	64	53	54	62	72	51	61
<i>scientific books</i> -	95	86	97	93	68	77	80	84
<i>scientific books</i> +	5	14	3	7	32	23	20	16
<i>prof books</i> -	91	74	94	86	57	57	73	75
<i>prof books</i> +	9	26	6	14	43	43	27	25
<i>pop science books</i> -	88	83	92	89	69	68	86	81
<i>pop science books</i> +	12	17	8	11	31	32	14	19
newspaper 0	17	9	48	33	16	9	29	26
newspaper 1_2	38	37	31	40	40	27	43	37
newspaper 3_4	32	35	17	21	29	33	22	26
newspaper 5	13	19	5	7	15	31	6	11
magazine_0	20	10	55	31	8	4	27	26
magazine_2_3	15	14	14	17	20	11	22	16
magazine_4_5	40	49	20	34	46	42	40	37
magazine_6	26	28	10	18	26	43	10	21
buy cultural mag +	20	38	7	14	47	64	21	24
buy cultural mag -	80	62	93	86	53	36	79	76
buy women mag +	68	83	43	66	68	82	71	66
buy women mag -	32	17	57	34	32	18	29	34
hobby photography -	95	75	98	92	55	65	65	75
hobby photography +	5	25	2	8	45	35	35	25
hobby DIY -	85	83	80	63	80	89	75	79
hobby DIY +	15	17	20	37	20	11	25	21
internet 0	82	29	92	45	2	22	8	50
internet 1	15	40	7	37	20	32	30	24
internet 2	3	31	1	18	79	46	62	26
amusement park -	97	80	99	89	54	74	70	85
amusement park +	3	20	1	11	46	26	30	15
casino -	100	98	100	97	84	96	91	96
casino +	0	2	0	3	16	4	9	4
festival +	1	3	1	1	20	15	5	5
festival -	99	97	99	99	80	85	95	95
circus -	98	94	100	96	89	88	92	95
circus +	2	6	0	4	11	12	8	5

The distribution of the active and passive modalities in the clusters								
Cluster:								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Population
cinema 0	89	39	99	75	7	17	24	62
cinema 1	11	46	1	22	29	49	42	24
cinema 2	0	15	0	3	64	34	34	15
movies 0	76	31	91	47	10	33	15	51
movies 1	20	43	7	33	35	42	38	28
movies 2	4	27	2	20	56	26	47	21
theatre 0	99	88	100	100	71	55	96	92
theatre 1	1	12	0	0	29	45	4	8
discotheque 0	96	71	99	85	18	59	29	74
discotheque 1	4	22	1	10	25	33	21	13
discotheque 2	1	7	0	5	57	9	50	14
parties 0	47	18	64	32	1	9	6	32
parties 1	30	30	24	32	16	30	19	27
parties 2	15	27	9	25	22	26	27	20
parties 3	8	25	4	12	61	35	48	21
sport events 0	93	77	96	80	49	72	49	79
sport events 1	6	17	2	17	37	22	35	16
sport events 2	1	5	1	3	13	5	15	5
hist monuments Poland 0	86	48	97	89	23	15	68	71
hist monuments Poland 1	14	52	3	11	77	85	32	29
museums Poland 0	93	69	99	96	37	29	83	81
museums Poland 1	7	31	1	4	63	71	17	19
<i>modart gall Poland 0</i>	99	96	100	100	79	72	98	95
<i>modart gall Poland 1</i>	1	4	0	0	21	28	2	5
<i>modart gall abroad 0</i>	100	99	100	100	94	92	99	99
<i>modart gall abroad 1</i>	0	1	0	0	6	8	1	1
<i>hist monuments abroad 0</i>	95	82	99	98	62	64	88	89
<i>hist monuments abroad 1</i>	5	18	1	2	38	36	12	11
<i>museums abroad 0</i>	98	92	100	99	80	74	97	94
<i>museums abroad 1</i>	2	8	0	1	20	26	4	6
cultural community center 0	95	89	99	98	82	71	92	92
cultural community center 1	5	11	1	2	18	29	8	8
entert/comedy event 0	94	75	98	92	48	50	80	83
entert/comedy event 1	6	25	2	8	52	50	20	17
zoo 0	94	72	99	93	46	46	75	82
zoo 1_2	6	28	1	7	54	54	25	18

The distribution of the active and passive modalities in the clusters								
Cluster:								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Population
live music -	98	83	100	100	12	8	87	81
live music +	2	17	0	0	88	92	13	19
live music hbrow -	31	50	0	56	72	23	92	53
live music hbrow +	69	50	0	44	28	77	8	47
concert rock/pop-	100	76	0	100	30	83	38	57
concert rock/pop+	0	24	0	0	70	17	62	43
concerts other -	79	68	0	0	60	71	57	64
concerts other +	21	32	0	100	40	29	43	36
music 0	9	5	67	8	1	1	1	17
music 1	18	9	13	12	5	9	4	11
music 2	35	31	13	37	18	37	28	28
music 3	22	31	5	25	33	27	33	23
music 4	16	23	2	18	43	26	35	20
classic -	65	66	91	92	74	30	97	75
classic +	35	34	9	8	26	70	3	25
dance/house -	91	79	89	68	54	87	51	74
dance/house +	9	21	11	32	46	13	49	26
hdrock/hvmtl -	100	95	99	95	74	97	81	92
hdrock/hvmtl +	0	5	1	5	26	3	19	8
jazz/blues -	97	85	99	94	64	66	86	87
jazz/blues +	3	15	1	6	36	34	14	13
music_oth -	72	79	64	79	81	72	87	77
music_oth +	28	21	36	21	19	28	13	23
opera -	90	92	99	100	95	71	100	93
opera +	10	8	1	0	5	29	0	7
rap/hh -	99	95	100	89	69	98	56	87
rap/hh +	1	5	0	11	31	2	44	13
rock/pop -	79	43	79	35	11	58	18	46
rock/pop +	21	57	21	65	89	42	82	54
techno -	100	98	100	92	78	99	62	90
techno +	0	2	0	8	22	1	38	10
wrldmus -	41	57	47	76	78	54	86	63
wrldmus +	59	43	53	24	22	46	14	37
radio 0	8	6	48	14	8	2	10	17
radio 1	9	7	10	11	10	10	10	9
radio 2	23	24	18	31	20	23	28	24
radio 3	25	29	14	22	28	29	29	23
radio 4	36	34	11	23	34	36	23	26

The distribution of the active and passive modalities in the clusters								
Cluster:								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Population
radio classical music 0	21	22	71	69	45	8	70	45
radio classical music 1	56	52	24	23	43	47	25	39
radio classical music 2	23	26	4	8	12	45	6	17
radio cultural 0	12	18	60	56	30	8	55	35
radio cultural 1	60	52	33	35	46	47	37	45
radio cultural 2	28	30	8	8	24	46	8	20
radio pop music 0	4	2	31	6	2	2	5	7
radio pop music 1	39	19	40	19	12	25	9	24
radio pop music 2	47	60	25	53	53	53	53	49
radio pop music 3	10	20	3	21	33	20	33	19
radio educational 0	26	35	68	68	47	21	68	48
radio educational 1	56	45	26	28	42	49	28	40
radio educational 2	18	20	6	4	11	30	4	13
radio entertainment 0	12	14	51	37	19	15	32	26
radio entertainment 1	48	40	30	29	36	44	32	37
radio entertainment 2	34	40	17	29	37	36	27	31
radio entertainment 3	6	6	2	5	7	5	9	6
radio news 0	1	1	3	4	5	0	7	3
radio news 1	9	12	14	16	19	13	26	15
radio news 2	51	52	52	50	47	50	45	50
radio news 3	39	35	31	30	29	37	22	32
radio oth cultural 0	16	21	57	58	35	13	59	37
radio oth cultural 1	60	54	35	31	47	52	33	45
radio oth cultural 2	24	26	8	11	18	35	8	18
radio other 0	31	39	71	72	55	27	68	52
radio other 1	55	48	26	22	34	58	27	38
radio other 2	14	13	3	6	10	15	5	9
radio dramas 0	24	44	63	77	55	33	74	53
radio dramas 1	50	46	26	20	37	45	22	35
radio dramas 2	26	10	11	3	8	22	4	12
radio religious 0	19	56	43	88	88	45	94	60
radio religious 1	51	37	23	11	9	47	5	27
radio religious 2	29	7	34	1	3	8	1	13
radio sport 0	36	36	62	49	47	36	43	44
radio sport 1	44	39	21	21	28	47	25	32
radio sport 2	14	17	13	24	18	15	22	18
radio sport 3	6	8	3	6	7	2	10	6

The distribution of the active and passive modalities in the clusters								
Cluster:								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Population
TV 0-1	10	17	16	13	40	26	23	18
TV 2	23	36	27	33	29	36	38	30
TV 3	39	34	31	33	23	29	24	32
TV 4	28	14	27	20	9	9	15	20
tv music 0	10	10	41	24	13	10	14	20
tv music 1	60	53	45	44	36	49	33	47
tv music 2	26	33	13	28	39	34	42	28
tv music 3	4	5	1	4	12	6	10	5
tv sport 0	28	25	44	28	22	23	19	29
tv sport 1	43	40	27	23	36	51	24	33
tv sport 2	19	20	21	30	29	19	33	24
tv sport 3	10	15	9	19	13	7	24	14
tv talkshow 0	22	26	47	34	38	36	34	34
tv talkshow 1	51	51	36	44	45	45	41	44
tv talkshow 2	27	23	18	22	17	19	25	22
tv entertain 0	8	9	21	14	16	11	15	14
tv entertain 1	40	44	44	43	44	50	43	43
tv entertain 2	43	38	30	37	34	34	35	36
tv entertain 3	9	9	5	7	6	4	7	7
tv series 0	2	8	9	13	19	9	18	10
tv series 1	24	38	31	40	48	41	49	37
tv series 2	44	39	38	31	23	35	26	35
tv series 3	30	15	22	16	9	14	7	18
tv movies 0	2	2	5	3	3	2	4	3
tv movies 1	28	32	34	30	37	36	34	32
tv movies 2	51	52	49	52	51	47	48	51
tv movies 3	19	15	12	15	9	15	14	15
tv culture 0	9	10	37	38	15	4	34	23
tv culture 1	57	60	47	47	55	47	52	52
tv culture 2	34	31	15	15	30	49	13	25
tv oth cultural 0	13	15	40	39	22	8	40	27
tv oth cultural 1	59	61	45	46	54	55	47	52
tv oth cultural 2	28	23	15	15	24	37	13	21
tv theatre 0	15	23	58	68	40	8	70	43
tv theatre 1	64	63	36	29	50	63	27	46
tv theatre 2	21	15	6	2	9	29	3	11

The distribution of the active and passive modalities in the clusters								
Cluster:								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Population
<i>tv documentaries 0</i>	6	6	29	24	11	3	22	16
<i>tv documentaries 1</i>	51	43	44	47	36	41	48	46
<i>tv documentaries 2</i>	36	43	23	25	42	47	27	32
<i>tv documentaries 3</i>	8	8	4	4	11	9	3	6
<i>tv educational 0</i>	14	13	45	33	18	7	25	25
<i>tv educational 1</i>	54	48	40	47	44	48	50	47
<i>tv educational 3</i>	32	39	15	20	38	45	24	28
tv religious 0	18	49	46	80	75	39	86	54
tv religious 1	57	46	36	19	23	50	12	35
tv religious 2	25	5	18	1	2	11	2	11
<i>tv news 0</i>	0	1	1	1	2	0	3	1
<i>tv news 1</i>	6	10	11	15	21	8	29	13
<i>tv news 2</i>	49	46	50	49	47	44	42	47
<i>tv news 3</i>	45	42	39	35	29	47	27	38

underrepresentation overrepresentation *passive modalities in italics*

Table 3. ANOVA, Mean Difference Axis 1; Modified Isco 30; 1/2¹¹²

	Mean Difference								
	military	farmers	skilled	manual	corporate	managers	natural	teaching	other prof.
farmers skilled workers manual workers corporate managers managers of small enterprises natural and engineering science professionals teaching professionals other professionals physical and engineering science associate professionals life science and health associate professionals teaching associate professionals other associate professionals office clerks customer services clerks personal and protective services workers models, salespersons and demonstrators retired homemaker student medical doctors nurses	-.41989*								
	-0.23808	.18181*							
	-0.25744	.16245*	-0.01936						
	0.33277	.75267*	.57085*	.59021*					
	0.09066	.51055*	.32874*	.34810*	-2.4211*	0.20875			
	0.29941	.71930*	.53749*	.55685*	-0.03336	0.16968	-0.03907		
	0.26034	.68023*	.49842*	.51778*	-0.07243	.20227*	-0.00648	0.03259	
	0.29293	.71283*	.53101*	.55038*	-0.03984	0.02219	-0.18656	-0.14749	-0.18008
	0.11285	.53274*	.35093*	.37029*	-2.1992*	0.00672	-0.38207*	-0.34300*	-0.37559*
	-0.08266	.33723*	0.15542	0.17478	-4.1543*	-0.17332	-0.20202	-0.16295	-0.19555
	0.09739	.51728*	0.33547	0.35483	-0.23539	0.00672	-0.24485*	-2.0578*	-2.23837*
	0.05456	.47445*	.29264*	.31200*	-2.7821*	-0.0361	-3.0491*	-2.6584*	-2.29844*
	-0.0055	.41439*	.23258*	.25194*	-3.3828*	-0.09616	-0.22193	-0.18286	-0.21545
	0.07748	.49738*	.31556*	.33493*	-0.25529	-0.01318	-4.7109*	-43202*	-46461*
	-0.17168	.24822*	0.0664	0.08577	-5.0445*	-2.6234*	-45785*	-41878*	-45137*
	-0.15844	.26146*	0.07964	0.09901	-4.9121*	-2.4910*	-5.1596*	-68563*	-71823*
-4.2530*	-0.0054	-.18721*	-.16785*	-7.5807*	-5.5196*	-7.2470*	-54180*	-57439*	
-0.28146	.13843*	-0.04338	-0.02402	-6.1423*	-3.7212*	-5.8087*	-0.04314	-0.07573	
0.2172	.63709*	.45528*	.47464*	-0.11557	0.12654	-0.08221	-0.0503	-0.08289	
0.21004	.62994*	.44812*	.46749*	-0.12273	0.11938	-0.08937	-0.21331	-0.24591	
0.04703	.46692*	.28511*	.30447*	-2.8575*	-0.04363	-0.25238	-0.021331	-0.24591	

¹¹² * The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 3. ANOVA, Mean Difference Axis 1; Modified Isco30; 2/2¹¹³

	Mean difference											
	physical and engin. associate	life (...) health associate	teaching associate prof.	other associate prof.	office clerks	customer services clerks	personal (...) services	models, salespers ons etc.	retired	homemaker	student	medical doctors
life science and health associate professionals	-0.19551											
teaching associate professionals	-0.01546	0.18004										
other associate professionals	-0.05829	0.13722	-0.04283									
office clerks	-0.11835	0.07716	-0.10289	-0.06006								
customer services clerks	-0.03537	0.16014	-0.0199	0.02292	0.08299							
personal and protective services workers	-.28453*	-0.08902	-0.26906	-.22624*	-.16617*	-.24916*						
models, salespersons and demonstrators	-.27129*	-0.07578	-0.25582	-.21300*	-.15293*	-.23592*	0.01324					
retired	-.53814*	-.34264*	-.52268*	-.47985*	-.41979*	-.50278*	-.25362*	-.26686*				
homemaker	-.39431*	-0.1988	-.37884*	-.33602*	-.27596*	-.35894*	-0.10978	-.12302*	.14384*			
student	0.10435	.29986*	0.11982	.16264*	.22270*	0.13972	.38888*	.37564*	.64250*	.49866*		
medical doctors	0.09719	0.2927	0.11266	0.15548	0.21555	0.13256	.38172*	.36848*	.63534*	.49150*	-0.00716	
nurses	-0.06582	0.12969	-0.05036	-0.00753	0.05253	-0.03046	0.2187	0.20546	.47232*	.32849*	-0.17018	-0.16302

¹¹³ * The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 4. ANOVA Mean Difference Axis 2; Modified Isco30; 1/2¹¹⁴

Mean Difference - Axis 2									
	military	farmers	skilled workers	manual workers	corporate managers	managers of small enter.	natural and engin prof.	teaching prof.	other prof.
farmers	-0.14868								
	-0.01321	.13547*							
	-0.05984	.08884*	-0.04663						
	-0.17196	-0.02328	-.15875*	-0.11212					
	-0.05401	0.09467	-0.0408	0.00583	0.11795				
	-0.07573	0.07294	-0.06253	-0.0159	0.09622	-0.02173			
	-.33080*	-.18212*	-.31759*	-27097*	-.15885*	-.27680*	-25507*		
	-0.17391	-0.02523	-.16070*	-.11407*	-0.00195	-0.1199	-0.09817	.15690*	
	-0.12516	0.02352	-0.11195	-0.06532	0.0468	-0.07115	-0.04943	.20564*	0.04875
	-0.20167	-0.053	-0.18847	-0.14184	-0.02972	-0.14767	-0.12594	0.12913	-0.02777
physical and engineering science associate professionals	0.11096	0.25963	0.12417	0.17079	0.28291	0.16496	0.18669	.44176*	0.28486
	-0.18397	-0.03529	-.17076*	-.12413*	-0.01201	-0.12996	-0.10824	.14683*	-0.01006
	-0.128	0.02068	-.11479*	-0.06816	0.04396	-0.07399	-0.05226	.20281*	0.04591
	-0.11963	0.02904	-0.10643	-0.0598	0.05232	-0.06563	-0.0439	.21117*	0.05427
	-0.1058	0.04288	-0.09259	-0.04596	0.06616	-0.05179	-0.03006	.22501*	0.06811
	-0.0615	0.08718	-0.04829	-0.00166	0.11046	-0.00749	0.01424	.26930*	0.11241
	-.31113*	-.16245*	-.29792*	-.25129*	-.13917*	-.25712*	-.23540*	0.01967	-.13722*
	-0.11943	0.02925	-.10622*	-.05959*	0.05253	-0.06542	-0.04369	.21137*	0.05448
	0.06533	.21400*	.07853*	.12516*	.23728*	0.11933	.14106*	.39613*	.23923*
	student	-0.28189	-0.13322	-.26869*	-.22206*	-0.10994	-.22789*	-.20616*	0.04891
-0.29345		-0.14478	-.28025*	-.23362*	-0.1215	-.23945*	-.21772*	0.03735	-0.11955

¹¹⁴ * The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 4. ANOVA Mean Difference Axis 2; Modified Isco30; 2/2¹¹⁵

	Mean difference - Axis 2											
	physical and engin. associate	life (...) health associate	teaching associate prof.	other associate prof.	office clerks	customer services clerks	personal services (...) services	models, salespers ons etc.	retired	homemak er	student	medical doctors
life science and health associate professionals	-0.07651											
teaching associate professionals	0.23612	0.31263	-0.29493									
other associate professionals	-0.05881	0.0177	-0.23895									
office clerks	-0.00284	0.07368	-0.23895	0.05597								
customer services clerks	0.00552	0.08204	-0.23059	0.06433	0.00836							
personal and protective services workers	0.01936	0.09588	-0.21675	0.07817	0.0222	0.01384						
models, salespersons and demonstrators	0.06366	0.14018	-0.17246	.12247*	0.0665	0.05814	0.0443					
retired	-.18597	-0.10946	-.42209*	-.12716*	-.18313*	-.19149*	-.20533*	-.24963*				
homemaker	0.00573	0.08225	-0.23039	0.06454	0.00857	0.00021	-0.01363	-0.05793	19.170*			
student	.19048*	.26700*	-0.04563	.24929*	.19332*	.18496*	.17112*	.12682*	.37645*	.18475*		
medical doctors	-0.15673	-0.08022	-.39285*	-0.09793	-0.1539	-0.16226	-0.1761	-.22040*	0.02924	-0.16247	-.34722*	
nurses	-0.16829	-0.09178	-.40441*	-0.10949	-0.16546	-0.17382	-0.18766	-.23196*	0.01767	-0.17403	-.35878*	-0.01156

¹¹⁵ * The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 5. Socio demographic variables across clusters

	Cluster						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
age	59	46	59	41	30	48	28
18-24	1	7	1	11	37	6	43
25-39	12	31	11	42	47	30	48
40-59	38	44	40	39	15	40	9
60+	49	18	47	8	1	23	0
age 18-24	1	7	1	11	37	6	43
age 25-34	6	18	5	27	34	20	37
age 35-44	10	20	12	25	20	16	14
age 45-54	18	22	20	19	7	23	5
age 55-64	29	23	24	14	2	19	1
age 65+	36	10	38	4	0	15	0
age 18-29	3	16	4	24	55	13	64
age 30-39	10	22	9	29	29	23	27
age 40-49	10	19	13	19	10	16	6
age 50-59	28	25	27	20	5	24	3
age 60-69	22	13	19	5	0	12	0
age 70+	26	5	29	3	0	11	0
male	34	37	48	60	52	30	69
female	66	63	52	40	48	70	31
edu degree	10	30	3	10	43	60	21
edu secondary							
voc/tech	22	33	14	27	20	20	23
edu secondary hum	10	12	4	9	26	12	19
edu vocational	34	21	34	40	5	7	20
edu primary	25	4	44	14	7	2	18
father edu degree	2	9	1	4	24	19	11
father edu							
secondary	8	24	4	13	34	31	29
father edu							
vocational	23	35	14	42	34	29	45
father edu primary	67	32	81	41	8	21	15
mother edu degree	2	8	0	3	28	22	14
mother edu							
secondary	9	28	3	15	38	34	37
mother edu							
vocational	16	24	11	34	25	16	34
mother edu primary	73	40	85	48	10	28	15
eduparmin deg	3	12	1	4	33	25	19
eduparmin 2nd	11	29	5	18	42	36	39
eduparmin voc	21	30	15	38	21	19	33
eduparmin prim	65	29	80	40	5	20	10

	Cluster						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
0 books	13	2	35	11	2	1	8
1-5 books	5	1	6	5	1	0	4
6-25 books	27	12	27	27	12	4	23
26-50 books	24	29	19	29	25	13	30
51-100 books	18	27	8	18	26	30	20
101-500 books	9	22	5	10	29	35	13
500+ books	3	7	1	1	5	17	3
0 records	58	20	73	35	16	16	17
1-20 records home	15	18	14	23	16	13	21
21-40 records home	11	20	7	19	17	14	19
41-80 records home	10	21	5	15	24	21	24
81+ records home	7	21	1	8	27	36	19
0 movies	71	39	81	50	27	35	33
movies 1-5 home	5	6	4	5	5	6	8
movies 6-25 home	18	30	10	29	28	26	33
movies 26-50 home	5	15	3	12	24	19	16
movies 51+ home	2	9	1	4	17	15	10
0 records purchased	77	43	87	65	34	30	47
records purchased 1-3	9	15	6	13	19	12	20
records purchased 4-8	7	22	5	13	22	24	18
records purchased 9+	7	20	2	9	25	34	16
0 movies purchased	86	65	93	74	43	53	62
movies purchased 1-4	8	17	4	15	24	19	19
movies purchased 5+	6	19	2	11	33	29	19
0 games purchased	90	76	93	78	63	74	64
games purchased 1-2	6	11	3	12	13	10	21
games purchased 3+	4	13	4	10	23	17	15

	Cluster						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
income HH average	2687	4025	2318	3128	4396	4536	3658
inc 0-1536 PLN	28	9	36	18	9	10	10
inc 1536-2340 PLN	24	15	27	19	15	10	19
inc 2341-3225 PLN	21	19	19	23	15	17	21
inc 3226-4532 PLN	15	26	11	24	26	23	23
inc 4532+ PLN	11	31	8	16	35	39	27
Income personal average	1213	1575	1001	1096	2152	2066	1407
inc <= 691 PLN	16	10	29	30	10	4	22
inc 692-995 PLN	22	15	27	25	10	6	19
inc 996-1309 PLN	26	19	23	19	13	15	16
inc 1310-1792 PLN	23	26	15	13	23	29	21
inc 1793 PLN	13	30	6	13	44	47	22
military	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
farmers	11	3	12	11	2	2	2
skilled workers	4	8	7	17	5	3	15
manual workers	8	10	11	18	5	4	15
legislators and senior officials	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
corporate managers	0	2	0	1	5	5	1
managers of small enterprises	0	1	0	1	3	3	3
natural and engineering science professionals	0	2	0	0	7	3	3
life science and health professionals	1	3	0	1	2	5	1
teaching professionals	0	4	0	1	5	12	2
other professionals	0	3	1	0	9	7	3
physical and engineering science associate professionals	0	2	0	1	4	2	1
life science and health associate professionals	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
teaching associate professionals	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
other associate professionals	2	8	0	4	6	6	3
office clerks	2	5	1	3	3	6	5
customer services clerks	0	1	0	0	1	1	2
personal and protective services workers	2	2	1	3	2	2	3
models, salespersons and demonstrators	2	5	1	7	3	1	4
retired	56	22	51	13	2	24	2
homemaker	10	13	14	15	8	7	8
student	0	4	1	3	25	6	25
urban	55	71	41	52	83	79	65
rural	45	29	59	48	17	21	35

